Hilyer v. Dunn

• Decision Date: 28 October 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION 15-00356-WS-N
• Parties: DONALD R. HILYER, JR. (AIS #165924), Plaintiff, v. JEFFERSON S. DUNN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

DONALD R. HILYER, JR. (AIS #165924), Plaintiff, v. JEFFERSON S. DUNN, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION 15-00356-WS-N

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

October 28, 2016

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Donald R. Hilyer, Jr., an Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72(a)(2)(R), and is now before the undersigned on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docs. 29, 30, 34). After careful review of the pleadings, and for the reasons set out below, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be granted, and Plaintiff Hilyer's federal claims be dismissed with prejudice.

I. Summary of Allegations.

Plaintiff Donald R. Hilyer, Jr. is within the custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections and was confined at Fountain Correctional Facility (Fountain) and J.O. Davis Work Release Center, in Atmore, Alabama, as well as the Loxley Community Work Center (Loxley Work Release), in Loxley, Alabama at all times relevant to this action.

The background to Hilyer's complaint begins on December 31, 2014, when Hilyer suffered a seizure while incarcerated at J.O. Davis Work Release Center (J.O. Davis). (Doc. 9-1 at 1). Following the seizure, Hilyer was immediately transferred to the medical infirmary at Fountain and then airlifted by Life Flight to Mobile Infirmary, in Mobile, Alabama, for treatment. (Id.). Physicians at Mobile Infirmary diagnosed Hilyer with oligodendroglioma, a cancerous brain tumor, which was determined to have caused the seizure. (Doc. 30-2 at 1-12).

Hilyer was hospitalized for 21 days in Mobile Infirmary during which time he underwent surgical treatment for partial removal of the brain tumor and was placed on prescription anti-seizure medications, Keppra and Dilantin, to control any potential seizure activity. (Doc. 9-1 at 1). Additionally, radiation therapy was prescribed and received to destroy the portions of the tumor remaining after surgery. (Doc. 7 at 6).

Upon discharge from the hospital on January 20, 2015, Hilyer returned to the infirmary at Fountain, where he received all prescribed medications and radiation treatments. (See Doc. 30; Doc. 9-1 at 1). On April 14, 2015, infirmary discharge papers were signed by the prison's physician, and Hilyer returned to J.O. Davis the following day, with orders to take, amongst other medications, Keppra twice daily (at 5:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m.) and Dilantin three times daily (at 5:00 a.m., 11:00 a.m., and 6:00 p.m.). (Doc. 30-10 at 97). Hilyer remained at J.O. Davis for one week before being transferred to Loxley Work Release on April 21, 2015. (Doc. 9-1 at 1). However, within hours of arriving at Loxley Work Release, Hilyer suffered another seizure. (Id.).

The medical records state that while walking to a water fountain at Loxley Work Release, Hilyer experienced seizure like activity on April 21, 2015; Hilyer was reportedlyfound "lying on the floor, bleeding from his mouth with his eyes open, conscious." (Doc. 30 at 5). At 6:11 p.m., orders were given for him to be transported to Fountain's infirmary for necessary treatment and observation. (Doc. 30-11 at 1). Hilyer arrived at Fountain's health ward approximately one hour later and was examined by nursing staff at 7:35 p.m. on April 21, 2015, where he exhibited no signs of active seizure activity and was held for observation for 24 hours. (Doc. 30-11 at 3, 6).

On June 18, 2015, Plaintiff Hilyer brought this § 1983 action¹ alleging Eighth Amendment violations against: (1) Defendant Katherine Gibson, Administrator of Health Services, for denying him prescribed anti-seizure medications during the week of April 15 through 21, 2015, (2) Jefferson Dunn, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, as Defendant Gibson's supervisor and for failure to pay cost of medical care, and (3) Shawn Geohagen, Certified Registered Nurse Practitioner, for denying him vitamins, dietary profile change, and medical treatment. (Doc. 9 at 5; Doc. 9-1 at 1; Doc. 18). He seeks compensatory and punitive damages from each defendant, payment of his medical bills, and his release from prison.² (Doc. 9 at 7, Doc. 7 at 7; Doc. 18 at 1).

Defendants have answered the suit, and their submitted Special Reports (Docs. 29, 30, 34) have been converted into a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 31). After a thorough review of the motion and Plaintiff's response thereto (Doc. 32), this motion is ripe for consideration.

II. Standard of Review.

Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ("The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment."); Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) ("[S]ummary judgment is appropriate even if 'some alleged factual dispute' between the parties remains, so long as there is 'no genuine issue of material fact.'").

The party seeking summary judgment has the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based upon the discovery instruments outlined in Rule 56(c), that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007) ("The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial."). Once this initial demonstration is made, the "responsibility then devolves upon the non-movant to show the existence of a genuine issue . . . [of] material fact." Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993); see also Allen, supra, at 1314 ("'When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then "go beyond the pleadings," and show by its own affidavits, or by "depositions, answers to interrogatories, andadmissions on file," designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'") internal citations omitted); see Comer v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 265 F.3d 1186, 1192 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Once the moving party discharges its initial burden of showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case, the non-moving party must specify facts proving the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial confirmed by affidavits, 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.'") (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Forbidding reliance upon pleadings precludes a party from "choos[ing] to wait until trial to develop claims or defenses relevant to the summary judgment motion." . . . This effectuates the purpose of summary judgment which "'is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" . . . Thus, "mere general allegations which do not reveal detailed and precise facts" will not prevent the award of summary judgment upon a court's determination that no genuine issue for trial exists.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 592 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Jones v. Resolution Trust Corp., 516 U.S. 817, 116 S. Ct. 74, 133 L.Ed.2d 33 (1995); see also LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1998) ("[The nonmoving party] must raise 'significant probative evidence' that would be sufficient for a jury to find for that party."). In other words, there is no genuine issue for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party[.]" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see Comer, supra, 265 F.3d at 1192 ("Summary judgment is required where the non-moving party's response to a motion is merely 'a repetition of his conclusional allegations' and is unsupported by evidence showing an issue for trial.").

In considering whether Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in this action, the undersigned has viewed the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff Hilyer. Comer, supra, 265 F.3d at 1192 ("We view the evidence and all factual inferences raised by it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-moving party.").

The requirement to view the facts in the nonmoving party's favor extends only to "genuine" disputes over material facts. A genuine dispute requires more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." A "mere scintilla" of evidence is insufficient; the non-moving party must produce substantial evidence in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

Garczynski, supra, 573 F.3d at 1165 (internal citations omitted). In addition, "[t]here is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be made based upon the materials before it on summary judgment." Resolution Trust Corp., supra, 43 F.3d at 599.

III. Analysis.

The Eighth Amendment provides that, "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits prison officials from exhibiting deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994); see also ...