Hilton v. Stewart

• Decision Date: 23 June 1908
• Citation: 15 Idaho 150,96 P. 579
• Parties: ANNIE F. A. HILTON, Respondent, v. SAMUEL W. STEWART, Executor of the Estate of JOHN R. PARK, Deceased, Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

96 P. 579

15 Idaho 150

ANNIE F. A. HILTON, Respondent, v. SAMUEL W. STEWART, Executor of the Estate of JOHN R. PARK, Deceased, Appellant

Supreme Court of Idaho

June 23, 1908

FOREIGN JUDGMENTS-EVIDENCE-MARRIAGE-RES ADJUDICATA-ESTOPPEL.

1. Under sec. 2428, Rev. Stat., "All marriages contracted without this state, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in this state."

2. The judgment and decree of the supreme court of the state of Utah, adjudging and decreeing a marriage performed in that state, to be a common-law marriage and to evidence which the following certificate was issued: "John Rockey Park born Tiffin, Seneca, Ohio, 7 May, 1833. Annie Flora Armitage born Nottinghill, London, 19 February, 1853. The above parties were sealed by Prest. D. H. Wells in the presence of Emeline Free Young, at her residence in Salt Lake City, U T., Dec. 5, 1872. The lady being on her supposed death bed. Daniel H. Wells,"-is admissible in evidence in an action in this state involving the marriage status between the same parties.

3. The judgment and decree of the supreme court of the state of Utah, adjudging and decreeing a marriage performed in that state to be valid, in an action involving the validity of such marriage, controls and governs this court, in an action in this state between the same parties involving the validity of such marriage and the marriage status of the parties thereto.

4. To make the matter res adjudicata, it is immaterial that the question alleged to have been settled by a former adjudication was determined in a different kind of proceeding or a different form of action from that in which the estoppel is claimed. The test is, was the question actually and directly in issue and judicially determined in the former suit between the same parties or their privies by a court of competent jurisdiction?

5. A person nominated as executor by a will probated in the state of Utah, and appointed as such in that state, and afterward appointed administrator (with the will annexed) in this state, represents said estate in both jurisdictions, and occupies the same position with reference to all controversies and suits by or against said estate, and in that respect, and to that extent, is the same person in both states.

6. The courts of Utah, having decided that a divorce granted by the Mormon church was illegal and void, and did not terminate the marriage relation between the parties thereto, in an action involving the validity of said divorce, fixed and determined the status of such parties, and controls and governs the courts of this state in an action involving the validity of such divorce.

7. A wife, who does not assert her rights to or interest in the property of her husband until after his death, even though living separate and apart from such husband, but does assert such right immediately after the death of such husband, and prosecutes her action with diligence, is not guilty of laches or estopped from asserting such right.

8. In an action involving the validity of a marriage and the right of a surviving wife or widow to her interest as such in her deceased husband's property, she is not estopped from maintaining such action on the ground of public policy, morality or decency, where it appears that she may have honestly believed that she had been legally divorced from her said husband, even though she has lived with another as his wife.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, for Fremont County. Hon. James M. Stevens, Judge.

An action to determine the right of the wife to a one-half interest in the property of the husband at the time of his death, and to have such interest set off and decreed to said applicant upon the final settlement of said estate. Judgment for petitioner affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. Costs awarded to the respondent.

Barnard J. Stewart, and Jesse R. S. Budge, for Appellant.

The doctrine of res adjudicata cannot apply, for the reason the subject matter is not the same, the parties to the action are not the same, and the jurisdiction of the Utah courts does not extend over the subject matter and persons of which the Idaho court has jurisdiction. In order to render a matter res adjudicata, there must be the existence of four conditions, viz.: (1) Identity of the thing sued for; (2) Identity of the cause of action; (3) Identity of the person or parties to the action; (4) Identity of the quality in the persons for or against whom the claims are made. (24 Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 725, 728, 733, 735, cases cited; 765, 778, 779, 780; 9 Ency. of Pl. & Pr., 622, 626; 1 Herman on Estoppel and Res Adjudicata, secs. 115, 290-292.)

