Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co.

• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: BECTON
• Citation: Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 282 S.E.2d 828, 54 N.C.App. 173 (N.C. App. 1981)
• Decision Date: 06 October 1981
• Docket Number: No. 8110IC80,8110IC80
• Parties: Charles W. HILLIARD, Employee, Plaintiff, v. APEX CABINET COMPANY, Employer, Defendant, and American Mutual Liability Company, Carrier, Defendant.

Page 828

282 S.E.2d 828

54 N.C.App. 173

Charles W. HILLIARD, Employee, Plaintiff, v. APEX CABINET COMPANY, Employer, Defendant, and American Mutual Liability Company, Carrier, Defendant.

No. 8110IC80.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Oct. 6, 1981.

McCain & Moore by Grover C. McCain, Jr., Durham, for plaintiff-appellant.

Teague, Campbell, Conely & Dennis by George W. Dennis, III, and Jeffrey L. Jenkins, Raleigh, for defendants-appellees.

BECTON, Judge.

The scope of review of Workers' Compensation awards made by the Industrial Commission is limited (1) to a determination of whether the Commission's findings of fact are supported by any competent evidence, and (2) to a determination of whether the Commission's findings of fact support its conclusions of law. Barham v. Food World, 300 N.C. 329, 266 S.E.2d 676 (1980); Buck v Proctor & Gamble, --- N.C.App. ---, 278 S.E.2d 268 (1981); Walston v. Burlington Industries, 49 N.C.App. 301, 271 S.E.2d 516 (1980). The Commission's findings of fact, if supported, are conclusive and binding on us on appeal. G.S. § 97-86. We conclude that the findings of fact by the Industrial Commission are supported by competent evidence and that its conclusions of law are supported by its findings of fact.

Suffering from headaches, nosebleeds, dizziness and shortness of breath and complaining that he was unable to work because of his health problems, the claimant, Charles Hilliard, quit his job of twenty-two years with Apex Cabinet Company. After quitting his job, Hilliard became self-employed and suffered a diminution in earnings. In filing his Workers' Compensation claim, Hilliard specifically alleged that his health problems were caused by his constant exposure to wood dust and fumes from glues, sealers, and lacquer in the cabinet shop where he worked. Hilliard argues that he is unable to find other jobs in pollutant-free environments because of his age, lack of education, and limited work experience. Significantly, Hilliard's personal doctors found no temporary or permanent disability arising from the health problems he complained of. One physician, Dr. Baggett, found no disability and opined that Hilliard could return to work. Dr. Sieker concluded that there was no abnormality, that there was no permanent damage, and that Hilliard could work in an environment free of wood dust and chemical fumes.

Although finding that Hilliard suffered from an occupational disease, the Commission determined that he suffered no temporary or permanent disability due to the occupational disease. The Commission's findings are based on competent evidence and are binding on us on appeal. That conflicting evidence which could lead to a contrary result was presented does not undermine the Commission's findings. Disability is defined as the "incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury in the same or any other employment." G.S. § 97-2(9). This definition applies equally to occupational diseases. G.S. § 97-52. The Workers' Compensation Statute does not guarantee that benefits will be paid whenever an employee is injured or suffers from an occupational disease. The Act is not designed to be a health or accident insurance policy. Lewter v. Enterprises, Inc., 240 N.C. 399, 403, 82 S.E.2d 410 (1954); Martin v. Georgia Pacific, 5 N.C.App. 37, 41, 167 S.E.2d 790 (1969).

Benefits are paid only when, due to occupational disease or injury, the employee is incapable of earning the same wages he earned at the time of contracting the disease or receiving the injury at his same job or any other employment. The claimant must show that the diminution in earning capacity is due to the disease or illness; it is not enough merely to show a diminution in wages earned subsequent to the affliction or injury. Pruitt v. Publishing Co., 27 N.C.App. 254, 218 S.E.2d 876 (1975), rev'd. on other grounds, 289 N.C. 254, 221 S.E.2d 355 (1976); Hill v. DuBose, 237 N.C. 501, 75 S.E.2d 401 (1953). Although the claimant has not solicited employment from other employers, he has met the requirement of the statute that he show...