Hilton v. Kijakazi
| Decision Date | 09 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-CV-9318 (RWL) |
| Citation | 602 F.Supp.3d 558 |
| Parties | Jennifer HILTON, Plaintiff, v. Kilolo KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Joseph Albert Romano, Law Office of Joseph A. Romano, Bronx, NY, for Plaintiff.
Nahid Sorooshyari, Sergei Aden, Sixtina Fernandez, Social Security Administration, Office of the General Counsel, New York, NY, for Defendant Andrew Saul.
DECISION AND ORDER: SOCIAL SECURITY APPEAL
Plaintiff Jennifer Hilton, represented by counsel, commenced the instant action against Defendant Commissioner (the "Commissioner") of the Social Security Administration (the "Administration"), pursuant to the Social Security Act (the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of the Commissioner's decision that Hilton is not entitled to disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). Hilton moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure, asking the Court to vacate the administrative decision and remand the case for further consideration of Hilton's documented impairments. (Dkts. 21, 22.) The Commissioner cross-moved for summary judgment and asks the Court to affirm the Commissioner's decision. (Dkts. 24, 25.) For the reasons explained below, this Court GRANTS Hilton's motion and DENIES the Commissioner's motion.
On April 13, 2018, Hilton filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits beginning on August 26, 2016. (R. 10.2 ) Hilton claimed disability due to impairments in her right knee, hip, shoulder, wrist and hand, as well as insomnia. (R. 61.)
On July 2, 2018, the Administration denied Hilton's claim. (R. 10.) Hilton filed a written request for a hearing on July 17, 2018. (R. 86.) On May 31, 2019, Hilton, represented by counsel, appeared and testified at an in-person hearing before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Robert Schriver. (R. 37-39.) A vocational expert ("VE"), Mitchell Schmidt, also appeared and testified. (R. 37.) On June 17, 2019, the ALJ issued a decision finding Hilton not disabled and capable of performing work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. (R. 18.) On September 8, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Hilton's request for review of the ALJ's decision, and the ALJ's decision became the final determination of the Commissioner. (R. 1-6.)
Hilton filed her Complaint in this action on November 6, 2020, seeking district court review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Dkt. 1.) On January 4, 2021, the parties consented to proceeding before the undersigned. (Dkt. 12.)
A United States District Court may affirm, modify, or reverse (with or without remand) a final decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ; Skrodzki v. Commissioner Of Social Security Administration , 693 F. App'x 29, 29 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order). The inquiry is "whether the correct legal standards were applied and whether substantial evidence supports the decision." Butts v. Barnhart , 388 F.3d 377, 384 (2d Cir. 2004) ; see also Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (same).
" ‘Failure to apply the correct legal standard constitutes reversible error, including, in certain circumstances, failure to adhere to the applicable regulations.’ " Douglass v. Astrue , 496 F. App'x 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2012) (). Courts review de novo whether the correct legal principles were applied and whether the legal conclusions made by the ALJ were based on those principles. See Johnson v. Bowen , 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987) (); Townley v. Heckler , 748 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1984) (); Thomas v. Astrue , 674 F.Supp.2d 507, 515, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ().
If the reviewing court is satisfied that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards, then the court must " ‘conduct a plenary review of the administrative record to determine if there is substantial evidence, considering the record as a whole, to support the Commissioner's decision.’ " Brault v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner , 683 F.3d 443, 447 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Moran v. Astrue , 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) ). Substantial evidence is defined as " " Schaal v. Apfel , 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) ); see also Biestek v. Berryhill , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, 203 L.Ed.2d 504 (2019) (reaffirming same standard). "The substantial evidence standard means once an ALJ finds facts, [the court] can reject those facts only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise ." Brault , 683 F.3d at 448 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ().
To be supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ's decision must be based on consideration of "all evidence available in [the claimant]’s case record." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(B). The Act requires the ALJ to set forth "a discussion of the evidence" and the "reasons upon which [the decision] is based." 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1). While the ALJ's decision need not "mention[ ] every item of testimony presented," Mongeur v. Heckler , 722 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam), or " ‘reconcile explicitly every conflicting shred of medical testimony,’ " Zabala v. Astrue , 595 F.3d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Fiorello v. Heckler , 725 F.2d 174, 176 (2d Cir. 1983) ), the ALJ may not ignore or mischaracterize evidence of a person's alleged disability. See Ericksson v. Commissioner Of Social Security , 557 F.3d 79, 82-84 (2d Cir. 2009) (mischaracterizing evidence); Kohler , 546 F.3d at 268-69 (); Ruiz v. Barnhart , No. 01-CV-1120, 2002 WL 826812, at *6 (ignoring evidence).
Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner's conclusion must be upheld. Rutherford v. Schweiker , 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982). The court must afford the Commissioner's determination considerable deference and " ‘may not substitute its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo review.’ " Jones v. Sullivan , 949 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Valente v. Secretary Of Health And Human Services , 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984) ); Dunston v. Colvin, No. 14-CV-3859, 2015 WL 54169, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2015) (same) (quoting Jones , 949 F.2d at 59 ), R. & R. adopted , 2015 WL 1514837 (S.D.N.Y. April 2, 2015). Accordingly, if a court finds that there is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner's decision, the court must uphold the decision, even if there is also substantial evidence for the claimant's position. Genier v. Astrue , 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010). "The Court, however, will not defer to the Commissioner's determination if it is the product of legal error." Dunston , 2015 WL 54169 at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing, inter alia, Douglass , 496 F. App'x at 156 ; Tejada v. Apfel , 167 F.3d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1999) ).
Under the Act, a person meeting certain requirements and considered to have a disability is entitled to disability benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). The Act defines disability as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A claimant's impairments must be "of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
To determine whether an individual is disabled and therefore entitled to disability benefits, the Commissioner conducts a five-step inquiry. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in any substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b). If so, the claimant is not eligible for benefits and the inquiry ceases.
If the claimant is not engaged in any such activity, the Commissioner proceeds to the second step and must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment, which is an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c). If the claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that are severe, the claimant is not entitled to benefits and the inquiry ends.
If the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the Commissioner continues to step three and must determine whether the impairment or combinations of impairments is, or medically equals, one of the impairments included in the "Listings" of the regulations contained at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. If the claimant's impairment or impairments meet or medically equal one of those listings,...
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