Hilson v. Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 17 April 2023
• Docket Number: 4:22-cv-00428-JEG-SBJ
• Parties: BAILEY HILSON, Plaintiff, v. WAUKEE COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT; BRAD BUCK, in his official capacity; and FAIROUZ BISHARA-RUNTIS, in her official capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

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BAILEY HILSON, Plaintiff, v. WAUKEE COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT; BRAD BUCK, in his official capacity; and FAIROUZ BISHARA-RUNTIS, in her official capacity, Defendants.

No. 4:22-cv-00428-JEG-SBJ

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division

April 17, 2023

ORDER

JAMES E. GRITZNER, SENIOR JUDGE U.S. DISTRICT COURT

This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss, ECF No 13, filed by Defendants Waukee Community School District Brad Buck, and Fairouz Bishara-Runtis. Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff Bailey Hilson's Amended Complaint ECF No. 12, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff resists. No party requested a hearing and the Court finds no cause for additional argument. The matter is fully submitted and ready for disposition.

I. BACKGROUND^[1]

At all times relevant, Bailey Hilson was a student at Northwest High School in the Waukee Community School District. She brings this action against the District, superintendent Brad Buck, and Northwest High School principal Fairouz Bishara-Runtis. According to her operative Amended Complaint, Hilson attended a school-sponsored band trip to Omaha, Nebraska, on September 18, 2021. Traveling with Hilson were multiple parent volunteers, who Hilson describes as improperly trained and unsupervised. At some point during the trip, Hilson, who is black, alleges she was “singled out by her race and verbally and physically abused by one or more parent volunteers due to her race.” Am. Comp. ¶ 10, ECF No. 12. In addition, Hilson and two other black students were required to sit in the back of the bus during the drive back from Omaha to Waukee. Hilson characterizes her placement on the bus as “a pathetic and embarrassing scene reminiscent of our nation's history of segregation in public transportation.” Id. ¶ 13.

The District conducted an investigation into Hilson's allegations of mistreatment on the September 18th band trip. The investigation culminated in an investigative report and a referral to the Waukee Police Department. Buck and Bishara-Runtis were directly involved in the investigation process. According to Hilson, Defendants' response to her allegations was a “sham.” Id. ¶ 13. She alleges the investigative report failed to address her allegations of race discrimination. Id. Hilson also alleges that Defendants knew the Waukee Police Department had no authority to investigate conduct that took place in Nebraska.

Hilson asserts that one or more unnamed parent volunteers continued to harass her after the September 18th band trip. Specifically, Hilson alleges the volunteers stalked her and other black students at school and at school events. Hilson alleges she told District officials that she felt unsafe at school, but they refused to assist her. She further alleges the District allowed the parent volunteers to “pursue a complaint” against Hilson but refused to investigate her own claim of retaliation. Id.

On July 5, 2022, Hilson filed an administrative complaint against Defendants with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission. She received a right-to-sue letter and, on November 18, 2022, commenced this lawsuit in the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, asserting various state and federal claims against the District, Buck, and Bishara-Runtis. Defendants timely removed. They then filed a motion to dismiss Hilson's petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing Hilson had failed to allege facts sufficient to support any of her theories of liability. Hilson resisted dismissal and also moved to amend. The Court granted Hilson leave to revise her pleadings.

On January 24, 2023, Hilson filed her Amended Complaint, ECF No. 12. The Amended Complaint enumerates eight causes of action: (1) common law negligence; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) bullying, in violation of Iowa Code § 280.28; (4) assault and battery; (5) due process violations under state and federal law; (6) equal protection violations under state and federal law; (7) violations of the Iowa Civil Rights Act and the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (8) a “violation of public policy by creating and maintaining an unsafe environment.” Am. Compl. ¶ 15, ECF No. 12. Defendants subsequently refiled their motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). They contend Hilson's Amended Complaint continues to allege insufficient factual matter to plausibly support any of her legal claims.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard for the Motion

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead sufficient factual matter to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Edwards v. City of Florissant, 58 F.4th 372, 376 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ahern Rentals, Inc. v. EquipmentShare.com, Inc., 59 F.4th 948, 953 (8th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)). “If, on the other hand, the plaintiff pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, the complaint stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Edwards, 58 F.4th at 377 (“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not shown- that the pleader is entitled to relief.” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).^[2]

In deciding whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility test, the Court must “accept ‘as true the complaint's factual allegations and grant[] all reasonable inferences to the non-moving party.'” Park Irmat Drug Corp. v. Express Scripts Holding Co., 911 F.3d 505, 512 (8th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 2009)). This rule “is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” which the Court may disregard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Likewise, “‘naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement,' do not suffice, nor do ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.'” Roberson v. Dakota Boys & Girls Ranch, 42 F.4th 924, 928 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). With few exceptions, the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis is constrained to factual matter alleged in the complaint. See Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab., Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 931 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he court generally must ignore materials outside the pleadings, but it may consider some materials that are part of the public record or do not contradict the complaint, as well as materials that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings.” (citations omitted)).

B. Hilson's Federal Claims

Because the Court's removal jurisdiction in this matter is based on federal questions, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a), the Court turns first to Hilson's claims under the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.^[3]

1. Due Process

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This language confers two different protections: procedural due process and substantive due process. Procedural due process requires states to observe minimum procedural safeguards before depriving a person of a protected interest-generally, “notice and . . . an ‘opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'” Mitchell v. Dakota Cnty. Soc. Servs., 959 F.3d 887, 897 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Swipies v. Kofka, 419 F.3d 709, 715 (8th Cir. 2005)). Substantive due process, by contrast, “protects individual liberties from government action ‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.'” Id. at 898 (quoting Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 2010)).

Hilson brings a substantive due process claim. To prevail, she must “demonstrate that a fundamental right was violated and that the [Defendants'] conduct shocks the conscience.” Id. (citing Folkerts v. City of Waverly, 707 F.3d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 2013)). According to Hilson, Defendants violated her right to be free from discrimination at school by allowing unsupervised volunteers to attend the band trip, by failing to protect her from the volunteers' subsequent harassment, and by otherwise “[r]efusing to assist [her] in dealing with the ramifications of the incident.” Am. Compl. ¶ 13, ECF No. 12. Hilson also alleges Defendants “actively participat[ed] in the racial discrimination” and “encouraged [her] continued victimization” by the volunteers. Id. ¶ 15.

Generally speaking, there is no substantive due process right to governmental protection against private harm. DeShaney v Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989). Exceptions exist only when a plaintiff “is in the state's custody against her will” or when the state “created the danger” that harmed the plaintiff. K.B. v. Waddle, 764 F.3d 821, 824 (8th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). Hilson argues this is a created-danger case. However, Eighth Circuit precedent is clear that neither the created-danger exception nor the custodial exception entitles a student to protection from private misconduct at school. See Lee v. Pine Bluff Sch. Dist., 472 F.3d 1026, 1030 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[S]tate-mandated school attendance does not entail so restrictive a custodial relationship as to impose upon the State the same duty to protect it owes to prison inmates, or to the involuntarily institutionalized.” (quoting Dorothy J....