Hilliard v. Williams
Decision Date | 20 November 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 71-1983.,71-1983. |
Citation | 465 F.2d 1212 |
Parties | Lilly Mae Onie Lee Whitelaw HILLIARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John L. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Dwayne D. Maddox Huntington, Tenn., Julian P. Guinn, Paris, Tenn., on brief, for plaintiff-appellant.
Bart Durham, Asst. Atty. Gen., David M. Pack, Atty. Gen., Nashville, Tenn., on brief for defendant-appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, EDWARDS, Circuit Judge, and McALLISTER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Certiorari Denied November 20, 1972. See 93 S.Ct. 461.
To what extent does a prosecuting attorney have civil immunity in a suit filed by a defendant whom he has prosecuted in a criminal proceeding? This recurring question is presented on the present appeal.
The defendant-appellee is the District Attorney General for the Twenty-sixth Judicial District of Tennessee. He was prosecuting attorney at a trial resulting in the conviction of plaintiff-appellant Hilliard for second degree murder. This conviction was reversed by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals on April 15, 1971. At the second trial Mrs. Hilliard was acquitted. In the meantime she had served one year in prison.
The evidence upon which Mrs. Hilliard was convicted at her first trial was entirely circumstantial. A key issue was whether stains on the nylon jacket worn by her at the time of her arrest were blood stains, and if so, whether the stains were from human blood as contended by the prosecution or hog blood as contended by the defense.
In reversing the conviction, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals said:
Following her acquittal at the second trial, Mrs. Hilliard filed the present civil action for damages against the District Attorney General. Jurisdiction is asserted both on the ground of diversity of citizenship and under the civil rights act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).1
The District Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), Fed.R.Civ.P. for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The District Court sustained this motion, holding that the District Attorney General is immune from civil liability. We reverse, holding that the District Court erred in ruling that the complaint does not state a claim on which relief can be granted.
This is an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The District Court certified that the order of dismissal involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. The District Court also directed the entry of final judgment as to the District Attorney General, making an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. Rule 54(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. This court granted leave to appeal.
Our reversal is based entirely upon the factual averments of the complaint, which are summarized hereinafter in this opinion. These averments must be treated as true for purposes of this appeal and are viewed in the light most favorable to Mrs. Hilliard. Lucarell v. McNair, 453 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1972), L'Orange v. Medical Protective Society, 394 F.2d 57, 59 (6th Cir. 1968). "In appraising the sufficiency of this complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L. Ed.2d 80 (1957).
The complaint avers that Mrs. Hilliard is a citizen of Indiana; on or about December 24, 1969, she arrived in Carroll County, Tennessee, to visit her maternal aunt, Vina Prince, and the aunt's husband, Ernie Prince; the purpose of her visit was to assert and settle her claim to a one-half interest in certain real estate inherited from her grandmother; Ernie Prince had operated the land for many years and had claimed ownership from time to time; on February 19, 1970, Ernie Prince was killed and Mrs. Hilliard was arrested and charged with his murder.
The complaint further states that at the time of her arrest Mrs. Hilliard was wearing a blue nylon jacket which the officers claimed was stained with the blood of Ernie Prince; the victim was murdered by two vicious axe blows to the skull, and the body thereafter was dragged to the rear of the house and shot in the mouth with a shot gun. Mrs. Hilliard asserted that when she was arrested there was no blood on her jacket, but if there were any such stains it was hog blood from preparing raw meat.
The complaint asserts that circumstantial evidence pointed the finger of guilt to Vina Prince, who is insane. The opinion of the State Court of Criminal Appeals pointed out that Mrs. Prince was not available as a witness, due to her mental condition. The court commented:
It is averred that the only probative material evidence against Mrs. Hilliard was the allegedly blood stained jacket and some allegedly blood stained curtains; that the jacket and curtains were sent to the FBI laboratory in Washington, D. C., for analysis; that the FBI report was negative as to human blood, or any blood, being on either the jacket or the curtains; that the District Attorney General saw the FBI report well in advance of the trial and was familiar with its contents; that neither the FBI report nor the jacket and curtains were made available to be introduced in evidence at the trial; that the contents of the FBI report were never divulged to Mrs. Hilliard or her attorney; instead, it was claimed by the prosecution that the jacket and curtains had been resubmitted to the FBI on April 28, 1970, at a time when the trial already had been set for May 15, 1970, too late for them to be returned in time for introduction in evidence; that the District Attorney General produced evidence before the jury to the effect that the spots on the jacket and curtains "looked like" or "appeared to be" blood stains, in spite of the FBI report that there were no blood stains; that the District Attorney General suppressed and concealed the positive proof that there was no blood on either the jacket or curtains; and that if the FBI report had been introduced into evidence, Mrs. Hilliard would have been acquitted at her first trial as she was at the second.
The complaint further contains these averments:
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