Hince v. O'KEEFE

Decision Date09 August 2001
Docket NumberNo. C0-00-49.,C0-00-49.
Citation632 N.W.2d 577
PartiesJohn Willard HINCE, et al., Petitioners, Appellants, v. Michael O'KEEFE, Commissioner of the Department of Human Services, et al., Respondents.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Warren J. Mass, Brooklyn Park, Thomas Wilson, Gregory Solum, Edina, Mike Biglow, James Dahlquist, Allan Poncin, Brian Southwell, Minneapolis, Kathleen Rauenhorst, Roseville and Stephen Radtke, Bloomington, for Appellants.

Mike Hatch, Attorney General and Noah A. Cashman, for Respondents.

Eric S. Janus, St. Paul and Teresa J. Nelson, Minneapolis, for amicus curiae MN Civil Liberties Union.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

ANDERSON, Paul H., Justice.

Appellants are individuals civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (Sex Offender Program). Appellants commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the Commissioner of the Department of Human Services is required to establish a review board for the Sex Offender Program treatment facilities under Minn.Stat. § 253B.22, subd. 1 (2000). In their complaint, appellants assert that they should be treated like mentally ill and dangerous patients with respect to the establishment of a review board. They also assert constitutional violations stemming from the denial of a review board. The Ramsey County District Court dismissed appellants' action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. We reverse.

Appellants' Status

Appellants are currently housed at the Minnesota Sexual Psychopathic Personality Treatment Center in Moose Lake and one unit of the Minnesota Security Hospital in St. Peter. All were civilly committed under Minnesota's civil commitment statute, Minn.Stat. ch. 253B (2000). Specifically, appellants were committed as persons with sexual psychopathic personalities (SPP) or as sexually dangerous persons (SDP) as defined in Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subds. 18b and 18c (2000). Unlike other civil committees, those committed as SPPs, SDPs, and mentally ill and dangerous persons (MID)1 are committed for an indeterminate period of time and the statute does not require that they be committed to the least restrictive setting.2Compare Minn.Stat. § 253B.09, subds. 1 & 5 (2000), with Minn.Stat. § 253B.18, subds. 1 & 3 (2000). The conditions of confinement at the Sex Offender Program facilities are similar to those in a prison in that patients have restricted privileges, including lockdowns, yet their commitment is not punishment for an offense. Minnesota Sex Offender Program Resident Handbook Attachments A & B (1998); Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319-20 (Minn.1995). SPPs and SDPs may be released or transferred to a nonsecure facility only upon approval of the commissioner and a special review board. Minn.Stat. § 253B.18, subds. 4c(a) & 6 (2000).

History of the SPP and SDP Acts

The current civil commitment statutes for SPP and SDP are the product of a delicate balancing between the "legitimate public concern over the danger posed by predatory sex offenders" and the fundamental right of those persons committed to live their lives "free of physical restraint by the state." In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 912, 914 (Minn.1994). As early as 1939, the legislature attempted to address this problem by providing for the civil commitment of persons with psychopathic personalities. Id. at 912-13. The constitutionality of the psychopathic personality commitment provision was challenged by an individual committed under the act and upheld by our court and the United States Supreme Court. State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 (1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 270, 60 S.Ct. 523, 84 L.Ed. 744 (1940). We upheld the psychopathic personality commitment statute by limiting its focus, concluding that in order to commit a person as a psychopathic personality, the person must evidence an "utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses * * *." Id., 205 Minn. at 555, 287 N.W. at 302.

The Supreme Court further clarified the constitutional parameters of civil commitment in 1992. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992). In Foucha, the Court identified three circumstances under which due process is not violated by a state's confinement of an individual: (1) convicted criminals may be imprisoned for deterrence and retribution; (2) an individual may be committed if the state has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the person is mentally ill and dangerous; and (3) in certain narrow circumstances such as pretrial detention, the state may subject persons who pose a danger to others to a limited confinement. Id. at 80-81, 112 S.Ct. 1780. Civil commitment falls in the second category. Following the Foucha decision, we considered whether Minnesota's commitment provisions for persons with psychopathic personalities afforded due process to these persons. See Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915-16. We concluded that "[s]o long as civil commitment is programmed to provide treatment and periodic review, due process is provided." Id. at 916 (emphasis added).

