Hilliard v. City of Hialeah
| Decision Date | 04 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 18-24594-CIV-ALTONAGA/Goodman |
| Parties | ELGIN HILLIARD, SR., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF HIALEAH, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Defendant Hialeah Housing Authority's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 85], filed November 30, 2019. Plaintiff, Elgin Hilliard, Sr., filed a Response [ECF No. 89], to which Defendant filed a Reply [ECF No. 102]. The Court has carefully considered the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") [ECF No. 68], the parties' written submissions,1 the record, and applicable law. For the following reasons, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
This action arises from Plaintiff's detention and the subsequent denial of his Section 8 voucher application. (See generally SAC). Plaintiff is a resident of Miami-Dade County. (See id.¶ 6). The Hialeah Housing Authority ("Defendant" or "HHA") is a public agency in the City of Hialeah. (See id. ¶ 7).
Plaintiff suffered an accident in 2015, leaving him unable to work and requiring the use of a walking cane. (See SAC ¶¶ 13-14). In June 2014, Plaintiff applied for a Section 8 voucher and was placed on the waiting list. (See Def.'s Facts ¶ 1).
On April 18, 2016, Defendant wrote to Plaintiff scheduling an appointment for his Section 8 application for April 25, 2016 and asking him to bring, among other things, documentation substantiating his income and expenses. (See Mot. Exs., Ex. B, Apr. 18, 2016 Correspondence [ECF No. 86-2]; Def.'s Facts ¶ 2). At the appointment, Plaintiff's caseworker, Margarita De La Cruz, requested additional documentation. (See Def.'s Facts ¶¶ 2-3).
On May 17, 2016, Plaintiff returned to the HHA office with the additional documentation. (Def.'s Facts ¶ 3). De La Cruz reviewed the documentation with the Assistant Section 8 Director Yvette Garcia. . After review, De La Cruz told Plaintiff he needed to supplement the documentation further to clarify how he was meeting his expenses. (See id. ¶ 5). Plaintiff became upset and accused De La Cruz and the receptionist, Ledya Halphen, of discrimination. (See id. ¶ 6).
Defendant acknowledges "the exact nature of the exchange between Plaintiff and the HHA employees is disputed[.]" (Def.'s Facts ¶ 7 (alteration added)). De La Cruz and Halphen reported to Garcia that Plaintiff was acting belligerent and threatening. . Defendant asserts Plaintiff made threatening statements to De La Cruz and Halphen (see Def.'s Reply Facts ¶ 30), while Plaintiff claims he did not (see Pl.'s Facts ¶ 7). Plaintiff admits he raised his cane while speaking to them but denies raising it in the manner De La Cruz described. (See Pl.'s Facts ¶ 7).
The HHA employees called Officer Rene Gutierrez, a retired police officer employed by Defendant, who arrived in the lobby shortly thereafter. (See Def.'s Facts ¶ 9). Officer Gutierrez asked Plaintiff to step outside to speak with him. (See id.). Once outside, Plaintiff, who was holding his cane, began asking Officer Gutierrez what he wanted and why he had asked him to come outside.2 (See id. ¶ 11). Plaintiff then put his cane down and assumed what Officer Gutierrez believed to be a combative, "squaring" stance. (Id. ¶ 13). Officer Gutierrez reached for his taser at one point during the encounter but never pulled it out from its holster. (See id. ¶ 15). Plaintiff was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct and assault of a law enforcement officer (see id. ¶ 14), but the charges were dropped (see Pl.'s Facts ¶ 36).
On May 24, 2016, Defendant wrote to Plaintiff advising his Section 8 application had been denied due to "threatening and abusive behavior toward HHA personnel." (Mot. Exs., Ex. G, Denial Letter [ECF No. 86-7]). Garcia made the decision to deny Plaintiff's application. (See Def.'s Facts ¶ 18). The parties dispute the reason for the denial of Plaintiff's application. (See id. ¶ 22; Pl.'s Facts ¶¶ 22, 26-27; Def.'s Reply Facts ¶¶ 26-27).
