Hinchman v. Pere Marquette R. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 April 1904
• Citation: 136 Mich. 341,99 N.W. 277
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: HINCHMAN v. PERE MARQUETTE R. CO.

99 N.W. 277

136 Mich. 341

HINCHMAN v. PERE MARQUETTE R. CO.

Supreme Court of Michigan

April 19, 1904

Error to Circuit Court, Berrien County; Orville W. Coolidge, Judge.

Action by Burwell Hinchman against the Pere Marquette Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error Reversed.

Frederick W. Stevens (Victor M. Gore, of counsel) for appellant.

James O'Hara, for appellee.

CARPENTER J.

Plaintiff brings this suit to recover compensation for personal injuries.

He recovered a verdict and judgment in the court below. His claim, as appears from his testimony, may be stated as follows: On the afternoon of September 24, 1900, he was traveling with his wife in a carriage on a highway which crossed defendant's road. When he reached this crossing he found it obstructed by one of defendant's engines. He waited about ten minutes, and then asked the engineer to move. The engineer replied, 'We don't have to,' but subsequently he moved the engine, not from the highway but so that its nearest point (the tender) was 'something over ten feet' distant from the plank crossing. Plaintiff told the engineer that he was still in the road, but the engineer replied, with an oath, 'Why don't you cross?' Plaintiff then attempted to cross, but, just as he got 'to the edge of the planking,' steam was emitted from the engine, the horse threw up his head and reared, 'the right line unsnapped,' and plaintiff jumped, and caught the bridle of his horse, the horse spun around and threw him, and he was injured. The evidence of the plaintiff did not indicate with any certainty just what caused the emission of the steam, and defendant's engineer testified positively that he did no act to occasion its emission. It also appeared that there was an automatic safety valve, through which the steam which frightened plaintiff's horse might have been emitted.

It is the contention of the defendant that we are bound to assume that the emission of the steam was through the automatic safety valve, and numerous authorities are cited to the proposition that such emission is not negligence. There was testimony from which the jury might have inferred that, though the steam was emitted from the automatic safety valve, its emission could have been prevented by appliances under control of defendant's engineer, and that defendant's engineer could have foreseen this emission, and have provided against the consequences by moving his engine farther from the crossing. From this evidence, we think that the jury might infer negligence.

It is contended that the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury was the fact that his line became unfastened, and not the negligent emission of the steam. It is not contended that the line became unfastened in consequence of plaintiff's negligence. The verdict of the jury negatives any such claim. But as plaintiff testifies that he would not have been injured 'if that line had not come unsnapped,' it is contended that the unsnapping of the line is the sole proximate cause of his injury. Defendant's argument assumes that the unsnapping of the line was not a result of its negligence. If it was, then, on principle and authority, such unsnapping would not lessen its liability. McKeller v. Township of Monitor, 78 Mich., at page 488, 44 N.W. 412; Putman v. R. R. Co., 47 Hun, 439. We are unable to agree with defendant in the proposition that we are bound to assume that this unsnapping did not result from its negligence. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, he had been able to control his horse for ten minutes by the use of this line. When the steam was emitted, the horse threw his head up, and the line unsnapped. We are unable to see why a jury could not infer from this evidence that defendant's negligence, by frightening the horse, caused the line to unsnap. But assuming that neither plaintiff's negligence nor defendant's negligence caused the line to unsnap, we cannot agree with defendant that the unsnapping of the line thereby became the sole cause of plaintiff's injury, and consequently relieved defendant from all liability. Because the line unsnapped, plaintiff jumped from his buggy and seized his horse by its bridle, and the horse spun him around and threw him, not merely because the line was unsnapped, but because the horse was still frightened, as a result of defendant's negligence. We think we go quite as far as we are warranted in holding, under this hypothesis, that plaintiff's injury resulted from two causes, viz., the unsnapping of the line and defendant's negligence. We think it clear that under such circumstances defendant is responsible. In Phillips v. R. R. Co., 127 N.Y. 657, 27 N.E. 978, defendant's employ�s, in lowering a gate, hit a horse attached to a vehicle. The horse became frightened and ran away. The court said: 'It may be assumed that the plaintiff would have escaped injury if the rein had not broken. * * * The jury specifically found that the gate was then being lowered, and it did hit the horse; and it may be assumed that they also found that this rendered the horse unmanageable, and caused the situation from which resulted the calamity, although the immediate cause may have been the inability of the driver to control the course of the horse, occasioned by the breaking of the rein, thus causing or permitting him to make so short a turn as to upset the wagon and throw the plaintiff out of it. The facts so found may have been a proximate cause of the injury, and it may be that they produced a condition which required strong reins for protection against the injury which followed. This was not, therefore, necessarily attributable solely to the breaking of the rein, which may have been one of two proximate causes, and in that view, if the latter occurred without fault of the plaintiff, she would not be denied the right to recover.' In Hunt v. Town of Pownal, 9 Vt. 411, plaintiff, while traveling on a highway, was injured as a result of two joint causes, viz., the insufficiency of a nut or bolt on the carriage (not chargeable to plaintiff's negligence), and the neglect of defendant to keep its highway in suitable repair. The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Redfield, said (page 418): 'The loss, then, is the combined result of accident and of defendant's neglect to repair the road. We think, under such circumstances, the defendants are liable for the loss. It is no doubt true that, had the accident not occurred, no damage would have been sustained. And had the defendants performed their duty the same result would have followed.'

Defendant contends that this conclusion is opposed to numerous authorities. Among others, he cites three Michigan cases--Lewis v. F. & P. M. R. R. Co., 54 Mich. 55, 19 N.W 744, 52 Am. Rep. 790, Beall v. Township of Athens, 81 Mich. 536, 45 N.W. 1014, and Powers v. Lumber Co., 92 Mich. 533, 52 N.W. 937. In Lewis v. F. & P. M. R. R. Co., plaintiff, a passenger on the defendant railway, was carried past his station on a dark night. On leaving the train he was misinformed by the conductor as to his whereabouts, but he soon discovered where he was, and started for his home. In crossing a cattle guard, his eyes deceived him, his foot slipped, he fell, and was seriously injured. It was held that the defendant's negligence in carrying him past the station and in misinforming him as to his whereabouts was not the proximate cause of his injury. In that case the wrong of the defendant had only this to do with the plaintiff's injury: It led to his being in the position he was, where he was injured by another cause. In this case, however, the force which injured plaintiff resulted directly from defendant's wrong. In Beall v. Township of Athens, plaintiff's horse became frightened at a log, not in, but alongside, the highway. He shied, plaintiff struck him with the whip, he sprang forward, and went down an embankment, upsetting the buggy and injuring plaintiff. To show the question involved and its disposition, we quote from the opinion: 'The important question in the case is whether the narrowness of the highway and the neglect to place railings or barriers along it primarily caused the accident. The township is only liable where the neglect complained of was the proximate cause of the injury. If such neglect was the secondary or remote cause, the township is not liable. The testimony shows conclusively, and without contradiction, that the primary cause of the accident arose from the horse taking fright at a log at the side of the road, and the act of the driver in striking the horse a blow with his whip.' This reasoning--and in accordance therewith the case was decided--is not helpful to defendant, but is distinctly helpful to plaintiff, in the case at bar. It leads to the conclusion that the fright of the horse--the direct result in this case of defendant's wrong--was the primary cause of plaintiff's injury. In Powers v. Lumber Co., plaintiff's intestate, a brakeman on defendant's railroad, was riding on a train of logs loaded by himself. One of these logs came...