Hillcrest Homeowners Ass'n v. Wiley
| Decision Date | 31 August 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-23,89-23 |
| Citation | 239 Mont. 54,778 P.2d 421 |
| Parties | HILLCREST HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, a Montana corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. A.G. WILEY and Kanchana Wiley, Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Thomas R. Bostock, Warden, Christiansen, Johnson and Berg, Kalispell, for plaintiff and appellant.
H. James Oleson, Oleson Law Firm, Kalispell, for defendants and respondents.
Plaintiff, the Hillcrest Homeowners Association, filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, alleging that the defendants, A.G. Wiley and Kanchana Wiley, now deceased, violated a restrictive covenant by building a garage on their lot in Hillcrest Estates subdivision, Flathead County. The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse and remand.
Hillcrest Estates is a residential subdivision located in Flathead County. In 1969, the owners of Hillcrest Estates adopted restrictive covenants that were then duly recorded in the Clerk and Recorder's office in Flathead County. These covenants provide in pertinent part:
RESIDENTIAL AREA COVENANTS.
1. LAND USE AND BUILDING TYPE. No lot shall be used except for single family residential purposes, only one residence per lot and no lot shall be subdivided.
2. IMPROVEMENTS. (a) All homes must be of new construction and have a minimum of 1600 square feet of living area on the ground level.
(b) Exterior of improvements must be completed within one year after start of construction.
(c) No temporary buildings of any nature will be allowed during or after construction, including trailer homes.
In 1979, A.G. Wiley and Kanchana Wiley purchased lot 3 in the Hillcrest Estates subdivision. In late 1980, or early 1981, they completed construction of a steel sided garage on their property. The Wileys built this garage as part of their original plan to build a single family residence with a detached garage. Kanchana Wiley died in May, 1983, and the actual residence was never built. A.G. Wiley eventually moved to Utah.
In April, 1987, the Hillcrest Homeowners Association filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, alleging that the garage violated the restrictive covenants. The Hillcrest Homeowners Association appeal the District Court's finding, which stated that the garage built on lot 3 is permanent, complete, and does not violate the restrictive covenants.
The only issue Hillcrest raises on appeal is whether the District Court erred in determining that the garage did not violate the restrictive covenants.
Hillcrest argues that the garage violates the "residential purposes" language of the restrictive covenant. In particular, Hillcrest argues that while a garage, in conjunction with a residence, is consistent with "residential purposes," a garage by itself, absent the development of a residence, is not consistent with "residential purposes." Hillcrest therefore argues that the Wileys violated the restrictive covenant that is applicable to the Hillcrest Estates. We agree.
Restrictive covenants are generally valid "if they tend to maintain or enhance the character of a particular residential subdivision." Town & Country Estates Ass'n (Mont.1987), 740 P.2d 668, 671, 44 St.Rep. 1257, 1260. When interpreting a restrictive covenant, this Court applies the same rules as those applicable to contract interpretation. Gosnay v. Big Sky Owners Ass'n (1983), 205 Mont. 221, 227, 666 P.2d 1247, 1250. Therefore, this Court must, if reasonably practical, read the restrictive covenant as a whole so as to give meaning to every part of the covenant. See § 28-3-202, MCA. In addition, the language of the covenant is to be understood in its ordinary and popular sense, see § 28-3-501, MCA, and the language will govern the covenant's interpretation when the words are plain and unambiguous. Gosnay, 205 Mont. at 227, 666 P.2d at 1250.
When interpreting the covenant in this case, this Court must ascertain the meaning of "residential...
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...Subdivision. ¶16 We employ principles of contract law when interpreting covenants. 510 P.3d 1213 Hillcrest Homeowners Ass'n v. Wiley , 239 Mont. 54, 56, 778 P.2d 421, 422 (1989) ("When interpreting a restrictive covenant, this Court applies the same rules as those applicable to contract int......
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