Hines v. Joy Mfg. Co.
| Decision Date | 29 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-5700,87-5700 |
| Citation | 850 F.2d 1146 |
| Parties | , 25 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1452, Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P 11,842 Carl W. HINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOY MANUFACTURING COMPANY and Long-Airdox Company, a Division of the Marmon Group, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Charles S. Wible (argued), Daniel Caslin, Owensboro, Ky., for plaintiff-appellant.
Marvin P. Nunley (argued), McCarroll, Nunley and Hartz, Owensboro, Ky., for defendants-appellees.
Charles G. Franklin (argued), Madisonville, Ky., for Joy Mfg. Co.
Before MERRITT and KENNEDY, Circuit Judges, and CONTIE, Senior Circuit Judge.
Carl Hines appeals the district court's dismissal of his complaint and various interlocutory orders entered in this products liability case. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court's judgment.
This case arises from an accident in an underground coal mine operated by Peabody Coal Company on August 8, 1983. On that date, the belt structure of a mobile bridge unit pinned appellant Carl Hines to the coal rib, resulting in serious and permanent injuries to his hips and legs. Following is a brief summary of the accident and a description of the machinery involved.
There were two pieces of equipment involved in the accident. One was a continuous miner which was designed and manufactured by appellee Joy Manufacturing Company to mine coal in an underground mine. The other was a continuous haulage system consisting of mobile bridge units designed and manufactured by appellee Long-Airdox Company to allow the movement of coal from the face of the mine to the surface. Although the continuous miner was designed to work with shuttle cars, the continuous haulage system eliminated the need for them.
To provide continuous hauling to the surface, several mobile bridge units may be connected in a snake-like fashion with an operator stationed at each unit. The continuous haulage system was designed to permit attachment directly to the tail of the continuous miner by welding a yoke, provided by Long-Airdox, to the continuous miner. In this case, both the mechanical and electrical connection of the continuous haulage system to the continuous miner were performed by Peabody Coal.
Hines, a mobile bridge unit operator, was injured as he attempted to dislodge a large rock from the continuous haulage system. After hitting the panic bar which shut down the power to the mobile bridge units and the continuous miner, appellant manually attempted to dislodge the rock. Another mobile bridge unit operator restarted the unit in hopes of dislodging the rock and proceeded to the area where appellant was working.
Upon hearing the conveyor belts of the continuous haulage system running, the continuous miner operator started the continuous miner and moved it in a reverse direction. Neither appellant nor the other mobile bridge unit operator was near the work station where the panic bars were located. The continuous miner with the attached continuous haulage system jackknifed, pinning appellant between the wall of the mine and the continuous haulage system. As a result of the accident, appellant sustained injuries to his hips and legs.
Hines filed a complaint on July 19, 1984, followed by an amended complaint on September 5, 1984, invoking the district court's diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332. Appellant alleges that appellees are liable for his injuries based on the legal theories of negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and defective design and manufacture of their respective pieces of equipment.
Appellee Joy Manufacturing moved for summary judgment on March 14, 1986, on the ground that Peabody Coal's subsequent attachment of Long-Airdox's continuous haulage system to the continuous miner, constituted an alteration of the product sufficient to invoke Kentucky Revised Statutes Sec. 411.320. Both appellees moved the court to bifurcate the proceedings into a trial for liability, followed by a trial for damages.
On September 12, 1986, the district court issued an order granting Joy Manufacturing's motion for summary judgment and bifurcating the trial. In granting Joy Manufacturing's motion for summary judgment, the district court held that there was no doubt that the continuous miner had been modified and that there was no question that Joy Manufacturing had furnished no instructions for the modification. The court further held that appellant would not have been injured if the continuous miner had been used in its original, unmodified condition. The court concluded that, therefore, section 411.320(1) provided a defense for Joy Manufacturing. The district court did not elaborate on its reasons for granting the motion to bifurcate the issues of damages and liability.
