Hill v. Williams

• Decision Date: 28 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. 22149.,22149.
• Citation: 74 Conn.App. 654,813 A.2d 130
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Luba N. HILL v. John R. WILLIAMS et al.

813 A.2d 130

74 Conn.App. 654

Luba N. HILL v. John R. WILLIAMS et al.

No. 22149.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Submitted on briefs October 31, 2002.

Decided January 28, 2003.

SCHALLER, FLYNN and BISHOP, Js.

Luba N. Hill, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff), filed a brief.

Norman A. Pattis filed a brief for the appellee (named defendant).

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff, Luba N. Hill, representing herself, brought an action against her former attorney, John R. Williams, seeking damages based upon various legal theories.¹ The question presented by this appeal is whether in granting summary judgment the trial court properly concluded that the complaint sounded only in tort theories and not in contract and was therefore barred by the tort statutes of limitations. We reverse the judgment of the trial court in part.

The issue before the court invokes our plenary power to review the legal effect of pleadings and to review the grant of a summary judgment. See Giulietti v. Giulietti, 65 Conn.App. 813, 833, 784 A.2d 905 ("question of whether a party's claim is barred by the statute of limitations is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo"), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 946, 947, 788 A.2d 95, 96, 97 (2001); Stingone v. Elephant's Trunk Flea Market, 53 Conn.App. 725, 729, 732 A.2d 200 (1999) ("`[s]ummary judgment may be granted where the claim is barred by the statute of limitations'"); Baldwin v. Jablecki, 52 Conn.App. 379, 381, 726 A.2d 1164 (1999) ("`The interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court.'"). "Whenever [the] language [of the pleadings] fails to define clearly the issues in dispute, the court will put upon it such reasonable construction as will give effect to the pleadings in conformity with the general theory which it was intended to follow, and do substantial justice between the parties." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dietter v. Dietter, 54 Conn.App. 481, 489, 737 A.2d 926, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 906, 743 A.2d 617 (1999). "[I]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of pro se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Macricostas v. Kovacs, 67 Conn.App. 130, 133, 787 A.2d 64 (2001). "The modern trend, which is followed in Connecticut, is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beaudoin v. Town Oil Co., 207 Conn. 575, 587-88, 542 A.2d 1124 (1988).

On March 23, 1999, the plaintiff commenced the present action. Her complaint contains a variety of allegations that sound in tort.² The preamble of the complaint also states that this case "is filed as a breach of contract" between the plaintiff and the defendant. The defendant first moved for summary judgment on April 19, 2000. The defendant's counsel was not able to attend the first hearing on his motion, which the court denied on May 8, 2000. Almost ten months after that denial, on February 22, 2001, the defendant filed another motion for summary judgment. Neither party filed affidavits supporting or opposing the motion.³ The court held a hearing and, on May 31, 2001, granted the defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment.

The plaintiff first claims that the court's denial of the motion for summary judgment on May 8, 2000, prohibited the defendant from subsequently filing an essentially identical motion. There is no dispute that the defendant's counsel was not able to attend the hearing to argue the first motion for summary judgment. The court noted in its memorandum of decision that the defendant simply refiled the motion for summary judgment that had been denied previously but stated that the earlier motion had been denied "without prejudice and [the] court expressly provided that the defendant could file a new motion for summary judgment."

"[A]lthough a judge should not lightly depart from a prior ruling on a motion before the same or a different judge, the prior ruling is not binding." Barnes v. Schlein, 192 Conn. 732, 734, 473 A.2d 1221 (1984); see also Wagner v. Clark Equipment Co., 259 Conn. 114, 130-31, 788 A.2d 83 (2002). We must bear in mind that where there have been different decisions on the same point of law, "the important question is not whether there was a difference but which view was right." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barnes v. Schlein, supra, 734, 473 A.2d 1221. In light of the circumstances of this case, where the court denied the initial motion "without prejudice," we conclude that the court acted properly in reconsidering the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

