Hill v. Wheatland Waters, Inc., CIV.A. 03-2354KHV.
| Decision Date | 28 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A. 03-2354KHV.,CIV.A. 03-2354KHV. |
| Parties | Rosetta HILL, Plaintiff, v. WHEATLAND WATERS, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Frank B. W. McCollum, Stacy M. Bunck, McCollum & Parks, L.C., Kansas City, MO, for Plaintiff.
James J. Cramer, Payne & Jones, Chtd., Overland Park, KS, for Defendants.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Wheatland Waters, Inc., ("Wheatland") terminated her employment because of race and/or national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Kansas Act Against Discrimination ("KAAD"), K.S.A. § 44-1009. This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 41) filed March 31, 2004 and Plaintiff's Motion For Sanctions Against Defendant (Doc. # 47) filed May 19, 2004. For reasons stated below, the Court finds that defendant's motion should be sustained in part and that plaintiff's motion should be overruled.
The following facts are either undisputed or, where disputed, construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
Wheatland operates a bottled water business. On April 1, 2002, Connie Rishworth, its chief executive officer, hired plaintiff as the only employee in the Human Resources Department. Plaintiff's position title was "HR and Administrative." Plaintiff is a female of African-American descent. When plaintiff began work, defendant had nine employees in the "front office," including one other African-American, Frederick Banks. Banks began work at Wheatland in March of 2002, and resigned several months later, in early June of 2002.
Plaintiff's job responsibilities included completing paper work for new employees, conducting exit interviews, tracking employee reviews, processing liability and workers compensation claims, administering employee benefit programs (401K and health, life and dental insurance), tracking safety meetings and Department of Transportation logs, updating manuals, producing a monthly newsletter and implementing employee incentives.1 Plaintiff also performed administrative tasks including back-up for the front desk and support to the chief operating officer and operations manager.
In June of 2002, seven of defendant's 75 employees were African-American. That month, Rishworth determined that "due to a downward trend in overall sales and an upward trend in operating costs, a reduction in staff (and corresponding savings in labor expenses) was necessary to maintain the financial stability of the company." After meeting with upper-level managers, Rishworth decided to "eliminate positions throughout the company's hierarchy — including positions high up on the company's organizational chart." Rishworth Affidavit of March 29, 2004 at 2, Exhibit B to Defendant's Suggestions in Support Of Its Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 42) filed March 31, 2004. Rishworth decided to eliminate positions which involved duties that remaining employees could most easily absorb. Based on this plan, Rishworth decided not to fill two vacant service positions. On June 17, 2002, Rishworth also eliminated the commercial sales position of David Keibel and terminated his employment.
Although plaintiff satisfactorily performed her job, Rishworth also decided to eliminate her position and terminate her employment. In deciding to fire plaintiff rather than another office employee, Rishworth reasoned that plaintiff would not be a candidate for any other office position since her background was almost entirely in human resources. On June 18, 2002, Linda Dodson (who apparently was plaintiff's supervisor) told plaintiff that defendant was laying her off due to budget constraints and downsizing. Plaintiff did not know that management had decided to downsize, and she thought that because she was the Human Resources director, management would have discussed with her any planned reduction in force. Plaintiff asked Dodson for documentation about the downsizing, but Dodson refused. Defendant did not terminate any other employees on June 18, 2002.2
After June of 2002, Rishworth eliminated four other positions throughout the company, all of which were occupied by Caucasians: John Davis, operations manager with four years tenure, on August 1, 2002; Jason Bonewits, plant manager with two years tenure, on February 14, 2003; and Marvin Kelly, route manager with ten years tenure, on April 30, 2003. Defendant also terminated Kevin Gilliland, inventory control employee with six months tenure, on May 10, 2003.3
In its reply brief, defendant for the first time provided the dates for the foregoing terminations. See Defendant's Reply Suggestions In Support Of Summary Judgment (Doc. # 46) filed May 13, 2004, at 41.4 These dates were based on supplemental disclosures (WW170 and WW171) which defendant made on May 13, 2004, when it filed its reply brief. Under Rule 37(c)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P., plaintiff has filed a motion to strike all evidence of the termination dates of Davis, Bonewits, Kelly and Gilliland. Plaintiff asserts that defendant should have produced documentary evidence of the termination dates in response to her request for "all documents relating to the June 2002 restructuring." Plaintiff notes that even if her discovery request did not cover the supplemental disclosures, the Scheduling Order (Doc. # 10) filed October 28, 2003, required defendant to produce WW170 and WW171 as evidence supporting its position. Plaintiff asks that the Court prohibit defendant from citing the dates of the four terminations, strike all argument based on those dates, and grant plaintiff reasonable attorneys fees resulting from defendant's failure to comply with the scheduling order and failure to respond to plaintiff's discovery requests.
In seeking Rule 37 sanctions, plaintiff did not comply with the local rule which requires a certification of consultation.5 Furthermore, plaintiff herself seems to rely on WW170 and WW171 as evidence that defendant did not terminate these four employees during a reduction in force ("RIF"). The Court therefore finds that plaintiff's motion for sanctions should be overruled.
Between April and December of 2002, plaintiff hired 43 employees (including Gilliland); 39 of those employees (including Gilliland) replaced employees who had left the company and four were hired into commission-only sales positions.6 Between March of 2002 and January of 2003, defendant increased the pay of 25 employees, with raises ranging from $.26 to $.80 per hour for hourly employees and $814.00 to $6,346.00 per year for salaried employees.7 From June of 2002 to June of 2003, despite these raises, defendant reduced its bi-monthly payroll from $67,785.46 to $54,985.32. During that same period, defendant reduced the number of employees from 75 to 52.8
After it terminated plaintiff, defendant assigned her duties to four remaining employees, all of whom are Caucasian: Linda Dodson assumed many human resources duties, Cambre Sovereign assumed employee benefit duties, and Heather McMillan and Candice Rishworth assumed plaintiff's administrative duties.
On the day defendant terminated her employment, plaintiff copied and took confidential company documents (including pay history sheets and employment applications) because she thought they would help her prove that defendant had no RIF. Defendant's employee handbook provided that misusing privileged or confidential information without prior authorization justified discipline up to and including termination. At her deposition, plaintiff acknowledged that copying confidential employee information for personal use was cause for termination. She has not disclosed any information in the documents, except to her attorneys and opposing counsel. Rishworth would have fired plaintiff when she learned that plaintiff copied and removed confidential employee information for personal use. Defendant asserts that it became aware that plaintiff possessed confidential company documents on February 11, 2003, when it received plaintiff's detailed EEOC charge. On October 31, 2003, plaintiff's counsel gave defendant certain employee evaluations, job postings and job applications which plaintiff had taken. In February of 2004, plaintiff's counsel gave defendant certain employee lists with rates of pay, review dates and handwritten notes which plaintiff had also taken.
Plaintiff asserts that in terminating her employment, defendant discriminated against her on account of race and national origin in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and K.S.A. § 44-1009. The parties agree that the identical analysis applies to plaintiff's race and national origin claims under all theories of recovery. Defendant contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because (1) plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of race or national origin discrimination; (2) defendant had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff; and (3) plaintiff has no evidence that the stated reason for termination is a pretext for discrimination. Alternatively, defendant asserts that it is entitled to partial summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for back pay because it would have fired plaintiff when it learned that she had violated company policy by taking confidential records.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d 1535, 1538-39 (10th Cir.1993). A factual dispute is "material" only if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." And...
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