Hillman v. U.S. Postal Service

• Decision Date: 14 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 97-4041-SAC.,97-4041-SAC.
• Citation: 169 F.Supp.2d 1218
• Parties: Victoria S. HILLMAN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, William F. Henderson, Postmaster General, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

169 F.Supp.2d 1218

Victoria S. HILLMAN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, William F. Henderson, Postmaster General, Defendant.

No. 97-4041-SAC.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

September 14, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Victoria S. Hillman, Osborne, KS, pro se.

D. Brad Bailey, Office of United States Attorney, Topeka, KS, for defendants.

Nancy Landis Caplinger, Office of United States Attorney, Topeka, KS, for William J. Henderson.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CROW, Senior District Judge.

This employment discrimination and retaliation case comes before the court on defendant United States Postal Service ("USPS")7Ds renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative for a new trial, or remittance of the compensatory damage award. (Dk 161). The court will also rule on plaintiff's motion to deny defendant's supplement to memorandum in support of defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative for a new trial, or remittance of the compensatory damage award (Dk.172). The court incorporates herein its findings made in its separate memorandum and order filed today in this case which addresses, among other matters, the issues of front and back pay.

On May 18, 2001, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on her retaliation claim, and for the USPS on plaintiff's sex discrimination claim. The jury awarded plaintiff compensatory damages in the amount of $80,000 for plaintiff's pain, suffering and emotional distress, based upon its finding of retaliation.

Standards for motion for new trial

Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a) authorizes the court to grant a new trial to all or any of the parties on all or part of the issues "in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States." A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984). In considering the motion, the court should "exercise judgment in preference to the automatic reversal for `error' and ignore errors that do not affect the essential fairness of the trial." McDonough Power Equipment, 464 U.S. at 553, 104 S.Ct. 845.

The motion may be granted where the court believes the verdict is against the weight of the evidence or prejudicial error has occurred. Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 861 F.2d 631, 637 (10th Cir.1988). It is the burden of the moving party to demonstrate that the trial errors are prejudicial errors or that the verdict is not based on substantial evidence. White v. Conoco, Inc., 710 F.2d 1442, 1443 (10th Cir.1983).

When the issue concerns the verdict being against the weight of the evidence, the trial court in the exercise of its discretion reviews the evidence. Black v. Hieb's Enterprises, Inc., 805 F.2d 360, 363 (10th Cir.1986). The record is viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Patton v. TIC United Corp. ., 77 F.3d 1235, 1242 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005, 116 S.Ct. 2525, 135 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1996). The motion is not to be granted unless the verdict is clearly, decidedly, or overwhelmingly against the weight of the evidence. Id.; Continental Cas. Co. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 860 F.2d 970, 972 (10th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1079, 109 S.Ct. 1530, 103 L.Ed.2d 836 (1989). "A new trial is not warranted simply because the court would have reached a different verdict." Boyce v. Board of Com'rs of Dickinson County, 857 F.Supp. 794, 797 (D.Kan.1994) (citations omitted).

Because of the sanctity attached to jury verdicts, courts do not lightly overturn them. Midwest Underground Storage, Inc. v. Porter, 717 F.2d 493, 502 (10th Cir.1983). Thus, motions for new trial are "`not regarded with favor and should only be granted with great caution.'" Maberry v. Said, 927 F.Supp. 1456, 1459 (D.Kan. 1996) (quoting United States v. Kelley, 929 F.2d 582, 586 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 926, 112 S.Ct. 341, 116 L.Ed.2d 280 (1991)).

In determining whether a new trial is appropriate, the trial court does not sit merely as an additional juror. VDA de Perez v. Hospital del Maestro, 910 F.2d 1004, 1006 (1st Cir.1990). The trial court must "`feel that the jury quite clearly reached a seriously erroneous result in spite of the clear weight of the evidence.'" Leichihman v. Pickwick Intern., 814 F.2d 1263, 1267 (8th Cir.) (quoting Leichihman v. Pickwick International, Inc., 589 F.Supp. 831, 834 (D.Minn.1984)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855, 108 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed.2d 116 (1987).

