Hiller v. Runyon

Decision Date13 April 2000
Docket NumberNo. 1-98-CV-90017.,1-98-CV-90017.
Citation95 F.Supp.2d 1016
PartiesJeff HILLER, Plaintiff, v. Marvin T. RUNYON, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

Bruce Green, Council Bluffs, IA, for plaintiff.

William C. Purdy, Assistant United States Attorney, Des Moines, IA, for defendant.

AMENDED AND SUBSTITUTED ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PRATT, District Judge.

Now before the Court is Defendant Marvin Runyon's Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff Jeff Hiller's action alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991 ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"). Plaintiff resisted the Motion and Defendant filed a reply brief; this matter is considered fully submitted.

I. Statement of Facts1

Plaintiff Jeff R. Hiller ("Hiller") has been employed as a city mail carrier by the Council Bluffs, Iowa branch of the United States Postal Service ("CBPO") since November, 1978. Hiller is a 47-year-old male, and has been married for 13 years. He and his wife have no children. Defendant Marvin Runyon ("Runyon") was the Postmaster of the CBPO at the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit.

In December of 1996, Hiller's right testicle began to swell, causing him severe back and leg pain, and making it difficult for him to carry mail. In January, 1997, he saw his family physician, Dr. K. Neil Sheppard, who performed an ultrasound in response to Hiller's complaints of acute swelling and pain in his right testicle. Because of the ultrasound's results, Dr. Sheppard referred Hiller to Dr. John Horgan, a urologist. After testing and exploratory surgery, Dr. Horgan determined Hiller's right testicle was cancerous and removed it. Hiller agreed to the surgery even though his other testicle was atrophic, and his ability to father children would be substantially limited. After the surgery, Hiller remained hospitalized for a time. After Hiller's release from the hospital, he had continued complaints of discomfort in his right groin area, particularly when changing positions and lifting. Oncologist Dr. Thomas M. Schmitz administered 20 radiation treatments to him between February 24, 1997 and March 21, 1997. Hiller's side effects from this treatment included nausea, vomiting, low blood counts and extreme fatigue.

Following his surgery and during his radiation therapy, Hiller was unable to work or perform activities such as walking, and engaging in sexual relations. Hiller continued to suffer from fatigue and nausea through April 7, 1997, after which date he returned to work.

Before Hiller returned to work, his wife notified Sam Gonzales, the CBPO Postmaster, of Hiller's condition. Hiller also informed his immediate supervisor, Mark Thompson ("Thompson"), of his cancerous condition, the removal of his right testicle, and the fatigue and nausea that the radiation treatments were causing him. On or about April 21, 1997, Dr. Schmitz released Hiller to a standard 40-hour workweek and eight hour workday.

After Hiller returned to work, he was able to "case," or sort, mail at the standard rate of 18 pieces of mail per minute, 8 flats per minute, and work eight hours a day. However, he was often unable to complete his daily route in 8 hours and frequently asked Thompson for assistance. In May, 1997, Thompson began accusing Hiller, on an almost daily basis, of being unable to perform his job. Thompson also told Hiller, almost daily, that he (Hiller) had an eight hour route. This was contradicted by route inspections conducted by the CBPO later in 1997, which confirmed that Hiller's route took, on average, 8 hours and 47 minutes to complete. Furthermore, Thompson repeatedly told Hiller that he was "unproductive" and "could not perform." Hiller interpreted these statements as evidence of Thompson's bias against persons with testicular cancer and, in particular, persons who have lost a testicle and who have difficulties procreating. On or about April 23, 1997, Hiller presented Thompson with a copy of the ADA and asked Thompson to stop harassing him. Thompson responded that he was unfamiliar with the ADA.

From about May 12 to May 28, 1997, Hiller was restricted to six hours per day by Dr. Sheppard, who was concerned that the pain Hiller was experiencing was related to his ongoing medical condition. During this week, Thompson and Gonzales required Hiller to report to work at 9:00 a.m., rather than his usual reporting time of 7:00 a.m. They also did not allow him to "case," or sort, his mail before beginning his route, instead having other workers case his route.

Casing is a less strenuous task which can be performed seated. By requiring Hiller to report at 9:00 a.m., and additionally not allowing him to case his mail before the route, Hiller had to perform the more strenuous route work for the full six hour day, unlike typical full-time, non-injured letter carriers, who on average cased mail for 2.5 hours and worked on their routes for 5.5 hours per day.

By May 28, 1997, Hiller had returned to working a standard 8-hour day, yet Thompson continued to harass him on a near-daily basis, accusing him of being "unproductive" and "unable to perform." On June 4, Hiller contacted the Postal Service Equal Employment Opportunity counselor. Thereafter, Thompson's harassment continued, until this suit was filed in May 1998.

Thompson was a combative manager, often criticizing and verbally challenging workers. In particular, he criticized older workers and Hiller more than others. The CBPO, through supervisor Peter Book, also attempted to prevent Hiller from attending his EEO counseling session on July 25, 1997, by wrongfully telling the counselor Hiller was absent without leave, even though Book had earlier permitted Hiller to go to the session. Book admitted later to Hiller he did not want him to go to the session. Hiller was not credited with the time considered absent without leave until September, 1997. Additionally, Book stated at one point that the CBPO would be better off if the older workers were gone. Finally, Thompson made it difficult for Hiller to request assistance on his route, and harassed him when he did so, often denying Hiller's request, only to later provide assistance. He also made it difficult for Hiller to make a request by not allowing Hiller to get an idea of mail volume before requesting assistance on his route. The harassment of Hiller distressed him, and he began treatment for depression.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

"[S]ummary judgment is an extreme remedy, and one which is not to be granted unless the movant has established his right to a judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and that the other party is not entitled to recover under any discernible circumstances." Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chemical Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 209 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing Windsor v. Bethesda Gen. Hosp., 523 F.2d 891, 893 n. 5 (8th Cir. 1975)). The purpose of the rule is not "to cut litigants off from their right of trial by jury if they really have issues to try," Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (quoting Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627, 64 S.Ct. 724, 88 L.Ed. 967 (1944)), but to avoid "useless, expensive and time-consuming trials where there is actually no genuine, factual issue remaining to be tried," Anderson v. Viking Pump Div., Houdaille Indus., Inc., 545 F.2d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing Lyons v. Board of Educ., 523 F.2d 340, 347 (8th Cir.1975)).

The plain language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment is properly granted when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Harlston, 37 F.3d at 382. The Court does not weigh the evidence nor make credibility determinations; rather the Court only determines whether there are any disputed issues and, if so, whether those issues are both genuine and material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact based on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Once the moving party has carried its burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by affidavits or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An issue is "genuine," if the evidence is sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Because discrimination cases often depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence, summary judgment should not be granted unless the evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the nonmovant. Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir.1994) (citations omitted). This is because defendants of even minimal sophistication will neither admit discriminatory animus nor leave a paper trail demonstrating it. Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1103 (8th Cir.1988) (citation...

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