Hines v. Smith

• Decision Date: 12 August 2009
• Docket Number: No. 44,285-CA.,44,285-CA.
• Citation: 16 So.3d 1234
• Parties: Brandy HINES and Her Husband, Raymond Hines, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Melissa Anne SMITH, M.D. and Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Co., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

16 So.3d 1234

Brandy HINES and Her Husband, Raymond Hines, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Melissa Anne SMITH, M.D. and Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Co., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 44,285-CA.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

August 12, 2009.

Frank M. Ferrell, Shreveport, for Appellant.

Fred W. Sartor, Jr., for Appellee.

Before BROWN, WILLIAMS, GASKINS, PEATROSS and MOORE, JJ.

WILLIAMS, J.

Plaintiffs, Brandy Hines and Raymond Hines, appeal a district court's ruling sustaining an exception of res judicata urged by defendant, Melissa Ann Smith, M.D.,¹ and her insurer, Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company, ("LAMMICO"). For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the district court's ruling and remand this matter for further proceedings.

FACTS

On January 14, 2006, the plaintiff, Brandy Hines, was treated for abdominal pain in the emergency room at St. Francis Medical Center ("St. Francis") in Monroe, Louisiana. Mrs. Hines was examined and treated by defendant, Dr. Smith, an emergency room physician on duty.² Mrs. Hines was released from the emergency room, but returned on February 20, 2006, complaining of severe abdominal pain. It was determined that Mrs. Hines was experiencing an ectopic pregnancy and that one of her fallopian tubes had ruptured. She underwent emergency surgery and was hospitalized for a lengthy period of time.

Sometime after Mrs. Hines was released from the hospital, she and her husband were contacted by a representative of St. Francis to discuss a possible settlement of any potential claims against the hospital. On May 17, 2006, plaintiffs executed a "Settlement Agreement and Receipt and Release," in which they settled "any and all claims and demands made by them and/or rights and causes of action arising out of the January 14, 2006 visit to St. Francis Emergency Room ..." for the sum of $33,000. Dr. Smith was not involved in the settlement negotiations. At that time, plaintiffs were unrepresented by legal counsel; however, according to plaintiffs, representatives of the hospital advised them to consider filing a lawsuit against Dr. Smith.

On April 24, 2008, plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice action, naming Dr. Smith and LAMMICO as defendants. Plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Smith failed to perform a pregnancy test which would have revealed that Mrs. Hines was experiencing an ectopic pregnancy. Plaintiffs further alleged that Dr. Smith breached the appropriate standard of care for an emergency medicine physician in her evaluation of Mrs. Hines.

Subsequently, defendants learned of the settlement agreement between plaintiffs and St. Francis. On September 11, 2008, defendants filed an exception of res judicata, contending the language of the settlement agreement served to bar any claims against defendants. The district court sustained the exception, stating:

[T]he court is relying upon the Alford [v.] Al Copeland Investments case and that language. The court has read the release. The court finds that the language in the release which provides that all persons were to be released from any claims arising out of this claim of ectopic pregnancy and its consequences. The language is broad enough to cover this situation we've got here. I also find that when rights are being reserved against a party or a possible party under these circumstances, that reservation must be expressed and in writing in order for it to be preserved. And accordingly, I find that the exception of res judicata should be and it is granted.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs contend the district court erred in sustaining the defendants' exception of res judicata. Plaintiffs argue that they did not intend to release Dr. Smith from liability in their settlement with St. Francis. Plaintiffs further argue that the district court erred in ruling that plaintiffs were required to expressly reserve their rights to bring a claim against Dr. Smith.

The essential elements of res judicata are found in LSA-R.S. 13:4231, which provides, in pertinent part:

Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:

(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.

* * *

(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.

A valid compromise can form the basis of a plea of res judicata. Ortego v. State, Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 96-1322 (La.2/25/97), 689 So.2d 1358; Marsh v. US-Agencies Cas. Ins. Co., 42,176 (La.App. 2d Cir.5/16/07), 957 So.2d 901, writ denied, 2007-1286 (La.10/26/07), 966 So.2d 575. The purpose of the doctrine of res judicata is to promote judicial efficiency and the final resolution of disputes. Avenue Plaza, L.L.C. v. Falgoust, 96-0173 (La.7/2/96), 676 So.2d 1077; Hawthorne v. Couch, 41,603 (La.App. 2d Cir.12/20/06), 946 So.2d 288, writ not considered, 2007-0173 (La.3/16/07), 952 So.2d 685. The doctrine of res judicata is stricti juris, and any doubt concerning application of the principle of res judicata must be resolved against its application. Kelty v. Brumfield, 93-1142 (La.2/25/94), 633 So.2d 1210; Hawthorne, supra.