In 1994, Dennis Linehan was scheduled to be released from prison after having completely served the sentence for his criminal convictions. However, before his release, the state sought to commit him as a psychopathic personality. In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609 (Minn.1994) (Linehan I). Linehan challenged his commitment and the district court upheld the commitment. On appeal, we concluded that the state had not proved the necessary elements to commit Linehan as a psychopathic personality. Id. at 614. In response to our decision, the legislature enacted the Sexually Dangerous Person Act (SDP Act). In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 869 (Minn.1999),cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1049, 120 S.Ct. 587, 145 L.Ed.2d 488 (1999) (Linehan IV). As written, the SDP Act commitment provisions differ from the psychopathic personality commitment provisions in that commitment as an SDP does not require proof that the person has an inability to control sexual impulses. Compare Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c (2000), with Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18b (2000).3 After enactment of the SDP Act, the state once again sought to commit Linehan, but this time under the new statute. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 174 (Minn.1996),vacated, 522 U.S. 1011, 118 S.Ct. 596, 139 L.Ed.2d 486 (1997) (Linehan III).4 When Linehan appealed, we upheld the constitutionality of the SDP Act, concluding that it applied only to those who were "mentally disordered" and dangerous and that SDPs may be confined so long as the state provides treatment for their disorders. Id. at 182, 188-89. Linehan appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Following our decision in Linehan III, the Supreme Court decided Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). In Hendricks, the Court concluded that a Kansas law for civilly committing sexually violent predators satisfied due process because it required a finding of dangerousness coupled with a finding of mental abnormality. 521 U.S. at 358-60, 117 S.Ct. 2072. The Court explained that the mental abnormality or personality disorder language set forth criteria relating to "an individual's inability to control his dangerousness" and was sufficient legal language, even if it was not precise medical terminology. Id. at 359-60, 117 S.Ct. 2072. The Court concluded that the "lack of volitional control, coupled with a prediction of future dangerousness * * * plainly suffices for due process purposes." Id. at 360, 117 S.Ct. 2072. Following its decision in Hendricks, the Court then granted certiorari in Linehan III, vacated our judgment, and remanded the case with instructions that it be reconsidered in light of Hendricks. Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d at 870-71.

On reconsideration following remand from the Supreme Court, we again concluded, with three justices dissenting, that the SDP Act satisfies due process requirements. See id. at 876, 878, 885, 887. We acknowledged that under the Supreme Court's holding in Hendricks, a finding of dangerousness alone was not sufficient justification for indefinite commitment. Id. at 872. We then interpreted the SDP Act in light of Hendricks and concluded that "the Minnesota SDP Act `requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.'" Id. at 875 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358,117 S.Ct. 2072). Thus, implicit in appellants' commitments as SDPs is a finding that they suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that "does not allow them to adequately control their sexual impulses * * *." Implicit in appellants' commitments as SPPs is a finding that they suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that renders them utterly unable to control their sexual impulses. Id. at 876.

Appellants' Claims

It is in light of this history of the SPP and SDP Acts that we consider appellants' claim that they are entitled to a review board under the civil commitment statute. Minnesota Statutes § 253B.22, subd. 1, requires the commissioner to "establish a review board of three or more persons for each regional [treatment] center to review the admission and retention of * * * patients receiving services under this chapter." Subdivision 2 of this section provides that "[e]ach treatment facility shall be visited by the review board at least once every six months. Upon request each patient in the treatment facility shall have the right to appear before the review board during the visit." Minn.Stat. § 253B.22, subd. 2 (2000). The review board reviews the admission and retention of patients and may investigate conditions affecting the care and treatment of patients in the treatment facility. Minn.Stat. § 253B.22,...

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