Hillard v. State

• Citation: 40 Md.App. 600,392 A.2d 1181
• Decision Date: 03 November 1978
• Docket Number: No. 209,209
• Parties: Samuel (NMN) HILLARD v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 600

40 Md.App. 600

392 A.2d 1181

Samuel (NMN) HILLARD v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 209.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 3, 1978.

Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender and Bradford C. Peabody, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Alice G. Pinderhughes, Asst. Atty. Gen., Arthur A. Marshall, Jr., State's Atty., for Prince George's County and F. Anthony McCarthy, Asst. State's Atty., for Prince George's County, for appellee.

Submitted to MORTON, MOORE and WILNER, JJ.

WILNER, Judge.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether a statement given by appellant while in police custody was prompted by an improper inducement offered by the interrogating officer. Claiming that it was, appellant urges that the Circuit Court for Prince George's County erred in admitting the statement into evidence. We disagree with appellant and shall therefore affirm the judgment against him.

Some factual background is necessary to a proper consideration of the issue raised by appellant. On the morning of April 8, 1977, appellant, along with three other men Russell Campbell, Carroll Harrison, and James Herbert drove to the home of one Warren Womack. Harrison and Campbell entered the house, shot Womack and robbed him of both money and heroin. Womack's 13-year old son was present in the house at the time, and to prevent him from being a witness, Campbell shot and killed the child. ¹

Campbell and Harrison then returned to the car where appellant and Herbert had been waiting for them, and all four drove to appellant's house where the heroin was divided.

Appellant was arrested in the District of Columbia during the afternoon of April 14, 1977, and taken to the police station in that jurisdiction. At his request, Ronald Tucker, his attorney, was called. At some point, upon the advice of counsel, appellant waived extradition, and was taken to a police station in Prince George's County. Some time later, the attorney (Tucker) came to the police station where he conferred with both appellant and Detective Earl Jones. Appellant was then questioned in Tucker's presence by Jones and, upon counsel's advice, appellant gave an oral statement which was reduced to writing and signed by both appellant and his attorney. In this statement, appellant admitted receiving Herbert at his home in the early morning hours of April 8, 1977, for the purpose of going to Warren Womack's house to purchase narcotics. He also admitted giving Herbert a pistol but denied any knowledge that Campbell or Harrison planned to shoot Womack.

Subsequently, appellant, together with Campbell, Harrison, and Herbert, was charged in a nine-count indictment with the murder of the child, various degrees of assault upon Womack, robbery, larceny, unlawful possession of a handgun, and unlawful use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. Appellant was ultimately convicted of but one of these counts unlawful use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence for which he was sentenced to a term of 10 years in prison. It is that conviction from which this appeal arises. ²

Prior to trial, appellant, then represented by different counsel, moved to suppress the statement given by him on the grounds that appellant's former counsel, who advised him to make the statement, was incompetent, that appellant did not effectively waive his right to remain silent, and that "undue influence, including coercion, misrepresentation and improper inducement were used to obtain" the statement. As noted earlier, the only contention, among these, presented in this appeal is whether an improper inducement was offered by Detective Jones.

Two evidentiary hearings were held on appellant's motion to suppress. At the first hearing, held on July 22, 1977, appellant testified that, while detained at the District of Columbia police station, he was questioned without being advised of his "rights", that Detective Jones told him that he (Jones) "had some influence over the Court", that if appellant made a statement "he would go to bat for me, and that he would make sure I get a reasonable bond that I could meet, and if I had to go to trial that he would testify favorably in my behalf." Additionally, appellant claimed that he was threatened that if he did not make a statement, "he just give me the murder charge for myself." Notwithstanding all of this, and the alleged refusal of the police to permit appellant to contact an attorney, he made no statement at that time.

Some time later, according to appellant, he consulted with Mr. Tucker, and, upon Tucker's advice, waived extradition and was taken to the Forestville police station in Prince George's County. Here, he claims, Detective Jones continued to question him, in the absence of counsel, "off and on for about four hours", notwithstanding that appellant was then suffering from "withdrawal" from heroin. Jones allegedly repeated his promise to "go to bat" for appellant, to "make sure" that he got a reasonable bond, to testify in his behalf, and indeed, if he caught the other codefendants and they corroborated appellant's story, "he would cut me loose." After all of this, appellant consulted with Mr. Tucker, and, upon Tucker's advice, made a statement.

Detective Jones, as might be expected, gave an entirely different account. He said that he refrained from questioning appellant for some 31/2 hours in order that Mr. Tucker could be present, and that all questioning took place in Tucker's presence. He specifically denied making any promises, threats, or inducements, and he denied as well that appellant was under the influence of any drugs, or in any pain. Throughout the interrogation, appellant was able to confer with Mr. Tucker, and, from time to time, the questioning was halted for that purpose. With respect to appellant's claim of inducement, Jones stated:

"Mr. Tucker was told at that time that he was fully aware that I had nothing to say in matters like that, that he was aware he would have to go to the State's Attorney's Office for any consideration, that I had nothing to do with that. And he stated that he understood that, as a member of the Bar."

As to the alleged threat to let appellant take the murder "rap" alone, Jones stated that he had told both appellant and his attorney that he didn't need a statement from appellant "basically because I already knew what had occurred." In corroboration of Detective Jones' version of the events, the State offered into evidence a written statement, signed by both appellant and Tucker, showing that appellant was advised of his various Miranda "rights", and that he waived the same. Typed into this printed form is the additional statement: "My lawyer's name is Mr. Ronald Tucker and he is present in the room at this time. My. lawyer, Mr. TUCKER, has advised me to make a statement." Included in the "waiver of rights" signed by appellant is the statement, "No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me." Also offered in support of Detective Jones was the actual statement given by appellant the subject of the suppression motion. This was in the form of a seven page written transcript of questions and answers, each page being signed by appellant and witnessed either by Mr. Tucker or Detective Jones.

Upon this record, and in obvious disbelief of appellant's story, the court denied the motion to suppress.

Some two weeks later, appellant renewed his motion to suppress and requested a De novo hearing thereon, alleging that three witnesses, not known at the time of the earlier hearing, were available to testify to promises made by the police to induce appellant to make his statement. Upon this motion, the court held a De novo Hearing immediately prior to the commencement of trial.

The second hearing commenced with Detective Jones again denying that any promises or threats were made, despite the persistence of Mr. Tucker in attempting to extract inducements. Appellant reiterated his story of the various promises allegedly made to secure a low bail, to "go to bat" for him, and ultimately to "cut him loose". Tucker supported appellant to the extent of indicating that Jones had said that, although he didn't need a statement from appellant, if appellant was truthful, he would "go to bat" for him. By this, he explained that Jones could make no promise directly, but he would convey to the State's Attorney's Office and would ultimately testify in court that appellant had been cooperative. Tucker's version was corroborated to some degree by his partner, Albert Preston, and by a paralegal who claimed to be present at the crucial interrogation.

Upon this evidence, the court again denied the motion. Disbelieving most of appellant's testimony, the court concluded:

"Everybody seems to agree that the main thrust of all the discussions between Jones, his lawyer who was present and the defendant, was that Jones would go to bat for this defendant if what the defendant told him, number one, turned out to be true, not only would he go to bat Indicating that the man maybe should be put on bond and not how much. Since this was a murder charge, neither Jones nor the...