Hinch v. Elliott
| Citation | 175 A. 684,119 Conn. 207 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
| Decision Date | 20 November 1934 |
| Parties | HINCH v. ELLIOTT. |
Appeal from Superior Court, New London County; Frank P. McEvoy Judge.
Action by Leona Hinch to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, Thomas Elliott, brought to the Superior Court and tried to the jury. Verdict for the plaintiff, which the court, on the defendant's motion, set aside, and from this decision the plaintiff appealed.
No error.
Morris Lubchansky, of New London, and Charles V. James, of Norwich for appellant.
Arthur T. Keefe and J. James Floyd, both of New London, for appellee.
Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY JJ.
As far as the decisive issue upon this appeal is concerned, the facts were little in dispute. The jury could reasonably have found them as follows: The plaintiff, with her husband, his brother, and another woman went from the brother's cottage, in an automobile owned by him, about ten miles to a beach to bathe. The car was a Chevrolet roadster, with a rumble seat. On the trip to the beach the women occupied the rumble seat. On the way back they sat upon the front of the car, one on each side. The plaintiff's evidence was to the effect that they sat between the fenders of the car and the hood, and that she had her feet on the front bumper, holding to a rod which connected the headlights. The trial court states in its memorandum of decision granting the motion to set the verdict aside, that the court and jury examined the car and that it was so constructed that the women could not have sat between the fenders and the hood, but must have sat upon the top of the fenders. Their purpose in taking such a position was to dry their hair. A portion of the route from the beach to the cottage was along the Boston Post road, a much traveled highway. The car went along this road, until just before the accident, at a speed of thirty-five to forty miles an hour. As it approached an intersecting road, the defendant's car coming in the opposite direction, turned without signal to enter this road, thus crossing the path of the car on which the plaintiff was riding. The driver of the latter car applied his brakes and turned to the left, but the right front wheel of his car collided with the left rear wheel of that of the defendant. Neither car was overturned and the two men, sitting in the front seat of the roadster, were not thrown out and suffered no serious injury. The women were thrown off the car and both hurt. The trial court set aside the verdict rendered for the plaintiff upon the ground that she was guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law.
The trial court was right in holding that the plaintiff was negligent as matter of law. Even if upon this record we cannot accept as conclusive the statement in the memorandum of decision of the trial court as to the position of the plaintiff, but must proceed upon the assumption that the jury might have accepted the testimony she offered, it still remains true that her position upon the car was one of great danger. This is illustrated by the fact that the men sitting in the car were not thrown out or injured when the collision occurred, while both women were thrown to the ground. To ride perched upon the front of an automobile as the plaintiff did, over a much traveled road, subject to all the vicissitudes of traffic conditions, at a speed of thirty-five to forty miles an hour, was conduct so inherently dangerous as to justify the application of the rule stated in Guilfoile v. Smith, 97 Conn. 271, 273, 116 A. 237, 238: " Certain conduct may be so obviously negligent as to justify a court in so describing it."
The question remains, Did that negligence so contribute to the accident as to defeat the right of the plaintiff to recover? In Montambault v. Waterbury & Milldale Tramway Co., 98 Conn. 584, 120 A. 145, we held that where the plaintiff was standing upon the front bumper of a trolley car when a collision occurred between it and another car, due to negligence in the operation of...
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Hosford v. Clark
...132, 138(9); Carpenter v. Kessner, Mo.App., 330 S.W.2d 270, 271(1); Hathaway v. Evans, Mo.App., 235 S.W.2d 407, 412(13).5 Hinch v. Elliott, 119 Conn. 207, 175 A. 684; Wheeler v. Buerkle, 14 Cal.App.2d 368, 58 P.2d 230; Granfield v. Herlihy, 322 Mass. 313, 77 N.E.2d 225; Central Transfer & S......
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Kinderavich v. Palmer
...to a certain hazard but was not negligent with reference to the particular risk which resulted in the injury. See Hinch v. Elliott, 119 Conn. 207, 209, 175 A. 684; Kryger y. Panaszy, 123 Conn. 353, 358, 195 A. 795; Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 477, 12 A.2d 646. Within this class we hav......
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Kinderavich v. Palmer
...... regard to a certain hazard but was not negligent with. reference to the particular risk which resulted in the. injury. See Hinch v. Elliott, 119 Conn. 207, 209,. 175 A. 684; Kryger v. Panaszy, 123 Conn. 353, 358,. 195 A. 795; Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 477,. 12 ......
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Melcher v. Murphy
...him from speeding. It is clear that riding the fender under such circumstances was negligence. In another case, Hinch v. Elliott, 119 Conn. 207, 175 A. 684, a guest who sat on a front fender of an automobile which was traveling between 35 and 40 miles per hour on a much-traveled road was he......