Hillsborough County v. Henderson
Citation | 33 So. 997,45 Fla. 356 |
Parties | HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY et al. v. HENDERSON et al. [*] |
Decision Date | 24 February 1903 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; Joseph B. Wall Judge.
Bill by William B. Henderson and Charles Wright against Hillsborough county and others. Decree for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal. Reversed.
Syllabus by the Court
1. Counties desiring to issue bonds must comply with the statutory provisions regulating such issue.
2. A resolution for the issuance of bonds by a county which stipulates that the bonds shall bear not more than 4 per cent. interest per annum, without fixing a definite rate, is not in compliance with the statutory requirement that the resolution determine the rate of interest to be paid.
3. Assuming that a resolution for county bonds for two designated purposes, under section 591 of the Revised Statutes of 1892, should state the amount of bonds required for each purpose, a resolution providing for a gross amount of bonds for the two purposes is sufficient in this respect where one of the purposes is the funding of the indebtedness of the county.
4. The statutory authority to issue bonds given counties by sections 591 et seq., Rev. St. 1892, includes the right to make the bonds payable in gold coin of the United States of the present standard weight and fineness.
COUNSEL Barron Phillips, Jno. P. Wall, P. O. Knight, F M. Simonton, and Thomas Palmer, for appellants.
Sparkman & Carter, for appellees.
The board of county commissioners of Hillsborough county proceeding under sections 591-593 of the Revised Statutes of 1892, in August, A. D. 1901, passed a resolution for the issue of county bonds, as follows:
This resolution was published in the several newspapers in the county as provided by law, and an election held, resulting in a majority of votes in favor of the bond issue. The board of county commissioners thereafter prepared bonds of said county to the amount of $400,000, bearing interest at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum, and containing a provision that they were payable in gold coin of the United States of America of the present standard weight and fineness. The sale of these bonds was advertised, and a resolution passed by the board accepting the bid of the defendants Seasongood and Mayer, who offered $380,260 and accrued interest for the entire issue.
The bill of complainants was thereupon filed to restrain the issue of said bonds for various alleged irregularities in the proceedings upon which the proposed issue was based. The temporary injunction granted was afterwards dissolved, except in so far as it enjoined the issue of bonds payable in gold coin, and, as to this feature, was made perpetual. From this decree both complainants and defendants appeal.
One of the objections made to the proposed issue of bonds is that the resolution adopted and submitted to the voters was not in accordance with section 591, Rev. St. 1892, chapter 4711, p. 105, Acts 1899, which provides that the resolution shall determine the rate of interest to be paid on the bonds. The resolution submitted provided for bonds 'bearing interest at a rate of not more than four per centum per annum, with interest payable semiannually.' It is essential to the right of the county to issue bonds that the provisions of the statute regulating such issue shall be substantially complied with; and, if the resolution in question does not determine the rate of interest which the bonds shall bear, it is fatally defective. State ex rel. Stanford v. School Dist. No. 1 of Cascade County, 15 Mont. 133, 38 P. 462. Is the provision that the interest shall not exceed a certain rate a compliance with the requirement that the rate shall be determined? 'To determine' is defined as meaning 'to ascertain definitely' or 'to settle,' and it is in this sense that the word is used in the statute. A provision which leaves for future determination the precise rate of the interest to be paid, merely limiting the range of the discretion to be exercised by those who shall ultimately fix it, cannot be said to determine the rate.
It does not cure the defect that the voters have ratified the resolution in its indefinite form. They can vote only upon such resolution as the board sees fit to submit to them. A majority of them may be willing to waive their right to have the terms of the bonds definitely fixed before submission to them, as provided by law, and to intrust these matters to the board for future determination, rather than have no issue of bonds. But the statute has vested the board with no authority to ask such a waiver; nor has it authorized the voters to delegate to the board, without the check of a subsequent ratification of its action, matters which by the terms of the statute must, after determination, be indorsed by popular vote. If the board can lawfully reserve for future determination by itself the interest which the bonds shall bear, so can it reserve any or all of the other matters required to be fixed in the resolution which it submits for ratification. The statute cannot be so nullified.
In conformity with this rule, it has been held by several courts that the authorization of bonds not to exceed a certain amount is not a compliance with a requirement that the amount to be issued shall be specified. State ex rel. Lexington & St. L. R. Co. v. Saline County Court, 45 Mo. 242; Smith v. Mayor & Council of Dublin, 113 Ga. 833, 39 S.E. 327; Mercer County v. Pittsburgh & Erie R. Co., 27 Pa. 389. Other cases holding that the resolution for the issue of bonds must determine those things required by law to be fixed therein, and not merely present an alternative for future decision, are Elyria Gas & Water Co. v. City of Elyria, 57 Ohio St. 374, 49 N.E. 335; Monadnock R. R. v. Peterborough, 49 N.H. 281; State ex...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Jackson Lumber Co. v. Walton County
... ... 642] ... the rate at 5 1/2 per cent. could not cure the defect. In ... support of this contention, the case of Hillsborough ... County v. Henderson, 45 Fla. 356, 33 So. 997, is cited, ... and attention is also called to section 3297, Rev. Gen ... Stats., relating to ... ...
-
Kerlin v. City of Devils Lake
... ... An ... appeal from the District Court for Ramsey County, Winchester, ... Special J., from an order vacating an injunctional order ... 45 Mo ... 242; Dawson v. Dawson Waterworks Co. 106 Ga. 696, 32 ... S.E. 907; Hillsborough County v. Henderson, 45 Fla ... 356, 33 So. 997; Smith v. Dublin, 113 Ga. 833, 39 S.E. 327 ... ...
-
Sebern v. Cobb
... ... R. HARTLEY, as the Board of Commissioners of Drainage District No. 2 of Ada County, Idaho, Respondents and Cross-appellants, v. v. B. E. COBB, Appellant and Cross-respondent ... [238 P. 1026] ... The ... court in Hillsborough County v. Henderson (Fla.), 45 ... Fla. 356, 33 So. 997, in considering a resolution authorizing ... ...
-
The State ex rel. City of Carthage v. Gordon
... ... Mobile, 36 ... Ala. 410; Bank v. Omaha, 18 N.W. 63; Hillsboro ... Co. v. Henderson, 33 So. 997. (3) (a) The city council, ... at the time of the issuance of the bonds, directed ... Light ... Co., 50 S.E. 169; Bowen v. Mayor, 79 Ga. 709; ... Mercer County v. Railroad, 27 Pa. St. 389; ... Staven v. Genoa, 23 N.Y. 449; Smith v ... Dublin, 113 Ga ... [217 ... Mo. 116] In the Florida case ( Hillsborough County v ... Henderson, 45 Fla. 356, 33 So. 997), cited by ... respondent, the statute required ... ...