Hilton v. State
Decision Date | 05 July 2007 |
Docket Number | No. SC05-438.,SC05-438. |
Citation | 961 So.2d 284 |
Parties | Tristan HILTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Anthony C. Musto, Special Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, FL, for Petitioner.
Bill, McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Robert J. Krauss, Bureau Chief, Tampa Criminal Appeals, and Marilyn Muir Beccue, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Respondent.
We have for review a decision of a district court of appeal on the following question, which the court certified to be of great public importance:
MAY A POLICE OFFICER CONSTITUTIONALLY CONDUCT A SAFETY INSPECTION STOP UNDER SECTION 316.610 AFTER THE OFFICER HAS OBSERVED A CRACKED WINDSHIELD, BUT BEFORE THE OFFICER HAS DETERMINED THE FULL EXTENT OF THE CRACK?
Hilton v. State, 901 So.2d 155, 160 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We rephrase the certified question to more closely relate to the applicable statute and facts as follows:
WHETHER A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER MAY STOP A VEHICLE FOR A WINDSHIELD CRACK ON THE BASIS THAT THE CRACK RENDERS THE WINDSHIELD "NOT IN PROPER ADJUSTMENT OR REPAIR" UNDER SECTION 310.610 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES (2001).
We answer this question in the negative and hold for the reasons discussed below that a cracked windshield violates section 316.610 only if it renders the vehicle in "such unsafe condition as to endanger any person or property." § 316.610, Fla. Stat. (2001).
On January 25, 2002, Clearwater police officers Sena and Harrison stopped Hilton's car after noticing that it had a crack in the windshield. The officers checked Hilton's identification for outstanding warrants and determined that Hilton was on probation for previously committing a felony. During the encounter, Officer Matthews, who had responded to the scene as backup, observed what initially appeared to be a rifle in plain view on the floor of the back seat of Hilton's car.
While escorting Hilton from the vehicle to the curb for purposes of taking him into custody for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, Officer Harrison smelled the odor of marijuana. Officer Harrison commenced a pat-down search of Hilton, and then another responding officer, Officer Dawe, observed a large bulge near the waistband of Hilton's shorts and proceeded to search Hilton as well. Officer Dawe's search revealed what was later determined to be forty-two bags of marijuana. Hilton was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana with intent to sell. Once the "rifle" was actually retrieved and removed from Hilton's vehicle and secured in the police cruiser, it was determined to be only a BB gun.1
Hilton filed a motion to suppress, asserting that the stop was improper because the crack in the windshield "was barely visible and located in the lower right corner of the windshield and did not obstruct any view of the driver" and because "[t]he rifle, at the scene, was determined to be a Daisy pump action air rifle." During a pretrial hearing, Officer Harrison indicated that the length of the crack was approximately seven or eight inches long. However, the testimony as to when Officers Harrison and Sena observed the crack was in severe conflict.2 Additionally, Officer Harrison testified that no glass was falling from the crack, and when asked if the crack would have obstructed the driver's view, he replied, Officer Harrison also stated that prior to the discovery of what initially appeared to be a rifle, his intention after checking Hilton's identification was solely to issue Hilton a warning for the cracked windshield and a seatbelt violation. Officer Sena testified that he knew Hilton was a convicted felon prior to the stop because he "worked a little over five years in the North Greenwood community in the community policing unit there, so I knew [Hilton] from the community." Officer Sena further testified that he and Harrison would not have stopped Hilton but for the crack in the windshield.
In ruling on the motion to suppress, the judge admitted that he had concerns about the conflicting testimony of the officers. Nevertheless, the trial judge denied the motion, stating:
[O]n reflection and review and consideration of the law . . . I think I have to at this point accept the testimony of the officers, notwithstanding conflict and notwithstanding that I can think of other possibilities, that I think the proper standard would be to accept that they observed the crack in the windshield, which was supported by the ultimate finding of the crack in the windshield, and that was the objective basis of the stop.
Hilton subsequently pled no contest to possession of marijuana, but reserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.
On appeal, the Second District initially held that the officers had no authority to stop Hilton's car and reversed his conviction. See Hilton v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (Hilton I). The court initially stated that while section 316.2952 of the Florida Statutes (2001) mandates that cars be equipped with a windshield and have working windshield wipers, the section says nothing about cracks. See id. at D1475. The Second District noted in its first opinion that section 316.610 of the Florida Statutes provides that it is a traffic violation to drive a car that either is unsafe or does not contain equipment in the proper condition. See id. However, because section 316.2952 merely requires a car to have a windshield, but does not contain requirements for the "proper condition" of the windshield, the initial panel of the Second District reasoned that driving with a cracked windshield would be a traffic violation only if it violated the "unsafe condition" portion of section 316.610. See id. The court concluded that "the evidence did not show that the crack in Hilton's windshield blocked the driver's view or otherwise placed the car in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person or property." Id. at D1476.
