Hill v. Walker

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas
• Writing for the Court: J. LEON HOLMES
• Decision Date: 26 April 2012
• Docket Number: NO. 5:12CV00016 JLH,5:12CV00016 JLH
• Citation: Hill v. Walker, NO. 5:12CV00016 JLH (E.D. Ark. Apr 26, 2012)
• Parties: YULANDA HILL PLAINTIFF v. CAROLYN WALKER, individually and in her official capacity as employee of the Department of Human Services DEFENDANT

YULANDA HILL PLAINTIFF

v. CAROLYN WALKER, individuallyand in her official capacity as employee of the Department of Human Services DEFENDANT

NO. 5:12CV00016 JLH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS PINE BLUFF DIVISION

Dated: April 26, 2012

OPINION AND ORDER

Yulanda Hill, a former Arkansas Department of Human Services employee, brings this action against Carolyn Walker, in her individual and official capacities, alleging various claims surrounding her termination by Walker, including violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and Hill's due process rights. Walker has moved to dismiss Hill's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court dismisses all of Hill's claims except those brought against Walker in her official capacity under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act.

I.

In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court "accept[s] as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, and review[s] the complaint to determine whether its allegations show that the pleader is entitled to relief." Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008). All reasonable inferences from the complaint must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 388 F.3d 588, 590 (8th Cir. 2004). A motion to dismiss should not be granted merely because the complaint "does not state with precision all elements that give rise to a legal basis for recovery." Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 864 (8th Cir. 1999). A complaint need only contain "'a short and plain statement of theclaim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). Stated differently, the plaintiff must "raise a right to relief above a speculative level." Schaaf, 517 F.3d at 549.

II.

The following facts are taken from Hill's complaint. On June 28, 2010, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (ADHS) hired Hill.¹ During the course of her employment with ADHS, Hill performed her job satisfactorily. At some point before May 25, 2011, Hill requested a disability accommodation from ADHS, as well as leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Hill informed various persons that she was experiencing depression, stress, anxiety, panic attacks, blood pressure problems, and blood sugar problems. Hill believed that these symptoms were disabling, and she asked to be removed from a case she was working on. The accommodation process never started, however. On May 25, 2011, Hill's doctor released her from work for "more than 5 days." Hill told supervisor Christine Thomas that the leave was because of her stress and anxiety attacks. Walker and Thomas granted Hill compensatory leave time and gave her FMLA paperwork. Soon after, however, Walker and Thomas withdrew their permission for Hill's compensatory leave and demanded that Hill return to work. Having relied upon the grant ofcompensatory leave, Hill could not return to work until June 20, 2011. When she returned, Walker terminated Hill and designated her as someone who would not be hired again by ADHS. Hill was not paid for her unused compensatory time.

III. Fair Labor Standards Act

Hill alleges that the failure to pay her for her unused compensatory leave time violated the FLSA. In her motion to dismiss, Walker acknowledges that the FLSA generally requires employees to be paid for unused compensatory time upon termination, but she argues that Hill's claim must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because Hill has pled no facts that tend to show that Walker had any responsibility over ADHS's payroll or to ensure that Hill was paid for her compensatory time. Such a responsibility belongs to ADHS, Walker asserts, which is not a party in the present action.

Hill's FLSA claim against Walker, individually, must be dismissed because her complaint fails to make any allegations to show that Walker is responsible for the fact that Hill did not get paid compensatory time. While the complaint alleges that Walker was responsible for Hill's termination, it does not state that Walker was also personally responsible for Hill's failure to get paid compensatory time. The various places in the complaint mentioning Hill's failure to be paid are either phrased in the passive voice or without a direct subject or acting party. See Complaint, Document #2, at 1 ("Walker had the ability to fire Plaintiff, which resulted in the loss of comp time due Plaintiff under the FLSA . . . ."); id. ("Plaintiff was deprived of comp time . . . ."); id. at 2 ("Plaintiff did not receive her comp time."); id. at 3 ("[T]he failure to pay Plaintiff constitutes . . . a violation of the FLSA.").² This view is bolstered by Hill's subsequent filings before the Court. In her initial response,Hill does not interact with Walker's argument; rather, she restates, word for word, the passive language from the complaint. See Document #8, at 1 ("Walker had the ability to fire Plaintiff, which resulted in the loss of comp time due Plaintiff under the FLSA . . ."). The mere fact that Walker's termination of Hill eventually resulted in Hill failing to receive payment for compensatory time from ADHS does not, by itself, make Walker the person responsible for the State's failure to pay for any compensatory time allegedly owed to Hill. Most importantly, in her response brief, Hill actually blames the State of Arkansas, not Walker, for the failure to pay. See Document #9, at 11 ("Here, the State decided, arbitrarily, to deny any compensatory time that the Plaintiff already had accrued.").

In keeping with the aforementioned response brief, Hill's claim against Walker in her official capacity is, in effect, a claim against the State of Arkansas. See Ky. v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985) ("[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity."). And an FLSA claim against the State of Arkansas is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Emps. of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, Mo. v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, Mo., 411 U.S. 279, 285, 93 S. Ct. 1614, 1618, 36 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1973) ("Congress did not lift the sovereign immunity of the states under the FLSA . . . ."); Raper v. Iowa, 115 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 1997). Thus, Hill's FLSA claim against Walker in her official capacity will be dismissed, also.

IV. Due Process

Hill brings two distinct due process claims through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, she alleges that she had a protected property interest in her compensatory time and that the failure to pay her for this time constituted a taking without due process. Second, she alleges that she was terminated in violation of ADHS policy and thus deprived of another protected property interest—her job—without due process. Walker argues that Hill has failed to state the first claim because Hill declined to take advantage of her post-deprivation remedy available through the Arkansas State Claims Commission. In addition, Walker argues, Hill has offered nothing to demonstrate that Walker was responsible for ADHS's payroll, so Walker cannot be liable for any due process violation. Hill has failed to state a claim that a property interest in her job was taken without due process, Walker contends, because Hill is an at-will employee under Arkansas law and therefore has no property interest in her position. Furthermore, Walker argues that Hill failed to plead that the procedural protections provided by the State are inadequate.

Hill's due process claim against Walker in her individual capacity for loss of compensatory time will be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for essentially the same reasons as her FLSA claim above, which is that she has not alleged any facts indicating that Walker was personally responsible for her failure to receive compensatory time from ADHS. As to Hill's compensatory time claim against Walker in her official capacity, Arkansas law provides a remedy in the form of a breach of contract claim, which Hill may pursue before the Arkansas Claims Commission. See Dover Elevator Co. v. Ark. State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 447 n.3 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 19-10-204(a)). Hill has therefore not stated a claim that her property was taken without due process of law. See Collierv. City of Springdale, 733 F.2d 1311, 1317 (8th Cir. 1984) (availability of state-law mechanisms precludes the finding of a violation of a constitutional right, privilege, or immunity).

Hill's claim that she was deprived of due process when she was discharged from her job also will be dismissed. To prevail on her claim that she was discharged from her employment without due process of law, Hill would have to establish that she had a protected property interest in her employment and that she was deprived of that interest without due process. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1491, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985). Whether an employee has a protected property interest in her employment depends on the employment contract and state law. See Eddings v. City of Hot Springs, 323 F.3d 596, 601 (8th Cir. 2003). Public employees such as Hill have protected property interests in their employment only "when there are 'contractual or statutory limitations on the employer's ability to terminate an employee,' such as a contract right to be terminated only for cause." Bennett v. Watters, 260 F.3d...