Hill v. Washburne

• Decision Date: 04 February 2020
• Docket Number: No. 18-11633,18-11633
• Citation: 953 F.3d 296
• Parties: Albert G. HILL, III, individually, and as a Beneficiary of the Margaret Hunt Trust Estate, derivatively on behalf of the Margaret Hunt Trust Estate, individually, as a beneficiary of the Haroldson Lafayette Hunt, Jr. Trust Estate, and derivatively on behalf of the Haroldson, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Heather V. WASHBURNE; Elisa M. Summers; Margaret Keliher, as Independent Executor of the Estate of Albert G. Hill, Jr., Defendants-Appellees
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

953 F.3d 296

Albert G. HILL, III, individually, and as a Beneficiary of the Margaret Hunt Trust Estate, derivatively on behalf of the Margaret Hunt Trust Estate, individually, as a beneficiary of the Haroldson Lafayette Hunt, Jr. Trust Estate, and derivatively on behalf of the Haroldson, Plaintiff-Appellant

v.Heather V. WASHBURNE; Elisa M. Summers; Margaret Keliher, as Independent Executor of the Estate of Albert G. Hill, Jr., Defendants-Appellees

No. 18-11633

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED February 4, 2020

REVISED March 13, 2020

Thomas Miles Farrell, Attorney, Charles Bedford Hampton, Esq., McGuireWoods, L.L.P., Houston, TX, Emil Lippe, Jr., Lippe & Associates, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Tom Moore Dees, III, Esq., Stewart Hyer Thomas, Attorneys, Hallett & Perrin, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellees Heather V. Washburne and Elisa M. Summers.

W. Scott Hastings, Esq., Locke Lord, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, David J. Beck, Esq., Beck Redden, L.L.P., Houston, TX, Quentin Brogdon, Crain Lewis Brogdon, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, Murray Jules Fogler, Esq., Attorney, Fogler Brar O'Neil & Gray, L.L.P., Houston, TX, Carrie L. Huff, Esq., Haynes & Boone, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, Gilbert I. Low, Orgain, Bell & Tucker, L.L.P., Beaumont, TX, Brian E. Mason, Dorsey & Whitney, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, Eric Thomas Stahl, Law Offices of Frank L. Branson, P. C., Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellee Margaret Keliher.

Before OWEN, Chief Judge, and BARKSDALE and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

STUART KYLE DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

Once again, we consider a dispute related to trusts formed by Haroldson Lafayette ("H.L.") Hunt, the late Texas oil baron reputed to be one of the world’s richest men when he died in 1974. See generally Hill v. Schilling , 495 F. App'x 480, 482 (5th Cir. 2012) (describing formation of the trusts); Hill v. Hunt , 2009 WL 5125085, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2009) (same). After "protracted [and] complicated" litigation, Hill v. Schilling , 593 F. App'x 330, 331 (5th Cir. 2014), squabbling over the trusts was supposedly ended by a settlement agreement confected in 2010. Yet, over the next four years, our court "weighed in on the settlement" four times. Id. This appeal makes it five.

The latest chapter concerns part of the settlement in which Hunt’s grandson, plaintiff-appellant Albert G. Hill III ("Hill III"), promised—in exchange for a nine-figure payment—not to contest the last will and testament of his father, Albert Hill, Jr. ("Hill Jr."). When Hill Jr. died, however, Hill III challenged the will in Texas probate court, lost, and appealed. In turn, Hill III’s sisters (Heather Washburne and Elisa Summers), defendant-appellees here,¹ asked the federal district court to enforce the settlement agreement and enjoin Hill III’s will challenges, including those in the ongoing probate court proceedings and appeal. The district court agreed, granting an injunction that, among other things, ordered Hill III to withdraw his state appeal. Hill III now appeals the injunction.

We hold that Hill III’s appeal of the injunction is, in most respects, moot. That is because, in the interim, the Texas appeals court has lost jurisdiction over Hill III’s state appeal and Hill III has withdrawn his failed will challenges in the probate court. The terms of the injunction related to those probate proceedings have thus been irrevocably fulfilled and nothing we might say about those provisions would afford Hill III any relief. His appeal is not moot, however, as to the terms in the injunction that prohibit Hill III from challenging his father’s will ever again, in any court. As to those terms, Hill III’s challenges all fail. We therefore dismiss in part and affirm in part. We also remand to allow the district court to consider whether the sisters are entitled to additional costs and fees.

I.

A.

In 2007, Hill III sued his sisters and Hill Jr. in state court. The lawsuit alleged misadministration of two trusts of which Hill III was a beneficiary. The suit was removed by consent and ultimately settled in May 2010, along with many other lawsuits concerning the Hill and Hunt families’ estates.

