Hines v. Seibels

• Decision Date: 17 June 1920
• Docket Number: 3 Div. 442
• Citation: 86 So. 43,204 Ala. 382
• Parties: HINES, Director General of Railroads, v. SEIBELS.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

86 So. 43

204 Ala. 382

HINES, Director General of Railroads, v. SEIBELS.

3 Div. 442

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 17, 1920

Appeal from Circuit Court, Montgomery County; Wm. L. Martin, Judge.

Bill by Walker D. Hines, as Director General of Railroads, in charge of the Western Railway of Alabama, against R.E. Seibels, as administrator of the estate of M.L. Fortson, deceased, to enjoin an action at law for damages for the death of said decedent. From a decree sustaining demurrers to the bill complainant appeals. Affirmed.

Steiner Crum & Weil, of Montgomery, for appellant.

Hill Hill, Whiting & Thomas, of Montgomery, for appellee.

THOMAS J.

The bill prayed injunction against a personal representative to prevent the prosecution at law of an action for damages for the wrongful death of intestate where settlement by compromise had been made with the sole heirs and distributees.

Damages collected in action brought under the homicide act for the wrongful death of an intestate vest exclusively in the distributees of the estate without administration. The administrator is only the holder of the naked title, and this title will not prevail against one to whom the equitable title and rightful possession has passed. Kennedy v. Davis, 171 Ala. 609, 612, 55 So. 104, Ann.Cas.1913B, 225. Neither have creditors a claim, right, or title to or interest in the damages. Griswold v. Griswold, 111 Ala. 572, 577, 20 So. 437.

Where a person liable for the wrongful death of another compromises therefor, and obtains a release from the decedent's sole heir and distributee, who is under no disability to make such settlement and give such release, and thereafter the administrator of the decedent's estate brings suit for such wrongful death, the release is not solely available at law, but in a court of equity, as the basis for a bill to enjoin a suit at law for such wrongful death. Kennedy v. Davis, supra.

Such is not the rule as against a sole legatee and distributee under a disability--as infancy--where the compromise and release are made, but same have not been affirmed after removal of the disability. That is to say, such rule does not obtain against a minor. Rogers v. De Bardeleben Coal & Iron Co., 97 Ala. 154, 12 So. 81; T.C., I. & R.R. Co. v. Hayes, 97 Ala. 201, 12 So. 98; Collins v. Gillespy, 148 Ala. 558, 41 So. 930, 121 Am.St.Rep. 81; McLaughlin v. Beyer, 181 Ala. 427, 61 So. 62; Smith v. Redus, 9 Ala. 99, 44 Am.Dec. 429; 14 R.C.L. 288, § 56. The bill avers the minority of the sole heirs and distributees when the alleged settlement was made, the release executed, and the bill filed. These facts were presented by appropriate grounds of demurrer. Construing the bill most strongly against the pleader, it affirmatively appears that the parties with whom the settlement was made were minors. The bill fails to allege the age of the minors, and for aught appearing they were under the age of 7 years. Pleadings are taken against the pleader, in equity as at law. Strickland v. Gay, 104 Ala. 375, 16 So. 77; Lewis v. Mohr, 97 Ala. 366, 11 So. 765; Stubbs v. Leavitt, 30 Ala. 352; Lockard v. Lockard, 16 Ala. 423. That is, the equity of the bill will be considered from the facts as the plaintiffs present them (Smith v. Teague, 119 Ala. 385, 24 So. 4), and no advantage to complainant can be claimed from vague and indefinite allegations in his bill. Underhill v. Mobile, etc., Co., 67 Ala. 45.

Complainant says in argument that, admitting the settlement was not binding on the infants, only they or the chancery court for them have the right of avoidance. The complainant cannot claim the right to ratify the agreement and maintain this suit for affirmance or disaffirmance against the minors. It has been held in other jurisdictions that ratification is as much a personal right to an infant as is disaffirmance. For analogous authority, see Bell v. Burkhalter, 176 Ala. 62, 57 So. 460; Jefford's Adm'r v. Ringgold & Co., 6 Ala. 544, 547; Shropshire v. Burns, 46 Ala. 108, 115; 14 R.C.L. 250, 251, § 29; 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 717, note.

Bills to enjoin an infant's breach of contract for personal services have been held to be without equity. In Cain v. Garner, 169 Ky. 633, 639, 185 S.W. 122, 125 (L.R.A.1916E, 682, Ann.Cas.1918B, 824), the court said:

"It is a simple contract for the personal services of an infant for a stipulated compensation to the father. The case, therefore, is reduced to the simple proposition of enforcing the executory contract of an infant. It is elementary law that, except for necessities, an infant may avoid any contract made by him during infancy. 1 Bl.Com. 465; 22 Cyc. 580; Breckenridge v. Ormsby, 1 J.J. Marsh. 236, 19

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