Hillmann v. City of Chi.

• Decision Date: 04 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. 04 C 6671,04 C 6671
• Citation: 66 F.Supp.3d 1109
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
• Parties: Robert P. Hillmann, Plaintiff, v. City of Chicago, Defendant.

66 F.Supp.3d 1109

Robert P. Hillmann, Plaintiff

v.City of Chicago, Defendant.

No. 04 C 6671

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed September 4, 2014

Kathryn Margaret Reidy, Law Offices of Kathryn M. Reidy, Bayview, ID, Brian M. Ozog, Stephen P. Carponelli, Carponelli & Krug, P.C., Chicago, IL, Byron Doyle Knight, Elizabeth Ann Knight, Knight, Hoppe, Kurnik & Knight LLC, Rosemont, IL, for Plaintiff.

Naomi Ann Avendano, Deja C. Nave, Mara Stacy Georges, Melanie Patrick Neely, Valerie Depies Harper, City of Chicago, Law Department Corporation Counsel, Patrick Edward Deady, Matthew James Cleveland, Hogan Marren, Ltd., Limo T. Cherian, Holland and Knight, LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Chief Judge Rubén Castillo, United States District Court

In 2004, Plaintiff Robert P. Hillmann filed this action against his former employer, the City of Chicago, alleging that his termination was illegal on various grounds. After a protracted history, this Court presided over a jury trial in April 2013. The jury returned a verdict in Defendant's favor on all charges except Plaintiff's claim of retaliatory discharge under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 305/1 et seq. , on which the jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff's favor. The jury assessed damages of two million dollars. Plaintiff's claim of retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., was before the bench at trial; on March 31, 2014, the Court issued an opinion granting judgment in Defendant's favor on that claim and ruling on various post-trial motions. (R. 539, Mem. Op. & Order); Hillmann v. City of Chicago, No. 04 C 6671, 14 F.Supp.3d 1152, 2014 WL 1613921 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 31, 2014). Presently before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the Court's ruling on Defendant's motion for remittitur.

This Court assumed responsibility for this lawsuit after the death of its dear colleague, William J. Hibbler. This opinion is the Court's third and hopefully final opinion in this delayed litigation, which has been tried twice before a jury. The Court's previous opinion thoroughly laid out the facts of the case and its extensive procedural history. For the sake of judicial economy, the Court assumes familiarity with those facts and does not repeat them here except as directly pertinent to the issue at hand.

Plaintiff began working for the Chicago Park District in June 1973 as a park attendant. After approximately five and a half years, he took a job in the Chicago Department of Streets and Sanitation, where he continued to work until he was terminated in July 2002 in retaliation for exercising his rights under the Workers' Compensation Act. At the trial, Professor Larry DeBrock testified as an expert witness. DeBrock performed an analysis of Plaintiff's pension loss, and he testified that if Plaintiff had retired at age 50, the present value of his lost pension benefits would be approximately $1.3 million. If Plaintiff retired at age 55, the present value of his lost pension benefits would be around $1.2 million. Jane Tessaro also testified about Plaintiff's pension loss. Tessaro was the manager of the benefits department at the Municipal Employees Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago (the “Pension Fund” or the “Fund”), the pension fund for some City workers. Tessaro testified that when Plaintiff was terminated, he had 21 years of pension credit in the Fund, which would have enabled him to start collecting benefits at age 55.

In September 2005, Plaintiff withdrew all of his pension contributions, which amounted to $87,192.95. He testified that he needed the money to pay bills after he was terminated. Once an employee receives a refund of his pension contributions from the Fund, he forfeits all future pension benefits. Tessaro testified that, given Plaintiff's termination on July 31, 2002, if Plaintiff had not withdrawn money from his account, he would have received $2,091.00 per month beginning at age 55. If he had not been terminated and had instead continued to work at his same salary until age 55, he would have received a pension of $3,507.00 per month beginning at age 55.

Following the trial, Defendant moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 for the Court to reduce the jury's two-million-dollar award to $15,000.00. (R. 515, Def.'s Mot. Alter J.) Because Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant's motion, the Court assumed that he agreed with any offset calculations and found that he had waived any objection. Hillmann, 14 F.Supp.3d at 1196–97, 2014 WL 1613921, at *42. The Court set off the $1.2 million Plaintiff had already received or would receive as a result of his worker's compensation award and reduced the damages for pain and suffering so that Plaintiff's remitted award totaled $400,000.00. Id. at 1196–97, 2014 WL 1613921, at *42–*43. The Court gave Plaintiff the option of accepting the remittitur or requesting an evidentiary hearing as to damages. Id. at 1197, 2014 WL 1613921, at *43.