At issue now is the settlement agreement. See Hill , 495 F. App'x at 482–83 (discussing genesis of settlement agreement). In exchange for a nine-figure payment and other benefits, Hill III agreed "not to contest the Last Will and Testament of Al Jr. or file any additional action, lawsuit, or legal proceeding challenging the disposition of his property" (the no-contest clause). The parties further "agree[d] that the remedy of specific performance and/or injunctive relief (whether mandatory or by restraint) shall be available for the breach of any term, condition, covenant, or warranty of" the settlement agreement. The parties consented to the district court’s continuing jurisdiction over actions to enforce the settlement agreement.

In November 2010, the district court approved the settlement agreement and entered final judgment. The judgment incorporated the settlement agreement by reference and reproduced the no-contest clause in virtually identical language, ordering Hill III not to "contest the Last Will and Testament of Al Jr., or file any additional action, lawsuit, or legal proceeding challenging the disposition of Al Jr.’s property."

Despite having executed the settlement agreement that served as its basis, Hill III appealed the final judgment, challenging, among other things, its implementation of the settlement agreement on grounds not at issue here. See id. at 483, 484–85. A panel of our court affirmed. Id. at 488. Thereafter, Hill III challenged the final judgment yet again, resurrecting a previously rejected claim that the district judge should have recused himself because of a financial interest of his wife. Hill , 593 F. App'x at 332. A panel of our court again affirmed. Id. at 335.

B.

Hill Jr. died on December 2, 2017. Two versions of Hill Jr.’s putative will were produced in probate court, and while their provisions are identical, Hill III argues that "the signatures and initials on them are very different, raising serious questions about whether either version was actually signed by Al Jr." Both documents were dated December 20, 2014, and, consistent with the settlement agreement, both excluded Hill III from any benefit.

On December 22, 2017, Hill III entered the probate proceedings, challenging terms of the will that appointed executors to a number of trusts. Those challenges are not at issue here.

On May 29, 2018, Hill III’s sisters asked the district court to enjoin Hill III’s claims in probate court on the ground that they violated the no-contest clause. Hill responded with his own motion to enforce the settlement agreement and final judgment. On July 3, 2018, the district court denied all relief without prejudice, holding any relief would be "premature" because of the pending probate proceedings.

On July 13 and August 3, 2018, Hill III filed amended answers in the probate court, in which he argued that the putative will had not actually been executed by Hill Jr.; that Hill Jr. lacked capacity when the will was executed; and that Hill Jr. had subsequently revoked the putative will. Hill III also challenged the putative will’s choice of independent executor. His sisters objected to these challenges in probate court, arguing they violated the settlement agreement and final judgment. The probate court noted the objection and continued the trial.

The sisters returned to the district court, renewing their request for injunctive relief only as to the challenges to Hill Jr.’s will in the amended answers (the "will challenges"). The district court deferred ruling, as Hill III had not filed a response and the probate court had not yet ruled on the sisters’ similar objection. A few days later, the probate court sustained the sisters’ objection and held that the settlement agreement and final judgment barred the will challenges. Hill III appealed the decision to the Texas court of appeals.

C.

In light of Hill III’s appeal of the probate court’s decision, his sisters renewed in the district court their requests for injunctive relief, costs, and attorneys’ fees. The matter was fully briefed.

The district court granted the sisters an injunction on December 7, 2018. It rejected Hill III’s argument that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the injunction, holding that the injunction was "necessary in aid of [the district court’s] jurisdiction" and "to protect and effectuate" the final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The district court also noted several previous occasions on which Hill III had violated the final judgment and thus held that the injunction was authorized by the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), in order to "deter and prevent future litigation of previously decided issues by a vexatious litigant."

Next, the district court held that Hill III’s claims in probate court violated the no-contest clause. It applied Texas contract law to the clause and concluded its meaning was unambiguous. It then cited several Texas cases holding that challenges to testamentary capacity, execution, and executor appointment constitute "will contests." See , e.g. , Gunter v. Pogue , 672 S.W.2d 840, 841–43 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (testamentary incapacity and undue influence claims were "unquestionably a will contest"); Short v. Short , 468 S.W.2d 164, 165 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (attacking genuineness of signature on will was "a will contest"). The court further agreed with the sisters that principles of quasi-estoppel rendered Hill III’s challenges "inequitable."

Finally, the district court found that the remaining permanent-injunction elements were met. See , e.g. , VRC LLC v. City of Dallas , 460 F.3d 607, 611 (5th Cir. 2006) (reciting elements). It found that but for the injunction, the sisters would suffer irreparable harm because they would "not have received the benefit of their bargain under the [no-contest clause]."...