Hiller v. Farmington Police Dep't
| Decision Date | 31 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | 3:12 - CV- 1139 (CSH) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | RICHARD M. HILLER, Plaintiff, v. FARMINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, Individually; OFFICER JOANNE M. BLUMMETTI, Individually; and RACHAEL SIBLEY, Individually, Defendants. |
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Richard M. Hiller brings this action pro se, seeking recovery for damages resulting from a motor vehicle incident with individual defendant Rachael Sibley on August 16, 2009 and the subsequent actions of the Farmington Police Department ("FPD") on that date. In his Complaint, Hiller includes civil rights claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against FPD Officer Joanne M. Blummetti and the FPD; a variety of state law claims against Sibley for "speeding" and "reckless driving;" intentional infliction of emotional distress against Blummetti and the FPD; and negligence claims against Blummetti and Sibley.1 Due to his § 1983 federal statutory claims, Plaintiff asserts that this Court has "federal question" subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3). Doc. 1, ¶ 2.
The Court has previously recounted the facts of this case in its Order entered on March 13, 2014 [Doc. 8], reported at 2014 WL 992790, familiarity with which is assumed. In short, Plaintiff alleges that on August 16, 2009, at approximately 11:30 a.m., while he and his brother were riding their motorcycles on Routes 84 West and 4 in Farmington, Connecticut, defendant Sibley drove past them in a Black Honda, passing them on the right hand side. Doc. 1, ¶¶ 9-12. In passing the two motorcycles, Sibley allegedly forced the motorcycles into the left lane, "almost kill[ing] both Plaintiff Hiller and his brother Robert Hiller by her reckless driving." Id., ¶¶ 10- 14. Sibley then allegedly "took off at a speed of 90 MPH." Id., ¶ 14.
Plaintiff further alleges that he immediately pursued Sibley's vehicle to obtain her "vehicle plate number in order to place a police complaint for reckless driving." Id., ¶ 15. Because Sibley allegedly drove above the speed limit, Plaintiff claims he was forced to ride his motorcycle above the speed limit to "catch up to [her] at the traffic signal." Id., ¶¶ 15- 16. Upon reaching Sibley at a traffic intersection, Plaintiff engaged in a confrontation with Sibley as she climbed from her vehicle to face him. Plaintiff admittedly "screamed," allowing as Shakespeare might say, "the blast of war [to] blow in [her] ears" with the heated inquiry of whether "she was drunk or on drugs."2 Id. Sibley then allegedly waived her "clenched fist" at Plaintiff with fury, prompting him to reply in raised voice, "You almost killed us[!]" Id., ¶ 17. After additional skirmishing, the traffic light changed from red to green, and Plaintiff departed the scene. Id., ¶¶ 18-19.
Later that day, Sibley contacted the FPD to make a complaint against Plaintiff for his conduct during the incident. Plaintiff alleges that Officer Blummetti "favored Defendant Sibleybecause she was the first to call the FPD." Id., ¶ 25.
Just before 3:00 p.m., Blummetti phoned Plaintiff at his home to instruct him to visit the FPD to collect a summons that had been issued against him.3 Shortly thereafter, a state trooper appeared at Plaintiff's door, further reinforcing the instruction to appear at the FPD to collect the summons. Id., ¶ 20.
Plaintiff and his brother responded by phoning the FPD to offer statements about the Sibley incident to Officer Blummetti. Id., ¶ 21. Plaintiff alleges that at that time, Blummetti "threatened [him with arrest] if he did not visit the FPD to collect the summons served on him." Id., ¶ 22. Blummetti also allegedly asked an "irrelevant question if Plaintiff Hiller grew up with a bunch of Hillers she knew in Tolland County," people with whom Plaintiff believes Blummetti had "some past incident." Id., ¶¶ 23- 24. Plaintiff asserts that Blummetti failed to "conduct a professional, non[-]emotional interview" and "showed no concern" that Plaintiff and his brother "were almost killed by Defendant Sibley." Id., ¶ 35. Plaintiff further alleges that the FPD failed to adequately train Blummetti regarding interrogation methods and condoned her "indiscriminate acts causing constitutional violations to be perpetrated against [him]." Id., ¶¶ 38-39.