"`Neither an error in the admission or exclusion of evidence nor an error in a ruling or order of the court, nor anything done or omitted by the court, can be grounds for granting a new trial unless the error or defect affects the substantial rights of the parties.'" Sanjuan v. IBP, Inc., 941 F.Supp. 1000, 1004 (D.Kan.1996) (quoting Courtney v. Safelite Glass Corp., 811 F.Supp. 1466, 1471 (D.Kan.1992)); see Heyen v. United States, 731 F.Supp. 1488, 1489 (D.Kan.1990), aff'd, 945 F.2d 359 (10th Cir.1991). In short, a court is to "ignore errors that do not affect the essential fairness of the trial." McDonough Power Equip. Inc., 464 U.S. at 553, 104 S.Ct. 845.

Standards for judgment as a matter of law

A court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law ("JMAL") only when "a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." Fed. R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). The Tenth Circuit reads this rule to mean that "a court may grant the motion `only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences which may support the opposing party's position.'" Finley v. United States, 82 F.3d 966, 968 (10th Cir.1996) (quoting Q.E.R., Inc. v. Hickerson, 880 F.2d 1178, 1180 (10th Cir.1989)), rev'd on other grounds, 123 F.3d 1342 (10th Cir. 1997) (en banc). The court "must construe the evidence and inferences most favorably to the non-moving party, and refrain from weighing the evidence, passing on the credibility of witnesses, or substituting our judgment for that of the jury." Magnum Foods, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 36 F.3d 1491, 1502 (10th Cir.1994) (citation omitted); see Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Department Stores, 82 F.3d 1533, 1546 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 928, 117 S.Ct. 297, 136 L.Ed.2d 216 (1996).

On the other hand, judgment as a matter of law must be granted if there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis with respect to a claim or defense under the controlling law. Harolds Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d at 1546-47. In order to deny judgment as a matter of law, the court must find more than merely "a scintilla of evidence" favoring the nonmovant, and the court must find that "evidence was before the jury upon which it could properly find against the movant." Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir.1988). Judgment as a matter of law is only proper when "the evidence so strongly supports an issue that reasonable minds could not differ." Ryder v. City of Topeka, 814 F.2d 1412, 1418 (10th Cir.1987).

While the trial court has the authority under Rule 50(a) to grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the plaintiffs' case, the more prudent course is to defer ruling until both sides have rested. 9A Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2533 at p. 318 (1995); Therrell v. Georgia Marble Holdings Corp., 960 F.2d 1555, 1569 (11th Cir.1992) ("`Where there is any doubt at all as to the propriety of a directed verdict, district courts should not jump the gun but should wait until both sides have presented their evidence before ruling on motions for directed verdict.' United States v. Vahlco Corp., 720 F.2d 885, 889 (5th Cir.1983).").

Issues

USPS alleges that the facts do not support the jury's verdict in favor of plaintiff on her retaliation claim, and that it was denied a fair trial due to evidentiary issues.

I. Retaliation

Neither party disputes the correctness of the court's instructions to the jury, requiring the jury to find that plaintiff engaged in protected conduct, that USPS contemporaneously or thereafter engaged in adverse employment activity against plaintiff, and that retaliation for plaintiff's protected conduct was a motivating factor in USPS's adverse employment decision. USPS concedes that plaintiff conferred with an EEO officer on Sept. 13, 1993, and that such constitutes protected activity, but challenges the evidence in support of the jury's finding of adverse employment action and a causal connection between that action and plaintiff's protected conduct.

Adverse Employment Action

The Tenth Circuit liberally construes the phrase "adverse employment action." See Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir.1998).¹ USPS does not challenge the fact that the denial of employment would constitute adverse employment action, but contends solely that no such employment was available at Smith Center in 1993.

USPS relies upon testimony from Virginia Niblack, the postmaster at Smith Center who hired plaintiff. Niblack testified that plaintiff was hired as a casual employee for only one 90-day period, and that she neither considered extending plaintiff's appointment as a casual nor hired anyone as a casual employee after plaintiff's initial 90-day appointment expired. The record supports the conclusion, however, that there was an opening at Smith Center at the relevant time for another 90-day casual position, for which plaintiff was qualified.² Plaintiff began her employment as a casual employee at Smith Center on June 26, 1993. Plaintiff testified that she was told during her interview for her initial 90-day appointment that her casual...