Hines v. Miller

• Decision Date: 24 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-2507.,01-2507.
• Citation: 318 F.3d 157
• Parties: Jesse HINES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. David MILLER, Superintendent, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

318 F.3d 157

Jesse HINES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. David MILLER, Superintendent, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 01-2507.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued June 20, 2002.

Decided January 24, 2003.

Mark Diamond, New York, NY, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Tami J. Aisenson, Assistant District Attorney (Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney for New York County, and Morrie I. Kleinbart, Assistant District Attorney, on the brief), New York, NY, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before: WALKER, Chief Judge, WINTER and F.I. PARKER, Circuit Judges.

JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Chief Judge.

Petitioner Jesse Hines appeals from the July 11, 2001 denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Lewis A. Kaplan, District Judge). In his petition, Hines's claimed that (1) he was denied due process by the state trial court's failure to appoint new counsel and hold a new hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel coerced him to plead guilty; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel by his counsel's failure to represent him on the motion to withdraw his plea. The district court rejected Hines's claims, but issued a certificate of appealability "limited to the questions [of] whether petitioner was (1) entitled, as a matter of constitutional law, to an evidentiary hearing, and (2) deprived of the effective assistance of counsel when he moved to withdraw his plea." Hines v. Miller, 156 F.Supp.2d 324, 333 (S.D.N.Y.2001) ("Hines II"). Hines renews his claims on appeal. While we affirm the district court's denial of the petition, we do so on different grounds.

BACKGROUND

In early 1995, Hines was indicted for second degree murder and related weapons charges in connection with the shooting death of Earl Murray on January 23, 1994. During his interrogation with police detectives, Hines made oral, written, and videotaped statements in which he admitted killing Murray. Specifically, in a five-page hand-written statement, Hines admitted that a man named Mark offered him $1500 to shoot Murray and gave him a .38-caliber revolver. Hines explained that the offer "seem[ed] so good" to him because his mother had just passed away, his aunt had kicked him out of her house, and he could use the money to find an apartment. Moreover, Mark told him that he "would never get court [sic]" and "that as long as I was with him I wouldn't get hurt." Hines, Mark, and Murray then went for a walk together, and when they were

behind the back of 1695 [Madison Avenue]... Mark said, "Go ahead remember the 1,500" and then I shot him. I shot him one time and Mark said, "Shoot again" but I couldn't do it. So I was standing there Earl began to fall and when he hit the floor Mark take his [cigarette] and [throw] it on Earl and then laugh. After that I run and drop the gun but I don't stop.

If convicted as charged, Hines faced a possible sentence of twenty-five to life. Hines's attorney engaged in extensive plea negotiations with the district attorney, who agreed to the minimum sentence of fifteen years to life if Hines pleaded guilty to the first count of the indictment charging murder in the second degree. To assist Hines in deciding whether to accept the plea offer, Hines's attorney arranged to show Hines his videotaped confession. The next day, June 13, 1996, Hines discussed the possibility of a plea with his aunt in the presence of the state court judge; his aunt apparently thought that "it would be good for" Hines to accept the plea offer. Immediately following this conversation with his aunt, Hines pleaded guilty to murder in the second degree. During the course of the plea proceedings, and prior to accepting the plea, the state trial court fully explained petitioner's rights to him. Hines specifically acknowledged that no one had forced him to plead guilty. The trial court then proceeded to question him about the crime, in response to which Hines admitted that he shot the victim with a gun on the date in question. The case was then set for sentencing.

Less than one week before sentencing, Hines filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea on the ground that he was innocent and had been coerced into pleading guilty by his attorney. When the case came on for sentencing before the state trial court, defense counsel declined to comment on Hines's allegation that counsel had pressured him into pleading guilty, but asked to be relieved in the event the court allowed withdrawal of the plea. The prosecutor made a statement opposing the motion. In response to the prosecutor's statement, defense counsel noted that he was "at a great disadvantage to defend the defendant" and asked the court to be relieved and to have new counsel appointed to argue the motion on proper papers. The trial court did not relieve counsel. Rather than address the request, the trial court questioned Hines directly, pointing out that he had stated on the occasion of his guilty plea that no one had forced him to plead guilty. Hines responded that his counsel "wanted me to cop out" from the outset of the case, and that on the day his attorney showed him the videotape of his confession, his attorney told him "that I have no chance to win at trial, to cop out would be better for me." Hines went on to state that he was innocent of the crime and had only pleaded guilty "out of fear, pressure, extreme pressure." The state trial court then asked Hines whether he had spoken to his aunt before pleading guilty, and he responded, "Yes, I did. She thought it would be good for me to take the 15 too. So I took it but —." Noting that Hines had inculpated himself fully when he entered the guilty plea and that he had stated then that no one had forced him to plead guilty, the state trial court denied the motion and proceeded immediately to sentencing, imposing the agreed-upon term of fifteen years to life imprisonment.

Hines appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing that the denial of the motion to withdraw the plea without appointing new counsel and without conducting an evidentiary hearing violated his right to due process of law under both the United States and New York Constitutions as well as the New York Criminal Procedure Law. Petitioner submitted a supplemental pro se brief in which he argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of both federal and state constitutions, because, among other things, his attorney used a videotape of his confession to induce him to plead guilty.

The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. People v. Hines, 267 A.D.2d 17, 698 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1999) ("Hines I"). Petitioner then applied for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, which was denied by order dated March 19, 2000. People v. Hines, 94 N.Y.2d 921, 708 N.Y.S.2d 360, 729 N.E.2d 1159 (2000).

Hines timely filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that he was deprived of his right to due process of law when the trial court denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea without appointing new counsel or holding an evidentiary hearing and that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

We review the district court's denial of habeas corpus de novo. Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 308 (2d Cir.2001).

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217 (codified at, inter alia, 28 U.S.C. § 2254), a petition for a writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with respect to a state court decision that has "adjudicated [a petitioner's claims] on the merits" unless the state court's decision "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). State court decisions that have not "adjudicated [claims] on the merits" are subject to the pre-AEDPA de novo standard of review. See Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 55 (2d Cir.2001). In Washington, issued shortly before the district court's decision in this case, we discussed the uncertainty of the meaning of the phrase "adjudicated on the merits" as used in § 2254. Id. at 52-55.

The district court, citing Washington and noting the brevity of the Appellate Division's memorandum decision, declined to decide whether the Appellate Division had adjudicated Hines's federal constitutional claims on the merits, concluding that the petition failed whether AEDPA's deferential standard or pre-AEDPA de novo review applied. Hines II, 156 F.Supp.2d at 328-29.

In Sellan, decided after the district court filed its opinion, we held that "adjudication on the merits" requires only that a claim be disposed of on the merits, as opposed to on a procedural or other ground, and that the state court need not refer to the federal claim or to federal law as a prerequisite to the deferential AEDPA standard under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Sellan, 261 F.3d at 312. In affirming Hines's conviction, the Appellate Division held that

[a]fter a thorough inquiry, the court properly denied defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The record establishes that defendant made a voluntary plea and fails to substantiate his claims of coercion and innocence. The conduct by his attorney that defendant claimed to have been coercive amounted to nothing more than the attorney's professional opinion on the strength of the case and sound advice to plead guilty. Defendant's claim of innocence was conclusory and was belied by his oral, written and videotaped confessions. Defense counsel properly declined to join in defendant's pro se motion to withdraw his plea since the motion lacked merit, and appointment of new counsel was not required (People v. Simpson, 238 A.D.2d 193, 656 N.Y.S.2d 724). We conclude that def...