The plaintiff's second claim calls on us to conclude that the court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant because the complaint contained the statement: "This lawsuit is filed as a breach of contract between John Williams and his client, the plaintiff." If the complaint sounds in breach of contract, the six year statute of limitations provided by General Statutes § 52-576 is applicable. However, if the complaint merely pleads legal malpractice or other claims sounding in tort, the applicable statutes of limitations would be at most three years, and, by virtue of the dates it sets out, the complaint would be time barred. See General Statutes §§ 52-577 and 52-584.⁴

The plaintiff's causes of action for the most part are intentional torts governed by § 52-577, resulting in a statute of limitations of "three years from the date of the act or omission complained of." General Statutes § 52-577. The plaintiff's claims of negligence and reckless, wanton or wilful misconduct are governed by § 525-84, which provides that the cause of action must be brought within two years "from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of...." General Statutes § 52-584.

Viewing all of the events pleaded by the plaintiff in her complaint in the light most favorable to her; see LaFlamme v. Dallessio, 261 Conn. 247, 262, 802 A.2d 63 (2002); we note that all of the alleged tortious misconduct took place while the defendant was representing the plaintiff. That relationship ended on February 6, 1995. The plaintiff commenced her action on March 23, 1999, more than four years after discharging the defendant and, therefore, more than four years after any such tortious conduct could have occurred. The plaintiff's causes of action that sound in tort are, therefore, time barred by the application of §§ 52-577 and 52-584.

The plaintiff argues, however, that her complaint also alleges a breach of contract and, therefore, § 52-576 provides the appropriate statute of limitations.⁵ We agree with the plaintiff. Although not artfully pleaded, parts of her complaint sound in breach of contract.⁶

Our Supreme Court has recognized that not all claims against an attorney are necessarily actions in tort. See Stowe v. Smith, 184 Conn. 194, 198-99, 441 A.2d 81 (1981); Robbins v. McGuinness, 178 Conn. 258, 261-62, 423 A.2d 897 (1979). In the present case, the complaint goes beyond being merely "couched in the language of tort...." Shuster v. Buckley, 5 Conn.App. 473, 478, 500 A.2d 240 (1985).

The plaintiff, in her complaint, describes the matters for which the defendant was hired and the dates on which the parties created the relevant agreements. Specifically, on March 27, 1993, the defendant agreed "to represent the plaintiff in a civil action against her exhusband." On April 14, 1993, the defendant agreed "to represent the plaintiff in her family case to appeal her divorce, obtain accurate support and obtain sole custody of the Hill children." And finally, on May 3, 1993, the defendant agreed "to represent the plaintiff in her legal malpractice suit against her [former] divorce attorney." The plaintiff then describes her complaint as a "breach of contract lawsuit."

At several points in the complaint, the plaintiff refers not only to the defendant's failure to proceed in several actions, but also to the defendant's refusals to take certain actions in furtherance of the matters for which the defendant had been hired. The New College Edition of the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1981) defines the word "refuse" as "to decline to do." It goes on to state: "Refuse is used of a positive, unyielding, sometimes brusque decision not to act, accept, or do something."

Use of the word "refuse" imports an intentional act rather than some inadvertence or negligent act or omission on the part of the defendant in breach of the agreements between the parties. For example, after describing the complaint as a "breach of contract lawsuit" in the preamble, the twenty-fourth count (incorporating language from a previous count) alleges that the defendant "refused to file [the] correct motion to obtain correct support" and "refused to schedule hearings ... to obtain correct support," actions which would appear to be required of him under the alleged April 14, 1993 agreement. This count and several others allege that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for his "breach of duty." The court implicitly treated this language as meaning only the duty of reasonable care considered in negligence cases. However, a duty also may arise pursuant to a contract such as allegedly existed in this case.⁷ Moreover, the same course of conduct may sound both in tort and in contract; see 57A Am.Jur.2d, Negligence §§ 119-25 (1989); and the court should apply the relevant statute of limitations to each claim.

The allegations described apply to a breach of contract claim. We, therefore, disagree with the court's holding that the plaintiff's complaint "failed ... to include any counts...