Hilsdorf v. Comm'r Of Soc. Sec.

Decision Date15 July 2010
Docket NumberNo. 08-CV-5290.,08-CV-5290.
Citation724 F.Supp.2d 330
PartiesLawrence HILSDORF, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

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Lawrence W. Hilsdorf, Bayside, NY, for Plaintiff.

John M. Kelly, United States Attorneys Office, Brooklyn, NY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, District Judge.

Pro se Plaintiff Lawrence Hilsdorf (“Hilsdorf” or Plaintiff) commenced this action pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act (the Act), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of a final determination by the Commissioner (“Commissioner” or Defendant) of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his July 14, 2003 application for Social Security Disability Benefits. ( See Compl. (Docket Entry # 1).) Both parties have moved for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hilsdorf seeks an order reversing the Commissioner's determination that he is not disabled, and remanding for an award of benefits or at least for reconsideration of the agency decision. The Commissioner defends the agency decision and seeks dismissal of the Complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the court concludes that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) made numerous legal errors and that the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff's motion is granted in part, and the case is remanded for further administrative proceedings consistent with this Memorandum and Order.

I. BACKGROUND A. Procedural History

Plaintiff first applied for Disability Insurance Benefits on June 9, 1998. He alleged that he became unable to work on May 14, 1998, due to coronary heart disease resulting in myocardial ischemia. (Admin. Record (“R.”) 153.) The Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff's application in January 1999. (R. 19.) Following a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued a decision on June 22, 2000, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled and that he had a residual functional capacity for sedentary work. (R. 153, 195.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (R. 179.) Plaintiff then filed an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York challenging the ALJ's decision. Hilsdorf v. Barnhart, No. 03-CV-2435 (DGT) (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2004) (“ Hilsdorf I ”). In Hilsdorf I, Judge Trager affirmed the ALJ's decision, finding it to be based on substantial evidence. Id.

On July 14, 2003, while Hilsdorf I was still pending before Judge Trager, Plaintiff filed a second application for disability benefits, again alleging an onset date of May 14, 1998. (R. 15, 61.) He alleged disability due to heart disease, hypertension, carpal tunnel syndrome, and rheumatoid arthritis. (R. 17, 51, 75, 180.) Because Plaintiff last met the eligibility requirements for disability benefits on December 31, 2003, (R. 15, 47, 71, 195), the relevant period for this second application is June 23, 2000 1 through December 31, 2003.

Plaintiff's second application was initially denied on January 9, 2004. (R. 51.) Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing on March 15, 2004. (R. 52.) ALJ Seymour Fier presided over the March 20, 2006 hearing, where Plaintiff was represented by counsel. (R. 257-88.) On June 9, 2006, ALJ Fier issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled and had retained the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work through December 31, 2003. (R. 11-17.) Upon review, the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ's decision and remanded the case for consideration of additional evidence. (R. 195.)

A second hearing was held before ALJ Manuel Cofresi on January 8, 2008. (R. 238.) On March 7, 2008, ALJ Cofresi denied Plaintiff's application. (R. 12.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity for “sedentary to light” work and was not disabled on or before December 31, 2003. (R. 15-22.) On October 29, 2008, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request to review the decision. (R. 5, 11.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this action.

B. Non-Medical Evidence

Plaintiff Lawrence Hilsdorf was born on June 3, 1956, in Flushing, New York. He joined the New York City Police Department in 1981, and served as a police officer for 17 years, until May 31, 1998. He has been married to his second wife, Maureen Kirk, since 1991. He has six children, five of whom live with him. (R. 57-58.)

Plaintiff began experiencing heart problems in 1995, which eventually led him to apply for disability retirement benefits from the NYPD. (R. 147, 242.) On January 26, 1998, the NYPD Medical Board approved his application. (R. 125-27.) Plaintiff left the force on May 14, 1998. (R. 76, 84, 88.)

Plaintiff filed the disability application which is the subject of this action on July 14, 2003. (R. 57-60.) At that time, Plaintiff claimed to be suffering from heart disease, high blood pressure, and rheumatoid arthritis. (R. 74-83, 87-94.) He complained of difficulty breathing, light-headedness, pain and stiffness in his neck, back, arm, and hip, and numbness in his arms and hands. (R. 74-83.) At that time, cardiologist William J. Tenet, M.D. was treating Plaintiff's heart problems. (R. 77, 90.) Dr. Tenet prescribed Accupril for Plaintiff's high blood pressure, and Lipitor for his cholesterol. (R. 80, 91.) Another doctor, Dimitrios J. Asters, M.D., was treating Plaintiff's arthritic pain, numbness, and carpal tunnel syndrome. (R. 77, 82, 90.) Dr. Asters prescribed Celebrex for Plaintiff's rheumatoid arthritis. (R. 82, 91.)