A pre-trial conference was held in January of 1987. At that time, the parties were ordered to exchange the identities of all expert witnesses who were expected to be called at the trial, together with a statement of the subject matter upon which the experts were expected to testify, the substance of facts and opinions to which the experts were expected to testify, and a summary of the grounds for the opinions. Appellant responded on January 26, 1987, listing Daniel E. Lebo, as an expert expected to testify on the defective and unreasonably dangerous design of the mobile bridge unit.
At trial, Mr. Lebo testified concerning identifiable design defects or deficiencies with regard to the safety of the continuous haulage system. Among other things, Mr. Lebo testified that there was no lockout device to deactivate the continuous miner while still allowing the mobile bridge units to be operated for clean out and that there was no pull-cord device to grab in an emergency. On cross-examination, appellee Long-Airdox's counsel elicited a response from Mr. Lebo that the testimony concerning the lockout and pull-cord devices were opinions that had been developed by Mr. Lebo subsequent to his deposition.
Long-Airdox then moved to strike Mr. Lebo's testimony in its entirety on the ground that there had been no supplement to discovery. Hines responded that Long-Airdox already knew of the information concerning the lockout and pull-cord devices because other experts had testified to these devices, so that there would be no difficulty in defending. Further, appellant contended that Mr. Lebo's testimony was substantially on the same subject, and that failure to admit the testimony would be harsh and would prejudice appellant's case. The district court struck only those portions of Mr. Lebo's testimony at trial that did not conform to his deposition testimony.
Later in the trial, Long-Airdox, over Hines' objection, presented testimony concerning the absence of prior claims involving the equipment which was the subject of the lawsuit.
A jury verdict was returned on May 21, 1987, in favor of Long-Airdox. This timely appeal followed. This court must consider the following questions on appeal: (A) whether the district court properly granted Joy Manufacturing's motion for summary judgment; (B) whether the district court abused its discretion in ordering separate trials on the issues of liability and damages; (C) whether the district court abused its discretion in striking that portion of appellant's expert witness' testimony which did not conform to discovery; and (D) whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the absence of prior claims.
The general standard an appellate court applies in reviewing a grant of summary judgment is the same as the district court employs initially under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2716 (1983); Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1536 (6th Cir.1987). "[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing'--that is, pointing out to the District Court--that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "Where the moving party has carried its burden of showing that the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits in the record, construed favorably to the nonmoving party, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial, entry of summary judgment is appropriate." Gutierrez, 826 F.2d at 1536. Where it is clear there is no genuine issue of material fact, a court may properly grant summary judgment on a ground other than that assigned in the motion. 6 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice Sec. 56.14 (1987). Additionally, "[a]n appellate court can find an alternative basis for concluding that a party is entitled to summary judgment and ignore any erroneous basis relied upon by the district court, provided it proceeds carefully so the opposing party is not denied an opportunity to respond to the new theory." Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 684 (6th Cir.1981).
Kentucky Revised Statutes Sec. 411.320 sets forth circumstances under which defendants are liable in Kentucky products liability actions.
(1) In any product liability action, a manufacturer shall be liable only for the personal injury, death or property damage that would have occurred if the product had been used in its original, unaltered and unmodified condition. For the purpose of this section, product alteration or modification shall include failure to observe routine care and maintenance, but shall not include ordinary wear and tear. This section shall apply to alterations or modifications made by any person or entity, except those made in accordance with specifications or instructions furnished by the manufacturer.
(2) In any product liability action, if the plaintiff performed an unauthorized alteration or an unauthorized modification, and such alteration or modification was a...
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§ 9.06 SIMILAR HAPPENINGS; OTHER ACCIDENTS
...the absence of prior similar claims will not be admitted unless it relates to a substantially similar product."); Hines v. Joy Mfg. Co., 850 F.2d 1146, 1153-54 (6th Cir. 1988) (evidence of lack of prior claims admissible "to show lack of defective design and lack of notice of any defect"); ......
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§ 9.06 Similar Happenings; Other Accidents
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