A probate decree is only binding as to the property actually before the court, i. e., that of which the decedent had died seised; and only upon those claiming such decree or some interest in the property; it is not binding upon any person who had no right to be present, offer testimony as to the matter before the court, and appeal therefrom. Therefore, it establishes the status of the widow only as to property before the court in the probate proceeding. (2 Black on Judgments, secs. 638, 638a; Brigham v. Fayerweather, 140 Mass. 411, 5 N.E. 265; Malona v. Schwing, 101 Ky. 56, 39 S.W. 523; Bailey v. Sundberg, 49 F. 583, 1 C. C. A. 387; Shores v. Hooper, 153 Mass. 228, 26 N.E. 846, 11 L. R. A. 308; Sorenson v. Sorenson, 68 Neb. 483, 94 N.W. 540, 98 N.W. 837, 100 N.W. 930, 103 N.W. 455; Backdahl v. Grand Lodge, 46 Minn. 61, 48 N.W. 454; Morin v. St. Paul M. & N. Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 176, 22 N.W. 251; Kosmerl v. Snively, 85 Minn. 228, 88 N.W. 753; Stacey v. Henke & Pillot, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 462, 74 S.W. 925; Bath v. Valdez, 70 Cal. 359, 11 P. 724; Walker v. Daley, 80 Wis. 222, 49 N.W. 812; 1 Freeman on Judgments, 4th edition, sec. 319B, p. 581; 2 Id., sec. 611, p. 1063; Van Camp v. Fowler, 16 N.Y.S. 281, 61 Hun, 626; affirmed, 133 N.Y. 600, 30 N.E. 1147; Chever v. Ching Hong Poy, 82 Cal. 68, 22 P. 1081; Chadburne v. Hartz, 93 Minn. 233, 101 N.W. 68; Sumner v. Sumner, 121 Ga. 1, 48 S.E. 727; In re Morris et al., 91 N.Y.S. 706, 100 A.D. 479; Reed v. Whipple, 140 Mich. 7, 103 N.W. 548; 19 Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 1093, 1094; Darcy v. Kelley, 153 Mass. 433; 26 N.E. 1110; Martin v. Tally, 72 Ala. 23; Woodruff v. Taylor, 20 Vt. 72.)

The parties to this action are not the same as those to the Utah actions, and the thing sued for in the Utah cases was Utah real estate, in the Idaho cases is Idaho real estate, so the thing sued for is not the same. The identity of the causes of action is not the same; hence it cannot be res adjudicata. The tribunals of one state have no jurisdiction over persons beyond its limits, and can only inquire into their applications to its citizens when exercising its conceded jurisdiction over the property within its limits. (1 Herman on Estoppel and Res Adjudicata, secs. 518, 623.)

The executor in Idaho and the executor in Utah are not, in contemplation of law, one and the same person; they received their authority in different jurisdictions, and are separate and distinct from each other, and a judgment against the executor of the Park estate in Utah could have no controlling effect in determining the marital status or property rights as against the executor in Idaho. (Johnston v. McKinnon, 129 Ala. 223, 29 So. 696; Story on Conflict of Law, sec. 522; Aspden v. Nixon, 4 How. (U. S.) 467, 11 L.Ed. 1057; Stacy v. Thrasher, 6 How. (U. S.) 44, 12 L.Ed. 337; McLean v. Meek, 18 How. (U. S.) 16, 15 L.Ed. 277; Low v. Bartlett, 8 Allen, 259; 1 Freeman on Judgments, sec. 163; Jefferson v. Beall, 117 Ala. 436, 67 Am. St. Rep. 177, 23 So. 44; Johnson v. Powers, 139 U.S. 159, 11 S.Ct. 525, 35 L.Ed. 112; Johnson v. Johnson, 63 Hun, 4, 17 N.Y.S. 570; Ela v. Edward, 13 Allen, 48, 90 Am. Dec. 174; Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 272, 11 S.Ct. 773, 35 L.Ed. 464; Price v. Mace, 47 Wis. 23, 1 N.W. 336.)

A judgment against an ancillary administrator furnishes no cause of action, and is not even evidence against a domiciliary executor or administrator, and likewise a judgment against a domiciliary administrator creates no cause of action and is not evidence against an ancillary administrator; the rule is the same whether the domiciliary and ancillary administrators be the same or different persons. (2 Wharton on Conflict of Laws, 1382, sec. 629A; Johnson v. Powers, 139 U.S. 156, 11 S.Ct. 525, 35 L.Ed. 112; Hill v. Tucker, 13 How. (U. S.) 458, 14 L.Ed. 223; Stacey v. Thrasher, 6 How. (U. S.) 44, 12 L.Ed. 337; McGarvey v. Darnall, 134 Ill. 367, 25 N.E. 1005, 10 L. R. A. 861; Story on Conflict of Laws, sec. 522; Freeman on Judgments, sec. 163; Judy v. Kelley, 11 Ill. 211, 50 Am. Dec. 455; Rosenthal v. Renick, 44 Ill. 202.)

It appears from the record in this case that new and additional evidence is now before this court, which was never submitted to the supreme court of the state of Utah, which said in the case of Hilton v. Roylance that not a single officer of the church who was qualified was put upon the stand to testify as to the meaning of the word "sealed" in Mormon parlance, and it appearing from the present record that we have the testimony of an apostle of the Mormon church and editor of the "Deseret News," the official organ of the church, as to the meaning of the term "sealed," it is certainly competent and proper for this court, there being a new record in the case, to consider and determine the question as to whether or not Mrs. Hilton was the wife and is the surviving widow of John R. Park. (Arthur v. Israel, 15 Colo. 147, 22 Am. St. Rep. 381, 25 P. 82, 10 L. R. A. 693; Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 394, 57 P. 1, 45 L. R. A. 628.)

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