Hines v. United States
| Decision Date | 18 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 11-cv-1064-MJR |
| Parties | COREY HINES, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
I. Introduction
Now before the Court is Corey Louis Hines's petition to vacate, set aside or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Analysis of the petition begins with an overview of the procedural history of the underlying criminal case.
On March 5, 2008, Hines was charged in an Indictment with one count of possession of a prohibited object (marijuana) in a federal prison. (United States v. Hines, Case No. 08-cr-30040-MJR) (Doc. 1) ("Crim. Doc.). On April 23, 2008, Hines was charged in a Superseding Indictment with possession of a prohibited object (marijuana) in a federal prison (Count 1), possession of marijuana with intent to distribute (Count 2) and conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana and heroin (Count 3) (Crim. Doc. 22).
After numerous, lengthy delays occasioned by Hines's recalcitrant behavior in refusing to cooperate with Magistrate Judge Philip M. Frazier and Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud, with the examining psychologist during a Court-ordered competency examination, with counsel and with the undersigned District Judge, as well as numerous interlocutory appeals, a jury trial commenced. Hines refused to come to the courtroom, even though the Court warned him that he would forfeit his right to represent himself if he refused.
Hines was brought, unwilling, to the courtroom shortly before jury selection and announced that he wanted nothing to do with the trial. He was represented at trial by Assistant Federal Public Defender Dan Cronin who waived Hines's presence at jury selection by stating that the Court had satisfied Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Constitution. On October 20, 2009, the jury found Hines guilty on Counts 1 and 2, but not guilty on Count 3 of the Superseding Indictment. On April 9, 2010, the undersigned Judge sentenced Hines to a term of 60 months' imprisonment on Count 1 and 84 months on Count 2, to be served consecutively to each other and consecutively to the undischarged term of imprisonment imposed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Hines was placed on supervised release for a term of 3 years on Count 1 and 4 years on Count 2, to run concurrently, and a special assessment of $100 on each of Counts 1 and 2, for a total of $200.00.
Proceeding pro se, Hines appealed his conviction and sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. United States v. Hines, 407 Fed.Appx. 975 (7th Cir. 2011). He raised the following challenges on appeal: (1) use of confession; (2) defects in instituting the prosecution; (3) denial of a detention hearing at his first appearance; (4) denial of a Faretta colloquy; (5) denial of a fair hearing on pretrial motions; (6 and 7) pre-accusation and pretrial delay; (8) denial ofa hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d); (9) deprivation of pro se status; (10) impaneling a jury in his absence; (11) the Court's refusal to disqualify himself; (12) the Court's striking objections to the presentence report; (13) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (14) lack of personal jurisdiction; and (15) defective Indictment (Doc. 26-1, "Brief of Defendant-Appellant").
On February 10, 2011, the Seventh Circuit denied all of Hines's assertions of error and affirmed his convictions and sentence in all respects. The Court denied rehearing on March 14, 2011. On April 15, 2011, Hines filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. On October 3, 2011, the Supreme Court denied review. Hines v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 352 (2011).
On December 5, 2011, Hines, proceeding pro se, filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1). On January 30, 2012, Hines filed a motion requesting disposition of preliminary review of his petition (Doc. 2). On March 15, 2012, Hines filed an interlocutory appeal "from the final judgment denying § 2255 and motion for disposition of preliminary review of § 2255" (Doc. 3). On July 30, 2012, the Seventh Circuit issued its Mandate, dismissing Hines's appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denying his motion for rehearing (Doc. 18).
On July 9, 2012, while the petition for rehearing was pending, Hines filed a motion seeking the recusal or disqualification of the undersigned Judge (Doc. 16). On August 8, 2012, the Court completed its preliminary review and directed the Government to respond to the petition by September 18, 2012 (Doc. 21). The Court also directed the Government to respond to the motion for recusal or disqualification by August 28. Hines subsequently supplemented his petition (Doc. 20) and filed twoadditional appeals (Docs. 29, 30). The appeals were again denied for lack of jurisdiction (Doc. 44). On February 26, 2013, the Court denied Hines's motion to stay adjudication pending review on certiorari and his motion for recusal or disqualification of the undersigned Judge (Docs. 46, 48, 49). On March 1, 2013, the Court denied Hines's motion to strike the Government's response to his petition (Docs. 37, 50). For the reasons stated below, the Court now dismisses Hines's § 2255 petition.
II. Analysis
28 U.S.C. § 2255 authorizes a federal prisoner to ask the court which sentenced him to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, if "the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or ... the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or ... the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law...."
Relief under § 2255 is limited. Unlike a direct appeal, in which a defendant may complain of nearly any error, § 2255 proceedings may be used only to correct errors that vitiate the sentencing court's jurisdiction or are otherwise of constitutional magnitude. See, e.g., Corcoran v. Sullivan, 112 F.3d 836, 837 (7th Cir. 1997)(§ 2255 relief is available only to correct "fundamental errors in the criminal process"). As the Seventh Circuit has declared, § 2255 relief "is appropriate only for an error of law that is jurisdictional, constitutional, or constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Harris v. United States, 366 F.3d 593, 594 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Borre v. United States, 940 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir. 1991)). Accord Prewitt v. United States, 83F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1996)("... relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for extraordinary situations")).
Section 2255 cannot be used as a substitute for a direct appeal or to re-litigate issues already raised on direct appeal. Coleman v. United States, 318 F.3d 754, 760 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 926 (2003). Accord Theodorou v. United States, 887 F.2d 1336, 1339 (7th Cir. 1989)(§ 2255 petition "will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.").
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, a § 2255 petition must be filed within one year of the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final. Robinson v. United States, 416 F.3d 645, 647 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255, ¶ 6(1)). While the statute does not define finality, "the Supreme Court has held that in the context of postconviction relief, finality attaches when the Supreme Court 'affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.'" Id. (citation omitted).
In the current proceeding, the Supreme Court denied review on October 3, 2011. Hines, 132 S.Ct. 352. Hines filed his petition approximately two months later on December 5, 2011. Accordingly, the petition is timely filed.
"[A] section 2255 motion is neither a recapitulation of nor a substitute for a direct appeal." Belford v. United States, 975 F.2d 310, 313 (7th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, Castellanos v. United States, 26 F.3d 717 (7th Cir.1994) (citations omitted). "As a result, there are three types of issues that a section 2255 motion can not raise: (1) issues that were raised on direct appeal, absent a showing of changed circumstances; (2) nonconstitutional issues that could have been but were not raised on direct appeal; and (3) constitutional issues that were not raised on direct appeal, unless the section 2255 petitioner demonstrates cause for the procedural default as well as actual prejudice from the failure to appeal. Id. (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 792 F.Supp. 1113 (N.D.Ill.1992); see Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 900 and 903-04 (7th Cir. 1982) (additional citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
In the instant petition, Hines asserts several claims that are exactly the same as those raised in his direct appeal of his conviction: (1) defect in instituting the prosecution; (2) speedy trial violation ("preaccusation and pretrial delay"); and (3) abuse of discretion (failure to hold a timely Faretta colloquy, failure to grant a fair hearing, failure to give a fair competency hearing, denial of right to proceed pro se, commencing trial (impaneling jury) in his absence and the undersigned Judge's failure to recuse himself). Hines has not alleged any "changed circumstances" that would merit revisiting issues already decided on direct appeal. He cannot relitigate these claims. In summary, Hines is procedurally barred from challenging thesedeterminations again in a § 2255 petit...
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