Hill v. United States, 5191.

• Decision Date: 03 November 1930
• Docket Number: No. 5191.,5191.
• Citation: 44 F.2d 889
• Parties: HILL et al. v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

44 F.2d 889 (1930)

HILL et al. v. UNITED STATES.

No. 5191.

Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.

Argued October 6, 1930.

Decided November 3, 1930.

J. S. Easby-Smith, F. W. Hill, Jr., and A. L. Newmyer, all of Washington, D. C., for appellants.

Leo A. Rover and Harold W. Orcutt, both of Washington, D. C., for the United States.

Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.

VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justice.

This appeal is from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against thirteen defendants, declaring two garages located in the city of Washington to be nuisances under the provisions of the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA), and directing the United States marshal for the District of Columbia to forthwith abate said common nuisances and "to securely lock and seal or cause to be securely locked and sealed all of the above described premises, and each and every part thereof, and including also all movable and immovable fixtures and other property upon the said premises kept and used in maintaining the said nuisance and forming a part thereof, and to cause the same to remain so locked and sealed continuously for one year subsequent to and immediately after the entry of this decree."

From the decree the defendants Hill and Sherby appealed.

It is conceded that the premises in question had been used for a long period of time for storing and distributing intoxicating liquors, and that the appellants had notice that the premises were being used for that purpose. The case, under the statute, resolves itself to the single question of whether or not the decree of the court directing the marshal to lock and seal the premises for one year can be upheld.

Section 22 of title 2 of the Prohibition Act of October 28, 1919, 41 Stat. 314 (27 USCA § 34), provides the manner in which the Attorney General, or the United States attorney, or any prosecuting attorney of any state, may bring a suit in equity to enjoin the continuance of any nuisance arising from a violation of the Prohibition Act; and, upon proof that the premises have been used for the manufacture, sale, or storage of intoxicating liquors, the court may in its discretion restrain the occupation or use of the premises for one year. Defining the authority of the court, the statute provides: "It shall not be necessary for the court to find the property involved was being unlawfully used as aforesaid at the time of the hearing, but on finding that the material allegations of the petition are true, the court shall order that no liquors shall be manufactured, sold, bartered, or stored in such room, house, building, boat, vehicle, structure, or place, or any part thereof. And upon judgment of the court ordering such nuisance to be abated, the court may order that the room, house, building, structure, boat, vehicle, or place shall not be occupied or used for one year thereafter." The statute then provides as an alternative that, instead of closing the premises, the court may permit the occupant or the owner to give bond with sufficient surety payable to the ...