Hill v. US

Citation858 A.2d 435
Decision Date19 August 2004
Docket NumberNo. 02-CF-527.,02-CF-527.
PartiesJames E. HILL, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Eric K. Klein, Public Defender, with whom James Klein and Samia Fam, Public Defenders, were on the brief, for appellant.

John P. Gidez, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese III, and Glenn L. Kirschner, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before RUIZ, REID, and WASHINGTON, Associate Judges.

RUIZ, Associate Judge:

A jury convicted James E. Hill of voluntary manslaughter while armed, as a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder while armed, and related weapons offenses.1 He principally claims on appeal that the police violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination by eliciting an incriminating statement from him in the absence of Miranda2 warnings. We agree that the trial court should have suppressed the incriminating statement and therefore reverse his convictions and remand the case for a new trial. We have previously "admonished the police in this jurisdiction about `the obvious impropriety,' as well as the risk to prosecutions, in the `deliberate failure of the police to inform a criminal suspect promptly of his rights under Miranda.'" United States v. Brown, 737 A.2d 1016, 1021 n. 8 (D.C.1999)

(citing Davis v. United States, 724 A.2d 1163, 1170 (D.C.1998)). Our decision today sounds this warning again.

I.
A. The Trial

Early in the evening of October 27, 2001, appellant and his close friend, Corey Bush, had just returned from purchasing a jug of antifreeze at a local store when they discovered that a parking spot had opened near 1475 Euclid Street, N.W., where they intended to visit a friend by the name of Geoffrey Coffie. Bush and Coffie stood on the sidewalk conversing while appellant attempted to re-park Bush's car in the newly available space. Just as appellant was about to parallel park, however, a stranger, Francisco Villegas-Diaz, approached the vehicle and opened the front passenger door, said something unintelligible to appellant, slammed the car door shut, and continued to walk rapidly down the street. Appellant immediately got out of the car and pursued Villegas-Diaz yelling expletives. Bush also gave chase intending "to smoke [Villegas-Diaz] out with the [jug of] antifreeze" because he was angry that Villegas-Diaz had touched his vehicle.

By the time Villegas-Diaz reached the corner of the block, appellant and Bush were "right beside each other" seven to eight feet behind. Bush "was going toward [Villegas-Diaz] with [the] bottle of antifreeze." Villegas-Diaz turned to confront his pursuers and pulled something silver in color from his pocket. He moved forward and backward in a menacing manner and lunged toward appellant and Bush, wielding a seven- or eight-inch knife. Although appellant originally thought the weapon was a gun, the second time Villegas-Diaz lunged forward appellant saw that it was in fact a knife. As Villegas-Diaz sprung for the third time, appellant drew a gun and fired at him—three shots as Villegas-Diaz began to advance and three more times as Villegas-Diaz continued to push forward in "an overhead swimming motion," "like trying to get there to him." After the shots, Villegas-Diaz apparently remained on his feet, but stumbled backwards and began to wander away. Having expended his ammunition, and the confrontation seemingly over, appellant returned to the business of parking Bush's car. Thereafter, appellant, Bush, and Coffie went to Coffie's apartment.3

Appellant testified on his own behalf, admitting that he shot the decedent, but claiming that he did so in self-defense. He explained that he did not shoot until the decedent was advancing toward him and he thought that the decedent intended to stab him. He claimed that he could not walk away for fear that the decedent would strike from behind.

Defense witness Sabrina Hughes, a Howard University student, corroborated appellant's account. She testified that when she heard gunshots from inside her dormitory, she ran to the window and observed a gunman extend his arm toward a victim who was approximately five to six feet away but approaching the gunman. She then heard three more gunshots. The victim continued to advance toward the gunman even as the shots were fired, and seemed to be trying to gather something from the ground. After the last round of gunfire, the gunman and his companion turned the corner and disappeared from sight.

