Hinds v. Dallas Independent School Dist.

Decision Date22 February 2002
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A.3:97-CV-2258-L.,CIV.A.3:97-CV-2258-L.
Citation188 F.Supp.2d 664
PartiesRonald HINDS, Plaintiff, v. DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

Jeanne Crandall, Reyna Hinds & Crandall, Dallas, TX, for plaintiff.

James E Coleman, Jr, Carrington Coleman Sloman & Blumenthal, Dallas, TX, for Dallas Independent School Dist., Kathleen Leos, Jose Plata, Yvonne Ewell, Sandy Kress, William Keever, Dan peavy, Kathlyn Gilliam, Chad Woolery, Lynda McDow, defendants.

Dan Peavy, McKinney, TX, pro se.

Alan B. Rich, Baron & Budd, Dallas, TX, Lawrence J. Friedman, James R. Krause, Friedman & Feiger, Dallas, TX, for Lawrence Friedman, Friedman & Asso., PC, Alan B. Rich, defendants.

Gary D. Elliston, DeHay & Elliston, Dallas, TX, Dennis J. Eichelbaum, Schwartz & Eichelbaum, Plano, TX, Leonard J. Schwartz, Schwartz & Eichelbaum, Austin, TX, for Schwartz & Eichelbaum, PC, defendant.

Melinda R Burke, Shannon Gracey Ratliff & Miller, Fort Worth, TX, Leonard J Schwartz, Schwartz & Eichelbaum, Plano, TX, for Dennis J. Eichelbaum, defendant.

Dennis J. Eichelbaum, Plano, TX, pro se.

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LINDSAY, District Judge.

On February 21, 2002, the court issued a memorandum opinion and order in this case. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a), the court issues this Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order to correct several errors in citation contained on page 11 of the original opinion. The amended opinion corrects these errors in citation so that the opinion now reads as the court originally intended.

None of these edits changes the substance of the opinion issued on February 21, 2002; the edits are made solely to reflect the correct citations. Accordingly, the Memorandum Opinion and Order issued on February 21, 2002 is hereby vacated and the following Amended Memorandum Opinion and Order is substituted in its place.

Before the court are the following:

1. Motion for Summary Judgment of the DISD and the DISD Defendants, filed April 12, 2001;

2. Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of the DISD and the DISD Defendants, filed April 12, 2001;

3. Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Rich, Friedman, and Friedman & Associates, P.C., filed April 16, 2001;

4. Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Rich, Friedman, and Friedman & Associates, P.C., filed April 16, 2001;

5. Defendants Schwartz and Eichelbaum, P.C.'s and Dennis Eichelbaum's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 16, 2001;

6. Brief in Support of Defendants Schwartz and Eichelbaum, P.C.'s and Dennis Eichelbaum's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 16, 2001;

7. Plaintiff's Response to the DISD and DISD Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief, filed June 8, 2001;

8. Plaintiff's Response to Defendants Rich, Friedman, and Friedman & Associates, P.C.'s Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief, filed June 18, 2001;

9. Plaintiff's Response to Defendants Eichelbaum and Schwartz & Eichelbaum, P.C.'s Second Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief, filed June 8, 2001;

10. DISD et al.'s Reply to Hinds's Response for Summary Judgment, filed June 22, 2001; and

11. Defendants Schwartz and Eichelbaum, P.C.'s and Dennis Eichelbaum's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to the Eichelbaum Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief, filed June 25, 2001.1

After careful consideration of the motions, responses, replies, summary judgment evidence, and applicable authority, the court grants the summary judgment motions of all Defendants.

I. Procedural and Factual Background

Ronald Hinds ("Hinds" or "Plaintiff") filed this action on September 12, 1997, against the Dallas Independent School District ("DISD"), Kathleen Leos ("Leos"), Hollis Brashear ("Brashear"), Jose Plata ("Plata"), Yvonne Ewell ("Ewell"), Sandy Kress ("Kress"), William Keever ("Keever"), Dan Peavy ("Peavy"), Kathlyn Gilliam ("Gilliam"), Chad Woolery ("Woolery"), Lynda McDow ("McDow"), collectively referred to as the "DISD Defendants"; Larry Friedman ("Friedman"), Friedman & Associates, P.C., Alan Rich ("Rich"), and David Reese ("Reese"), collectively referred to as the "Friedman Defendants"; and Schwartz & Eichelbaum, P.C., and Dennis Eichelbaum ("Eichelbaum"), collectively referred to as the "Eichelbaum Defendants." All groups of Defendants are collectively referred to as "Defendants." Defendants Leos, Brashear, Plata, Ewell, Kress, Keever, Peavy, Gilliam, and McDow, during the relevant period for this action, were trustees of DISD.2 Woolery was the superintendent of DISD for the relevant time period. Friedman and his law firm, Rich, Reese, and Eichelbaum and his law firm provided legal representation to DISD, its trustees, and Woolery during the relevant time period.