Plaintiff also complained of continuous pain, decreased mobility, and difficulty sitting or standing for long periods of time. In a Disability Report dated July 4, 2003, Plaintiff stated that [t]he daily pain in my legs [and] hips make[s] me limp around most of the day. My mobility has just gotten worse, the pain is continuous. I can't raise my arms over my head without pain and it hurts to sit or stand for any long period of time.” (R. 82.) At the hearing before ALJ Cofresi, Plaintiff testified that in 2003 he had to lie down two to three times a day for 30 minutes or so because he was “tired all the time.” (R. 243.) Plaintiff claimed he experienced difficulty sitting or standing for more than 30 minutes at a time, and could comfortably lift and carry only up to five or six pounds. (R. 244.)

Plaintiff reported that he took Advil for his pain, along with his other prescription medications. Plaintiff also took Valium because he was “very depressed.” (R. 245.) Plaintiff reported that he smoked one pack of cigarettes per day and drank sometimes.

With regard to daily activities, Plaintiff reported that he spent the day reading, watching television, listening to music, and taking a walk. (R. 136.) He also did limited shopping for his medications. He reported that he could walk two to three blocks before having to stop and rest. (R. 244.)

C. Medical Evidence

1. Evidence Prior to the Relevant Period 2

On May 8, 1996, Plaintiff was hospitalized at the New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens complaining of shortness of breath and chest pain with radiation down his left arm. (R. 116.) Tests results were within normal limits. (R. 115.) An electrocardiogram (“EKG”) revealed normal sinus rhythm and stable pattern, (R. 122), and an echocardiogram showed normal aortic valve, normal left atrium, normal mitral valve, and normal ejection fraction. (R. 121.) Plaintiff was placed on a Heparin drip, and his symptoms improved. He was discharged in stable condition.

On January 26, 1998, the NYPD Medical Board (the “Board”) approved Plaintiff's application for Accident Disability Retirement, based on a diagnosis of probable acute myocardial ischemia due to coronary disease. (R. 125-27.) The Board stated that the case was not “a clear cut, open and shut one.” (R. 125.) In fact, on June 19, 1995, the Board found that there was no evidence of coronary artery disease and that Plaintiff could perform the full duties of a police officer. ( Id.) That finding was based in part on a cardiac catheterization performed in February 1995, which had shown no evidence of coronary disease and that plaintiff's chest pain was quite unlike ischemic angina pectoris; coronary angiograms were within normal limits, as were subsequent stress tests. ( Id.) A repeat stress test in February 1997, however, revealed two changes: “evidence of an area of septal and anteroseptal reversible ischemia which may indicate an element of ischemia,” and “a mild fixed inferior defect which may represent diaphragmatic attenuation artifact versus possible inferior scarring.” (R. 126.) The Board discounted the latter finding because it was most likely a diaphragmatic attenuation artifact, but stated that the ischemia was not so easily discounted, despite being inconsistent with the negative angiograms. ( Id.) Although the Board ultimately diagnosed Plaintiff with probable acute myocardial ischemia due to coronary disease, it reiterated that this was not “an open and shut case of easily identifiable and recognizable ischemia or infarction.” ( Id.)

2. Evidence During the Relevant Period
a. Dr. Tenet's Report

An undated and unsigned disability report from Dr. Tenet reported that the doctor had been treating Plaintiff every six to seven months. (R. 130.) The report listed treating diagnoses of hyperlipidemia and arteriosclerotic heart disease. ( Id.) It also noted that Plaintiff was asymptomatic, and had experienced weight gain. ( Id.) The report stated that Plaintiff was not experiencing chest pain or anginal equivalent. (R. 131.) The sections of the report relating to Plaintiff's limitations of physical activity-including his capacity to lift, carry, walk, stand, sit, push and pull-were left blank. Besides this partially completed report from Dr. Tenet, the record contains no other medical evidence from Plaintiff's...

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