The party who urges the exception of res judicata bears the burden of proving its essential elements by a preponderance of the evidence. If there is any doubt as to its applicability, the exception must be overruled. Davis v. Home Depot, 96-850 (La.App. 5th Cir.2/22/97), 690 So.2d 208, writ denied, 97-0728 (La.5/1/97), 693 So.2d 740, citing State, Dept. of Social Services v. Matthews, 615 So.2d 1112 (La. App. 5th Cir.1993). The standard of review of a ruling sustaining an exception of res judicata is manifest error when the exception is raised prior to the case being submitted and evidence is received from both parties. State ex rel. Murphy v. Haren, 42,098 (La.App. 2d Cir.5/16/07), 957 So.2d 869, writ denied, 2007-1285 (La.9/21/07), 964 So.2d 345; Floyd v. City of Bossier City, 38,187 (La.App. 2d Cir.3/5/04), 867 So.2d 993.

The purpose of a compromise is to prevent or put an end to litigation. The essential elements of a compromise are: (1) mutual intention of putting an end to the litigation and (2) reciprocal concessions of the parties in adjustment of their differences. Rivett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 508 So.2d 1356 (La.1987); Thompson v. Jackson Parish Police Jury, 36,497 (La. App. 2d Cir.10/23/02), 830 So.2d 505.

In the instant case, Mr. and Mrs. Hines executed a document entitled "Settlement Agreement and Receipt and Release" in which they acknowledged that they had received the sum of $33,000 from St. Francis "all in full, final, complete and absolute satisfaction of any and all claims and demands made by them and/or rights and causes of action arising out of the January 14, 2006 visit to St. Francis Emergency Room, including the surgical procedure performed on February 20, 2006 and all causes of action arising out of or related to the ectopic pregnancy." The lengthy agreement further provided:

Appearers, BRANDY NICOLE HINES AND RAYMOND EARL HINES, JR. further declare and acknowledge that, for and in consideration of the above described payments, they ... have forever released, acquitted and discharged ... ST. FRANCIS MEDICAL CENTER, INC., and its agents, servants, employees, partners, officers, members, directors, successors, heirs, administrators, executors and assigns, parent and subsidiary corporations, and any and all other persons, firms, corporations, partnerships and associations, whether or not herein specifically named, of and from any and all claims, actions, causes of actions, rights, demands and damages, whether same be ex contractu or ex delicto, for ... any claim of any nature, character or kind;

which Appearers ... now have or which they did at any time have, which may hereafter accrue, arising from or on account of or in any way growing out of or connected with or resulting from, or which may hereafter result from that certain accident, casualty or event, which occurred on or about [the] January 14, 2006 visit to St. Francis Emergency Room, including the surgical procedure performed on February 20, 2006 and all causes of action arising out of or related to the ectopic pregnancy. It is understood and agreed by Appearers ... the settlement above described and for which this Settlement Agreement and Receipt and Release given, has been and is being made in the settlement and compromise of doubtful and disputed claims; that the claims of Appearers, including the claims and demands made by them in regard to and/or arising out of that certain accident, casualty or event, which occurred on or about [the] January 14, 2006 visit to St. Francis Emergency Room, including the surgical procedure performed on February 20, 2006 and all causes of action arising out of or related to the ectopic pregnancy, have been denied and disputed and are now being denied and disputed by the party hereby released. ...

(Emphasis added).

Plaintiffs contend the language of the settlement agreement released St. Francis and its employees, but did not expressly release Dr. Smith from liability. Plaintiffs also argue that the testimony of Mr. Hines proved that they did not intend to release Dr. Smith when they executed the agreement.

Based on the language of LSA-R.S. 13:4231, our courts have established that the following five elements must be satisfied for a finding that an action is precluded by res judicata: "(1) the judgment is valid; (2) the judgment is final; (3) the parties are the same; (4) the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit existed at the time of final judgment in...