Hinds brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Tex. Const. art. I.3 See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ¶ 1, filed February 28, 2001, hereafter referred to as "Plaintiff's Complaint." The basis for this action is a lawsuit filed by DISD officials against Hinds and several other individuals in September 1995. The gravamen of Hinds's action is as follows:

12. On September 13, [1995], in an effort to harass, intimidate, and discredit Hinds, prevent his exercise of free speech, deprive his client of representation, deprive Hinds of the ability to effectively represent his client, denial of access to the courts, retaliate against his participation in criticism and litigation against certain of the Defendants, prevent his future participation in criticism and litigation against Defendants, DISD filed a RICO, mail fraud, wire fraud and conspiracy lawsuit naming Hinds, Venable, Finlan, and Grant as Defendants. DISD did so knowing that its claims were baseless and without any form of factual foundation. Thereafter, the individual defendant trustees ratified the action taken by their attorneys, instructing their attorneys to proceed with litigation even though it was baseless and without any form of factual foundation.

13. Defendants took such actions even though Texas law does not permit a lawsuit making such claims to be filed against the attorney (Hinds) for an opposing party.

14. In a further effort to deprive Hinds of his protected statutory and constitutional civil rights, Friedman issued a press release and made television appearances wherein he maximized the public exposure of Defendants' false and malicious and unlawful allegations and lawsuit in an effort to further discredit and destroy the reputation of Hinds in retaliation for Hinds' exercise of his protected statutory and constitutional rights and in an effort to deny Hinds the future enjoyment of his protected statutory and constitutional civil rights.

15. The pattern of conduct of Defendants throughout these proceedings demonstrates that the violation of Hinds' protected statutory and constitutional civil rights was a part of their very deliberately conceived strategy to drive Finlan and the Venables and their counsel from the courthouse and eliminate public criticism and other forms of speech and access to the courts.

16. Subsequently, on the eve of hearing of Hinds' Motion for Summary Judgment as to these claims, DISD filed its Third Amended Petition which deleted the RICO, mail fraud and wire fraud claims so that they would not be heard by the trial court. The remaining civil conspiracy claim was heard by the trial court which granted summary judgment to Hinds. DISD then appealed Hinds' summary judgment and the appellate court agreed with Hinds and affirmed the trial court ruling.

. . . . .

19. By their actions, as above described, Defendants have conspired to violate, and have violated, Hinds [sic] protected statutory and constitutional civil rights and, by this complaint, he seeks, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, recovery of his actual damages, punitive damages, attorneys fees, such pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as is allowed by law, and costs of court in pursuing this matter.

20. [A]t all times relevant hereto, Hinds had well known and well established rights to engage in the unfettered legal representation (constrained only by the rules, statutes and ethics governing his profession and his clients' legal positions), as a duly licensed attorney, of unpopular clients (who are critics of government and government officials), to engage in political speech, to engage in speech on behalf of his clients, to associate, both professionally and personally, with those government critics and other [sic] who are unpopular with Defendants, and to be free of retaliation by government and government officials who are offended by the lawful actions and criticism directed at them by these associates. By their conduct, as described above, Defendants, acting under color of official office, knowingly breached and violated, and conspired to breach and violate, Hinds' freedom of speech (both his own personal expression and that made on behalf of his clients), Hinds' freedom of association, and Hinds' freedom from governmental retaliation. Further breached and violated is the fundamental right of a licensed attorney to represent unpopular clients (who are critics of government and government officials) free of retaliation by government and government officials who are offended by the clients' own constitutionally protected actions and criticism. By filing their illegal action against Hinds, Defendants sought to punish and oppress and damage Hinds for the exercise of his rights and, in fact, they achieved this unlawful purpose. They sought to chill and destroy Hinds' exercise of his protected rights and did, in fact, achieve this unlawful purpose. Defendants' actions were without legal right or justification.

Plaintiff's Complaint ¶¶ 12-16, 19, 20.4

Finally, with respect to his state cause of action, Hinds asserts a claim for malicious prosecution. He contends...

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