Finally, at around 4:30 pm, Plaintiff reluctantly appeared at the FPD to file his own complaint regarding Sibley with a second shift police officer.4 Id., ¶ 32; see also id., p. 23 ("Statement ofRichard Hiller" to Officer K. Vincent). By that time, Blummetti's shift had ended and, as she had indicated on the phone, she would "not be there" and was "not going to wait." Id., ¶ 29. Plaintiff thus alleges his complaint regarding Sibley was largely "ignored by Defendant Officer Blummetti." Id., ¶ 34. Rather than conducting a formal investigation of the incident, Blummetti merely gave Sibley "an oral warning for travelling [sic] at a high speed rate on the highway and let her go." Id., ¶ 33. Moreover, Hiller specifically faults Blummetti for failing to examine the "Black Box" recording of driving data in Sibley's Honda, conduct a sobriety test on Sibley, and "check [Sibley's] mobile phone" to see if she was "texting . . . while driving." Id., ¶¶ 30, 34, 36-37, 54.
II. DISCUSSION
Pending before the Court is Blummetti's and FPD's joint "Motion to Dismiss" [Doc. 16] Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules 12(b)(2), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6) of Civil Procedure. Specifically, FPD and Blummetti (herein collectively "Defendants") argue the following eight grounds for dismissal: insufficient service of process; lack of personal jurisdiction; failure to state a claim (as to Counts I, II, and III under § 1983); qualified immunity of Blummetti (as to Plaintiff's first three counts, under § 1983); statute of limitations as to Plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence (Counts V and VII); Connecticut General Statute § 52-557n(a)(2) as a bar to Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against the FPD (Count V); failure to state a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Count V; and the doctrine of governmental immunity as a bar to Plaintiff's negligence claim in Count VII.
Despite the expiration of the prescribed period to object to Defendants' motion, Plaintiff hasfiled no responsive papers. See D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(a)(1) (). In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court does not interpret Plaintiff's failure to respond as consent to the motion and will determine whether "the pleadings provide sufficient grounds to deny the motion." Id.
In addition, the Court notes that Defendants' first argument for dismissal is jurisdictional - lack of personal jurisdiction. In general, jurisdictional challenges must be addressed before assessing the viability of particular claims because, for example, in the absence of personal jurisdiction and/or a waiver thereof by Defendants, the action may not proceed against Defendants.5 The Court will thus commence its analysis by considering Defendants' jurisdictional challenge.
Defendants' first argument for dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint is that Hiller failed to effect proper service upon them and, therefore, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. Specifically, Defendants claim that Plaintiff never properly served either Officer Blummetti or the FPD with the Complaint. In the absence of proper service, a district court lacks personal jurisdictionover those defendants not properly served. Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 59 (2d Cir. 2012). In addition, "there must be a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction that renders such service of process effective." Id. "The available statutory bases in federal courts are enumerated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)," which provides that "[s]erving a summons . . . establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant . . . who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located." 673 F.3d at 59-60 (). The Court must look to Connecticut law, as well as to the Federal Rules, in determining whether personal jurisdiction may be exercised with respect to Defendants.
"Under Rule 12(b)(5), [Fed. R. Civ. P.,] a party may file a motion to dismiss due to insufficiency of service of process." Rzayeva v. United States, 492 F.Supp.2d 60, 74 (D.Conn.2007). "A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) must be granted if the plaintiff fails to serve a copy of the summons and complaint on the defendants pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure], which sets forth the federal requirements for service." Id. (citing Cole v. Aetna Life & Cas., 70 F.Supp.2d 106, 110 (D.Conn.1999)). "Once validity of service has been challenged, it becomes the plaintiff's burden to prove that service of process was adequate." Rzayeva, 492 F.Supp.2d at 74 (citing Cole, 70 F.Supp.2d at 110).
In particular, pursuant to Rule 4(c), Fed. R. Civ. P., "[a] summons must be served with a copy of the complaint" and "[t]he plaintiff is responsible for having the summons and complaint served within the time allowed by Rule 4(m)," i.e., "within 120 days after the complaint is filed." Moreover, under Rule 4(e), Fed. R. Civ. P., the means of serving an individual from whom a waiver of servicehas not been obtained, include "delivering a...
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...v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Hiller v. Farmington Police Dep't, No. 12-CV-1139, 2015 WL 4619624, at *7 (D. Conn. July 31, 2015) (noting that the dismissal of a pro se complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is not appropriate "unles......