Plaintiff asserts "there was no other reason his application was denied other than his statements to HHA employees." (Pl.'s Facts ¶ 22). To support this assertion, Plaintiff cites De La Cruz's deposition testimony, in which she stated, "[W]hen I completed the file that I submitted to review, I didn't see anything negative to interfere or deny his case." (Resp. Exs., Ex. E, De La Cruz Dep. 83:11-14; see also Pl.'s Facts ¶ 22).
Defendant urges a "holistic reading of the surrounding testimony." (Def.'s Reply Facts ¶ 26). De La Cruz testified that for his application to be approved, Plaintiff would have beenrequired to report any extra income. (See Mot. Exs., Ex. D, De La Cruz Dep. [ECF No. 86-4] 83:8-25; 84:1-2). De La Cruz also testified Plaintiff never provided the additional documentation she had requested about his income, but his application would have been approved if he had done so and the incident between Plaintiff and the HHA employees had not occurred. (See id. 101:6-17). Defendant asserts De La Cruz's testimony shows "Plaintiff's case was trending towards being closed due to misrepresentation [of his income] prior to his alleged threatening of HHA employees and subsequent arrest." (Def.'s Reply Facts ¶ 26 (alteration added)).
The denial letter also informed Plaintiff of the right to request an informal review of the decision to deny his Section 8 application. (See Def.'s Facts ¶ 19). On August 11, 2016, an informal hearing was held. (See id. ¶ 20). On August 17, 2016, the hearing officer overturned the decision to deny Plaintiff's application. (See Mot. Exs., Ex. H, Notice of Decision [ECF No. 86-8] 1).3 Plaintiff's application was not reinstated (see Pl.'s Facts ¶ 28), nor did Plaintiff undertake any efforts to reinstate the application (see Def.'s Reply Facts ¶ 28).
On April 15, 2019, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint, asserting five claims against Defendant.4 Count I, styled as a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, allegesOfficer Gutierrez "committed the tort of false arrest" against Plaintiff, and Defendant should be held vicariously liable for Officer Gutierrez's actions. (SAC ¶¶ 75-82). Count III alleges Officer Gutierrez used excessive force against Plaintiff in violation of the Fourth Amendment.5 (See id. ¶¶ 88-91). Count V alleges Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (See id. ¶¶ 96-99). Count VI alleges Defendant deprived Plaintiff of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and violated the Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. sections 1437 et seq., and the Act's implementing regulations. (See id. ¶¶ 100-06). Count VII alleges Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. sections 3601 et seq. ). Defendant moves for summary judgment on these counts. (See generally Mot.).
Summary judgment may only be rendered if the pleadings, discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c). An issue of fact is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). It is "genuine" if the evidence could lead a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party. See id.; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The Court draws all reasonable inferences in favorof the party opposing summary judgment. See Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000).
If the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may obtain summary judgment simply by: (1) establishing the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact as to any essential element of a non-moving party's claim, and (2) showing the Court there is insufficient evidence to support the non-moving party's case. See Blackhawk Yachting, LLC v. Tognum Am., Inc., No. 12-14209-Civ, 2015 WL 11176299, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2015) (citations omitted). "Once the moving party discharges its initial burden, a non-moving party who bears the burden of proof must cite to . . . materials in the record or show that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute." Id. ().
"Summary judgment may be inappropriate even where the parties agree on the basic facts [] but disagree about the inferences that should be drawn from these facts." Whelan v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 1:12-cv-22481, 2013 WL 5583970, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2013) (alteration added; citation omitted). Where "reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then the Court should deny summary judgment" and proceed to trial. Id. (citations omitted).
Defendant argues it is entitled to summary judgment on Count I because it cannot be held vicariously liable under section 1983 as a matter of law. (See Mot. 7-8). Plaintiff admits Defendant "may not be held vicariously liable for constitutional violations brought pursuant to [section] 1983[.]" (Resp. 3 (alterations added)). Nevertheless, he states Defendant should be heldvicariously liable for Officer Gutierrez's actions under Florida law. (See id. 3-4). In response to this creative argument, Defendant points out Count I "is clearly brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. [section] 1983, not Florida law," and the Court should reject Plaintiff's "attempt[ ] to inject an additional claim against [Defendant] where one does not exist." (Reply 2 (alterations added)).
Throughout the litigation, Plaintiff has taken the position Count I states a section 1983 claim, not a tort claim under Florida law. In the Second Amended...
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