Within several minutes of the shooting, officers with the Metropolitan Police Department found Villegas-Diaz lying on the sidewalk approximately 139 feet from the corner of 15th and Euclid Streets. He was taken to the hospital where he was pronounced dead from gunshot wounds to the left upper chest and arm. The police also quickly found appellant inside Coffie's apartment, where they conducted a pat down search that yielded a .22-caliber revolver in the right front pocket of appellant's jacket.4

Having heard the foregoing evidence, the jury indicated after one day of deliberations that it was at an impasse. The trial judge encouraged the jurors to identify areas of agreement and disagreement, and suggested that the court might now allow the jury to consider the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. The jury immediately responded that it was, in fact, already deadlocked with respect to manslaughter, prompting the trial court to give the so-called Winters antideadlock instruction.5 The jurors resumed deliberations the next day and requested a written copy of the instruction. The jury rendered guilty verdicts later that day on the manslaughter while armed and weapons counts.

B. The Motion to Suppress

Appellant moved pre-trial to suppress a statement he gave to the police after he was arrested. Testimony at the suppression hearing established that shortly after the shooting and his arrest, appellant was transported to the third district police station where he was handcuffed to a chair in an interview room. At approximately 10:00 p.m., Detective Lupercio Rivera arrived at the station house and learned that appellant was in custody. He further learned that no one had yet spoken to appellant, and "instructed [that] nobody [is] to advise him of his rights until I do...." At 11:30 p.m.—approximately three and one-half hours after appellant had been taken into custody—Detective Rivera entered the interview room to offer a soda and to allow appellant to remove his sweatshirt because the interview room was hot. He later returned with a beverage, according to the detective's testimony, for the purpose of introducing himself to appellant. He was accompanied by Sergeant J.D. Manning. As recounted by Detective Rivera, the following exchange occurred before Miranda warnings were given:

[Detective]: I told him [Hill] I'm Lu Rivera, I'm the one running the show and you're going to be charged with murder II.
[Prosecutor]: And at that point, what, if anything, did the defendant do or say?
[Detective]: He asked me, how about my friend? What's up with him?
[Prosecutor]: Did you know ... who [Hill] was referring to?
[Detective]: Yes, sir.
[Prosecutor]: Who?
[Detective]: Corey Bush.
...
[Prosecutor]: And had you interacted with Corey Bush prior to coming into that interview room?
[Detective]: Yes, sir.
[Prosecutor]: And had you interviewed Mr. Bush about what had happened at 15th and Euclid earlier that night?
[Detective]: Yes, sir.
[Prosecutor]: And did he tell you?
[Detective]: Yes, sir.
[Prosecutor]: When Mr. Hill asked you about my friend, what did you say?
[Detective]: I said he's okay. Then he asked me, is he locked up?
...
[Prosecutor]: And what did you say in response to that question?
[Detective]: I said no, but let me tell you he told us what happened.
...
[Prosecutor]: What happened after you made that statement?
[Detective]: It was a brief silence and then Mr. Hill looked at me and then he said, no, I'm going to tell you what happened.
[Prosecutor]: How brief a silence, seconds, minutes?
[Detective]: Ten seconds, 15 seconds.
[Prosecutor]: And his words were?
[Detective]: No, I'm going to tell you what happened.
...
[H]e proceeded to tell me that he was driving the vehicle. He was trying to park. Some Spanish guy opened the door. They got into an argument. He got out of the car, meaning Mr. Hill, approached the Spanish guy and the Spanish guy started reaching into his waistband. There was something shiny, something silver in his waistband, and then that's when he shot the guy, parked the car and went into the apartment.
...
[Prosecutor]: About how long did that narrative last? How long did he speak?
[Detective]: Two minutes, two minutes, 15 seconds, something like that.
...
[Prosecutor]: What happened when he stopped speaking?
[Detective]: There was silence in the room. I didn't say anything and Sergeant Manning didn't say anything. There was silence for about 20 seconds and then somebody knocked on the door ... and then I left the room.

Appellant was advised of his rights at 1:30 a.m., whereupon he asked for an attorney.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress appellant's statement to the police, concluding that Detective Rivera's comments did not constitute the functional equivalent of express questioning.6 As the court reasoned, there is case law that looks at whether there is the functional equivalent of interrogation, and I believe the case you cited, that maybe the Innis case, Rhode Island versus Innis, where you talked about the police making comments to the defendant about wanting the missing child to have a decent [C]hristian burial. I believe those comments were much more designed and intended to put pressure on a suspect to make an incriminating statement, and the statement that the detective added beyond responding to the immediate question that...

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