However, the Second District subsequently granted rehearing en banc and then affirmed Hilton's conviction, concluding that because section 316.2952 of the Florida Statutes requires a windshield on every motor vehicle, the officers lawfully stopped Hilton because his cracked windshield constituted a noncriminal traffic infraction. See Hilton v. State, 901 So.2d 155, 156-57 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (Hilton II). On rehearing, the Second District noted that section 316.610(1) of the Florida Statutes authorizes a police officer to stop a driver and submit a vehicle to an inspection if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the vehicle is "unsafe or not equipped as required by law or that its equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair." Id. at 157 (quoting § 316.610(1)). The court reasoned from this statutory language that the Legislature did not intend to limit the authority of the police only to cases in which the defective equipment created an immediate or heightened level of risk. See id. In further support of its conclusion on rehearing, the Second District quoted the opening paragraph of section 316.610, which provides:
It is a violation of this chapter for any person to drive . . . any vehicle . . . which is in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person or property, or which does not contain those parts or is not at all times equipped with such lamps and other equipment in proper condition and adjustment as required in this chapter, or which is equipped in any manner in violation of this chapter. . . . Id. (quoting § 316.610(1)). The Second District concluded that because a windshield is required by section 316.2952, it is a violation of section 316.610 to drive a vehicle with a windshield that is not in proper condition. See id. The Second District also noted that because subsection (2) of section 316.610 authorizes an officer to give a driver written notice to repair a vehicle equipment defect even where that defect does not present unduly hazardous operating conditions, officers may properly stop a vehicle to give such a notice. See id.
The Second District additionally held on rehearing that section 316.610(1) does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See id. The court concluded that this statute was not created by the Legislature as a means of criminal investigation; rather, the Legislature intended "to create a noncriminal safety stop to permit police to perform a quick vehicle-specific safety inspection that is cheaper and less intrusive, and arguably more effective, than methods of mandatory, annual vehicle inspection." Id. at 157-58. Moreover, the Second District concluded that even if a cracked windshield constitutes a traffic violation only if it creates an unsafe condition, an officer may be reasonable in his or her belief that the crack met such criterion, although an examination of the windshield after the stop ultimately revealed that the crack did not. See id. at 159.
Concluding that the issue presented by this case "affects the power of law enforcement throughout the state," the Second District certified the above-quoted question to this Court as one of great public importance. See id. at 160.
It is a question of statutory interpretation as to whether section 316.610 of the Florida Statutes permits a stop for a cracked windshield on the basis that the crack renders the windshield "not in proper adjustment or repair," even if the crack does not otherwise render the vehicle unsafe. Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So.2d 287, 289 (Fla.2003).
Section 316.610 of the Florida Statutes, a general statute addressing defective equipment on vehicles, provides, in pertinent part:
316.610. Safety of vehicle; inspection. — It is a violation of this chapter for any person to drive . . ....
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Harris v. State
......United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)). The burden is on the State to demonstrate that the police had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search. See Doctor v. State, 596 So.2d 442, 445 (Fla.1992); see also Hilton v. State, 961 So.2d 284, 296 (Fla.2007) (“When a search or seizure is conducted without a warrant, the government bears the burden of demonstrating that the search or seizure was reasonable.”). When it comes to the use of drug-detection dogs, the United States Supreme Court has ......
-
Heien v. North Carolina
......The officers arrested both men. 135 S.Ct. 535 366 N.C. 271, 272–273, 737 S.E.2d 351, 352–353 (2012) ; App. 5–6, 25, 37. The State charged Heien with attempted trafficking in cocaine. Heien moved to suppress the evidence seized from the car, contending that the stop and search ...Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1279–1280 (C.A.11 2003). Five States have agreed. See Hilton v. State, 961 So.2d 284, 298 (Fla.2007) ; State v. Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Iowa 2010) ; Martin v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 285 Kan. 625, ......
-
Gilmore v. State
...... See also [204 Md.App. 574] People v. Ramirez, 140 Cal.App.4th 849 [854], 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 813 [816] (2006)[ (a suspicion founded on a mistake of law cannot constitute the reasonable basis for a lawful traffic stop) ]; Hilton v. State, 961 So.2d 284 [298–99] (Fla.2007)[ (small crack in lower right windshield did not render defendant's vehicle unsafe or provide a particularized and objective basis for the stop) ]; Martin v. Kan. Dep't of Rev., 285 Kan. 625 [639], 176 P.3d 938 [948] (2008)[ (officer misunderstood and ......
-
Heien v. Northcarolina
...1244 (C.A.10 2013); United States v. Chanthasouxat,342 F.3d 1271, 1279–1280 (C.A.11 2003). Five States have agreed. See Hilton v. State,961 So.2d 284, 298 (Fla.2007); State v. Louwrens,792 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Iowa 2010); Martin v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue,285 Kan. 625, 637–639, 176 P.3d 938, 94......