Hines v. Dahn
Decision Date | 02 August 1920 |
Docket Number | 5514. |
Citation | 267 F. 105 |
Parties | HINES, Director General of Railroads, v. DAHN. [1] |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
F. H Helsell, of Ft. Dodge, Iowa (C. A. Helsell, of Ft. Dodge Iowa, W. S. Horton, of Chicago, Ill., and Nelson & Duffy, of Dubuque, Iowa, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.
W. A Smith, of Dubuque, Iowa (D. J. Lenehan and L. G. Hurd, both of Dubuque, Iowa, on the brief), for defendant in error.
Before SANBORN and CARLAND, Circuit Judges, and TRIEBER, District judge.
Defendant in error, hereafter plaintiff, brought this action against Illinois Central Railroad Company and the Director General of Railroads, hereafter defendant, to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligent operation of said railroad. Plaintiff recovered a verdict against the defendant, the action having been dismissed as to the railroad company. Defendant brings error.
The first contention made by counsel for defendant is that the plaintiff cannot maintain this action, for the reason that it is in legal effect an action against the United States, and the plaintiff as an employe of the United States had prior to the commencement of the action applied for and received the benefits of an act to provide compensation for employes of the United States suffering injuries while in the performance of their duties. 39 Stat. 742 (Comp. St. Secs. 8932a-8932uu). The facts material to this contention as they appear in the record are as follows: On May 29, 1918, plaintiff was a railroad mail clerk engaged in the performance of his duties as such while riding in a mail car composing a part of train No. 11, of the Illinois Central Railroad Company, then running over the track of said company, under the management and control of defendant. On said date and while he was so engaged said train was derailed and wrecked by plunging through a bridge composing a part of the roadbed of said Illinois Central Railroad Company, near Aplington, Iowa, and by reason thereof he was seriously and permanently injured. Division V of defendant's answer contains the following allegation:
'That under the act for compensation for the employes of the United States aforesaid, this plaintiff has made application in the manner provided by said act for compensation under said act, and this defendant is informed and believes and charges that such application has been affirmatively acted upon and said employe has the benefit of all the provisions of said Compensation Act.'
This allegation of the answer was admitted by paragraph 3 of plaintiff's demurrer to said answer, the demurrer being sustained. In subdivision 2 of said paragraph 3 in addition to the formal demurrer plaintiff also stated:
'That even if it be true that plaintiff has been paid compensation under the act to provide compensation for employes of the United States, such fact does not constitute any defense to this action, said act not purporting to furnish an exclusive remedy to plaintiff, but, on the contrary, expressly providing for the maintenance of an action of this character.'
On the record as it stands, and in view of the fact that at the trial the case was treated by court and counsel as if the plaintiff had applied for and accepted the benefits of the Compensation Act above referred to, the case must be treated here in the same way. The first question therefore to be considered is: Was plaintiff's action in legal effect one against the United States?
By chapter 418, 1st Sess. 64 Cong., approved August 29, 1916, 39 Stat. 645 (Comp. St. Sec. 1974a), it is provided:
'The President, in time of war, is empowered, through the Secretary of War, to take possession and assume control of any system or systems of transportation, or any part thereof, and to utilize the same, to the exclusion as far as may be necessary of all other traffic thereon, for the transfer or transportation of troops, war material and equipment, or for such other purposes connected with the emergency as may be needful or desirable.'
Pursuant to the authority thus given, the President on December 26, 1917 (40 Stat. 1733), issued a proclamation containing the following language:
Section 1 (section 3115 3/4a): 'That the President, having in time of war taken over the possession, use, control, and operation * * * of certain railroads and systems of transportation (called herein carriers). ' 'That any railway operating income accruing during the period of federal control in excess of such just compensation shall remain the property of the United States.'
Section 6 (section 3115 3/4f): 'That the sum of $500,000,000 is hereby appropriated, out of any moneys in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, which, together with any funds available from any operating income of said carriers, may be used by the President as a revolving fund for the purpose of paying the expenses of the federal control.'
Section 10 (section 3115 3/4j):
Section 12 (section 3115 3/4l):
Act Feb. 28, 1920, Sec. 206g, 262 F. 340, reads as follows:
'No execution or process, other than on a judgment recovered by the United States against a carrier, shall be levied upon the property of any carrier where the cause of action on account of which the judgment was obtained grew out of the possession, use, control, or operation of any railroad or system of transportation by the President under federal control.'
The first provision quoted above from the Federal Control Act recites that the President, having in time of war taken over the possession, use control and operation of certain railroads and systems of...
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