Plaintiff now contends that he thought briefing on the issue of damages was suspended until the Court ruled on Defendant's motion for a new trial, and he asks the Court to reconsider its ruling on Defendant's motion for remittitur with the benefit of Plaintiff's responsive briefing. (R. 540, Pl.'s Mot. Reconsider.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

Any order “that adjudicates fewer than all the claims ... does not end the action as to any of the claims ... and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). “An order that offers a choice between a remitted award and a new trial is not a final decision.” Republic Tobacco Co. v. N. Atl. Trading Co., 381 F.3d 717, 739 (7th Cir.2004). Accordingly, the Court may freely reconsider or revise its prior ruling on Defendant's motion for remittitur. Reconsideration is appropriate “when there has been a significant change in the law or facts since the parties presented the issue to the court, when the court misunderstands a party's arguments, or when the court overreaches by deciding an issue not properly before it.”United States v. Ligas, 549 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir.2008). However, “as a rule courts should be loathe to [reconsider prior rulings] in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision was ‘clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.’ ” Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983) ).

The jury awarded Plaintiff damages only on his state law claim, so Illinois state law governs the Court's review of that award. Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co., 444 F.3d 593, 611 (7th Cir.2006). Although courts in the Seventh Circuit typically compare a damages award with damages awards in similar cases, Thompson v. Mem'l Hosp. of Carbondale, 625 F.3d 394, 408 (7th Cir. 2010), as Defendant urges this Court to do, that is not the practice in Illinois courts, Richardson v. Chapman, 175 Ill.2d 98, 221 Ill.Dec. 818, 676 N.E.2d 621, 628 (1997) (collecting cases). Defendant contends that the statement in Naeem that state law should govern damages is dicta and does not indicate the prevailing law in the Circuit. (R. 544, Def.'s Resp. at 2–3.) Defendant maintains that the proper approach to damages is to compare awards in similar cases, regardless of whether the decision is based in state or federal law. (Id. ) (citing Arpin v. United States, 521 F.3d 769, 776–77 (7th Cir.2008) ; Jutzi–Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 759–60 (7th Cir.2001) ). In both Arpin and Jutzi–Johnson, however, the district courts were required to consider awards in similar cases in order to properly explain their reasoning pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) because they were determining the appropriate award following bench trials. See Arpin, 521 F.3d at 776 (“When a federal judge is the trier of fact, he, unlike a jury, is required to explain the grounds of his decision. This means, when the issue is the amount of damages, that the judge must indicate the reasoning process that connects the evidence to the conclusion.” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ; Jutzi–Johnson, 263 F.3d at 758 ) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Where, as here, there has been a jury verdict and the court's responsibility is to review the jury award rather than determine an award, the Supreme Court has held that courts must apply the appropriate state standard for review of damages on a post-trial motion. See Naeem, 444 F.3d at 611 (citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 431, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996) ). The Court thus applies Illinois law regarding review of jury awards.

“A remittitur is an agreement by the plaintiff to relinquish, or remit, to the defendant that portion of the jury's verdict which constitutes excessive damages and to accept the sum which has been judicially determined to be properly recoverable damages.” Tri–G, Inc. v. Burke, Bosselman & Weaver, 222 Ill.2d 218, 305 Ill.Dec. 584, 856 N.E.2d 389, 409 (2006). The practice of remittitur has long been acknowledged in Illinois as a way to promote “both the administration of justice and the conclusion of litigation.” Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 179 Ill.2d 367, 228 Ill.Dec. 636, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1079 (1997). Nevertheless, “[t]he determination of damages is a question reserved to the trier of fact, and a reviewing court will not lightly substitute its opinion for the judgment rendered in the trial court.” Richardson, 221 Ill.Dec. 818, 676 N.E.2d at 628. “The deference given to the careful deliberative process of the jury is overcome if, after examining the evidence presented at trial, the trial judge determines that the jury verdict is excessive.” Best, 228 Ill.Dec. 636, 689 N.E.2d at 1079. “An award of damages will be deemed excessive if it falls...