Hill v. United States
| Decision Date | 13 July 1950 |
| Docket Number | No. 928.,928. |
| Citation | 75 A.2d 138 |
| Parties | HILL v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Robert I. Miller, Joseph A. McMenamin Washington, D. C., on the brief for appellant.
Martin J. McNamara, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, George Morris Fay, United States Attorney, and Joseph M. Howard, Assistant United States Attorney, all of Washington, D. C., on the brief, for appellee.
Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and HOOD and CLAGETT, Associate Judges.
On prosecution by the United States appellant was convicted in the Criminal Branch of the Municipal Court of the offense of threats. Code 1940, 22-507. The statute provides that any person convicted of threats to do bodily harm shall be required to give bond to keep the peace for a period not exceeding six months, and in default of bond may be sentenced to imprisonment not exceeding six months. Appellant was convicted April 18 and was ordered to post a peace bond of $300 or to serve 60 days. In accordance with Municipal Court, Criminal Division, rule 9(c), an appeal bond of $300 was set, but the record shows appellant did not post either the peace bond or the appeal bond and was committed to jail. The case was argued on its merits in this court June 26.
The government on June 22 filed a suggestion of mootness, stating that the sentence here involved was completed on June 18, 1950. Appellant has now filed a reply thereto.
We agree that the case has become moot. In St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 63 S.Ct. 910, 911, 87 L.Ed. 1199, petitioner had been sentenced to five months' imprisonment by the trial court for contempt. Before certiorari was granted, petitioner had fully served his sentence. The Supreme Court in refusing to consider the merits of the appeal stated:
The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the moral stigma of a judgment on a person's reputation entitles a person to appeal, stating: 1
Appellant seeks to distinguish the St. Pierre case on the ground that since that case involved a sentence for contempt the defendant could have gained his release at any time by answering questions of the grand jury. Regardless, however, of the correctness of this contention, the fact remains that in both cases a jail sentence had been completed when the case reached the appellate court and that in such circumstances the Supreme Court decided that the case had become moot. The reasoning of the Supreme Court applies exactly to the present case.
The government mentions in its suggestion of mootness that when appellant was sentenced on April 18 he was then serving a sentence imposed in another criminal case and that the judgment in the present case was not ordered to run consecutively with the prior case. Appellant in his reply brief also mentions that he was serving a sentence for another offense pending this appeal. But the record here makes no mention of any other case. In the absence of clear language to the contrary it is presumed sentences imposed on more than one offense at the same time or at different times will run concurrently.2 It may well be that appellant would not have gained his liberty even had he posted an appeal bond in the present case, but it is still true, as stated by the Supreme Court, that reversal of the judgment below can not operate to undo what has been done or restore to petitioner the penalty of the term of imprisonment which he has served. It would hardly be argued by appellant that affirmation of the judgment below would result in his serving another sentence. We are in the same position as was the Supreme Court in the St. Pierre case when it stated: "Nor has petitioner shown that under either state or federal law further penalties or disabilities can be imposed on him as a result of the judgment which has now been satisfied."
Appeal dismissed.
On Motion for Rehearing
We previously dismissed this appeal as moot because when its status was first called to our attention the sentence imposed had already been completely served by appellant. Appellant has now filed a motion for rehearing and reconsideration on the ground that such decision places this court in a position to declare any case moot in which a defendant is serving a sentence by setting a date for hearing beyond the final date served by the defendant in order to complete his sentence. We do not understand that it is even suggested that any court would pursue such a course deliberately, but we think it may be helpful to the Bar to call attention to certain of the rules of this court in...
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Butler v. District of Columbia, 3413.
...page 43, 63 S.Ct. 910, 87 L.Ed. 1199; Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 909, 4 L.Ed.2d 963 (1960). See also Hill v. United States, D.CMun.App., 75 A.2d 138 (1950). In Hanback v. District of Columbia, D. C.Mun.App., 35 A.2d 189 (1943), we held that the general principles announced in S......
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Government of the Virgin Islands v. Ferrer, 12905.
...denied 358 U.S. 942, 79 S.Ct. 349, 3 L.Ed.2d 349; City of Seldovia v. Lund, D.C.Alaska 1956, 138 F.Supp. 382; Hill v. United States, D.C.Mun.App., 1950, 75 A.2d 138. It is true that if a defendant on appeal is able to show that his conviction entails collateral legal disadvantages in the fu......
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Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Ferrer, 12,905
...den. 358 U.S. 942, 79 S. Ct. 349, 3 L. Ed. 2d 349; City of Seldovia v. Lund, D.C. Alaska 1956, 138 F. Supp. 382; Hill v. United States, D.C. Mun. App. 1950, 75 A.2d 138. It is true that if a defendant on appeal is able to show that his conviction entails collateral legal disadvantages in th......
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Tatum v. United States.
...it was conceded that appellant had served his sentence. We accordingly raised the question whether the case was moot. In Hill v. United States, D.C.Mun.App., 75 A.2d 138, we followed the ruling in St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 42, 63 S.Ct. 910, 911, 87 L.Ed. 1199, where it was s......