Hillie v. State, 030221 MSCA, 2019-KA-01859-COA

Opinion JudgeLAWRENCE, J.
Party NameGREGORY HILLIE A/K/A GREGORY MARQUE HILLIE APPELLANT v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
AttorneyATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ABBIE EASON KOONCE DISTRICT ATTORNEY: BRENDA F. MITCHELL
Judge PanelBEFORE CARLTON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ. BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ., CONCUR. SMITH, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
Case DateMarch 02, 2021
CourtMississippi Court of Appeals

GREGORY HILLIE A/K/A GREGORY MARQUE HILLIE APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

No. 2019-KA-01859-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi

March 2, 2021

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/12/2019

BOLIVAR COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT HON. CHARLES E. WEBSTER TRIAL JUDGE

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ABBIE EASON KOONCE

DISTRICT ATTORNEY: BRENDA F. MITCHELL

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ.

LAWRENCE, J.

¶1. Gregory Hillie was indicted in Bolivar County for first degree murder (Count I) pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-19(1)(a) (Rev. 2014) and aggravated assault (Count II) pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-7(2)(a) (Rev. 2014). Hillie's indictment contained a firearm enhancement pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-37-37(1) and (2) (Rev. 2014). After trial, Hillie was convicted of both Count I and Count II. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for Count I and twenty years for Count II to be served in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The sentences were set to run consecutively. Hillie filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, a new trial, which was denied. Hillie now appeals, asserting that the circuit court failed to comply with Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 7.1(c) regarding his desire for self-representation and alleged waiver of counsel. As a result of this alleged error, Hillie requests reversal of his conviction and a new trial. Finding no error, we affirm the circuit court's judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On the evening of July 16, 2015, a group of friends and acquaintances were gathered at the intersection of Johnson Avenue and White Street in Cleveland, Mississippi. Among those gathered were Gregory Hillie, Lawrence Falconer, and Falconer's son, Willie Coleman. Falconer and Coleman had recently arrived in town to attend a family wedding. Hillie had also recently arrived in town from Chicago on the same bus as Falconer. Hillie was in a wheelchair on the night of the gathering. The group was congregated outside, socializing, drinking beer, and rapping. The gathering spilled over into the early morning of July 17, 2015. While the group was talking, Hillie told everyone that he was an "insane gangster" in Chicago, which he claimed was a branch of the "gangster disciples." Suspicious of Hillie's claim, Coleman called a friend in Chicago to verify the existence of the group. Coleman's friend confirmed his suspicion and told Coleman that he had never heard of the "insane gangsters." According to Coleman, Hillie seemed "disrespected" by the fact that the men questioned the existence of, and his membership in, the "insane gangsters." Coleman testified that Hillie suddenly pulled a gun out of his pants and shot Colman in the leg. After shooting Coleman a second time, Hillie proceeded to shoot Falconer in the leg. As Falconer tried to crawl away from the scene, Hillie shot Falconer a second time, but this time Hillie shot him in the head. According to Coleman, Hillie then rolled away in his wheelchair yelling, "I told you I was insane." By the time the police arrived on the scene, Falconer was deceased. Coleman's injuries were not fatal, but he was unable to answer questions on that day at the scene of the shooting. After detaining and questioning the remaining witnesses at the scene, Hillie ultimately became the prime suspect. Several witnesses were able to identify Hillie as the shooter specifically because they said the shooter was in a wheelchair. Hillie was arrested in Chicago ten days after the shooting; however, a gun was never recovered. On March 30, 2016, Hillie was indicted for first degree murder (Count I) and aggravated assault (Count II) in connection with Falconer's death and Coleman's gunshot injuries. Hillie's indictment included a firearm enhancement.

¶3. At the outset, the circuit court appointed Christopher Powell as Hillie's attorney. Early on in the litigation process, Powell filed a motion for a mental evaluation on Hillie's behalf. The circuit court granted Hillie's request for a mental evaluation, and he was examined by forensic psychologist Christine Collins, who found him competent to stand trial. While Hillie had not yet made a formal request to the circuit court to represent himself, there was a line of questioning at the competency hearing during cross-examination wherein Dr. Collins was asked if Hillie was competent enough or had the mental capacity to choose to represent himself if he so chose. Dr. Collins testified, "[Y]es, I would think that he is competent enough to ask a Court if he could." At the conclusion of the competency hearing and in response to the line of questioning regarding the possibility of Hillie's self-representation, the circuit judge stated: With regard to the question of competency to stand trial which is actually why we're here, although she did offer an opinion as to - he's competent to make the decision - whether or not he would want to defend himself or not, I frankly think that would be a devastating decision on his part, but he's entitled to make that decision if he so chooses.

(Emphasis added).

¶4. Following the competency hearing, Powell filed a motion for Hillie to be allowed to proceed pro se. At the beginning of the motion hearing, the circuit judge stated, "I think any defendant has a right to represent himself if he so chooses. I can't say it's the wisest course of - the wisest course, but he certainly has that right." Powell further addressed Hillie's request that Powell be removed from the case as Hillie's attorney. The circuit judge responded to that request and stated: I can tell you that I am reluctant to do that. There are - I don't know Mr. Hillie's background, but certainly there are subtleties that can occur both pretrial and during the trial that someone that lacks a legal education and/or more importantly the experience of trial work, particularly in a criminal case, particularly in a capital - with a capital charge, may not fully grasp. Those are my concerns, and, frankly, notwithstanding Mr. Hillie's desire, as expressed in the motion, I cannot imagine a circumstance under which I would allow Mr. Hillie to proceed without you at least being available to him at all times, and if that means you would be sitting at counsel table, you'll be sitting at counsel table so that if a question were to come up or some issue were to come up and he needs - because the Court is not gonna be in a position to be able to explain anything to Mr. Hillie except perhaps from a procedural standpoint. But there may be some - a question may come up with regard to strategy or evidentiary in nature that, without a good understanding of the rules of evidence and the rules - now the rules of criminal procedure - he would be in a significant disadvantage. So I don't expect I'll be releasing you from this matter.

Now, merely if Mr. Hillie chooses to represent himself, which I personally think is not - and professionally think is not a good decision, but he has the right to do so if that's what he chooses to do. So I think - have I fairly addressed those issues?

(Emphasis added). The circuit court entered an order granting in part and denying in part Hillie's motion to proceed pro se. The order stated in part: Despite the court's statements to the defendant advising against proceeding pro se in this cause and pointing out possible evidentiary and procedural pitfalls which the defendant may encounter, the defendant remained steadfast in his desire to proceed pro se in this matter. Such does not require the countenance of the court-the defendant has a right to proceed pro se if he elects to do so. As such, for whatever purposes, the defendant's request to proceed pro se is granted. The motion also seeks the removal of the defendant's current counsel, an experienced criminal trial attorney, from the case. The court declines such request. Counsel will remain appointed to the defendant albeit in a severely limited role. Counsel shall...

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