Hinkle v. Christensen
| Decision Date | 02 May 1984 |
| Docket Number | A,No. 35-1,No. 82-2313,35-1,82-2313 |
| Citation | 733 F.2d 74 |
| Parties | 17 Ed. Law Rep. 475 Patti HINKLE, Appellee, v. Eugene CHRISTENSEN, Individually and as a member of the Kadoka Board of Education; Ben Handcock; Ardith Swisher; Joe Stoddard; Saxon Williams; Dan Addison and Keith Berry, Individually and as a member of the Kadoka Board of Education, and Layton Arnold, Individually and as Superintendent of the Kadoka School District The Kadoka School Districtppellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Linda Lea M. Viken, Finch & Viken, Rapid City, S.D., Jeremiah A. Collins, Gary L. Sasso, David M. Silberman, Bredhoff & Kaiser, Washington, D.C., for appellee.
David A. Gerdes, May, Adam, Gerdes & Thompson, Pierre, S.D., Robert A. Sambroak, Jr., Kadoka, S.D., for appellant.
Before BRIGHT, JOHN R. GIBSON, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.
Patti Hinkle brought this civil rights action against the Kadoka School District No. 35-1, its superintendent, and members of its board of education following her dismissal from employment as a teacher at the school. The jury returned a verdict and awarded damages against the school district, but against none of the individual defendants, on Hinkle's claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The jury denied recovery on Hinkle's claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985. We affirm.
During her tenure at Kadoka High School, Hinkle was one of the more active participants in the Kadoka Education Association (KEA). For a time Hinkle was president of this union composed of Kadoka School District teachers. In 1978 she became the KEA's chief negotiator, and hence the union's main representative in collective bargaining negotiations between KEA and the Kadoka School District. Ultimately, on behalf of KEA, Hinkle filed unfair labor practice charges against the school district's board of education and superintendent with the South Dakota Department of Labor. The charges were consolidated and scheduled for a hearing on January 24, 1979. The board of education voted unanimously on January 23, 1979, to dismiss Hinkle. She was notified of the board's action the next day after she returned to school from the unfair labor practice hearing. The board cited as the reason for its action an incident in which it was alleged that Hinkle had used offensive language in a discussion with a student.
The board reached its decision to dismiss Hinkle without giving her prior notice of its intended action; according to the terms of the notice of termination, Hinkle's dismissal was effective upon its delivery. The notice of termination further advised Hinkle that if she so requested a hearing would be provided after which the board would decide whether to "sustain or revoke its original determination to terminate [her] employment." Hinkle did not request a post-termination hearing, however. At trial she testified that she had not done so because she thought that a hearing could not have changed the board's decision. The minutes of the January 23, 1979 board meeting, including the resolution adopted by the board pertaining to Hinkle's dismissal, were published in the Kadoka Press a weekly newspaper of general circulation. In its resolution the board stated that Hinkle "had used language which was improper, indecent and immoral," demonstrating a "flagrant neglect of duty," and that a review of her personnel file "indicated that she had been reprimanded previously for the use of improper language in school."
Hinkle sought recovery under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 on three grounds: (1) that she was dismissed because of her union activities in violation of her First Amendment freedoms of speech and association, (2) that her dismissal without a hearing beforehand worked a deprivation of her property interest in continued employment without procedural due process, and (3) that she had been deprived of liberty to seek and obtain employment through the release of stigmatizing information without her having been afforded procedural due process. In addition to its general verdict the jury found, in response to special interrogatories, that Hinkle was dismissed from her teaching job because of her labor union activities and that she was denied the ability to seek and obtain employment as a result of statements made about her by the defendants.
On appeal the school district contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's determination that Hinkle was dismissed because of union activities and maintains that the offer of a post-termination hearing fulfilled procedural due process requirements, given the exigency of removing from the classroom a teacher who had used offensive language. Accordingly, the school district contends that the district court committed error by refusing to grant its motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial.
The school district's other contentions all pertain only to the trial of Hinkle's procedural due process claims. It is argued that the district court committed error when it (1) directed a verdict in Hinkle's favor on the issue whether she had been deprived of property without due process, (2) excluded proffered opinion testimony dealing with the asserted need for Hinkle's expeditious removal from the classroom, (3) refused to instruct the jury that Hinkle had been afforded due process if, following a hearing involving the same evidence relied upon by the board in its decision, Hinkle would have been dismissed nevertheless, and (4) instructed the jury that with respect to her claim of deprivation of liberty without due process Hinkle had not received a hearing at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner.
While Hinkle sought damages on several grounds, in order to sustain the jury's verdict we need only find that Hinkle is entitled to recover on the basis of one of her claims. See LeSuer Creamery, Inc. v. Haskon, Inc., 660 F.2d 342, 346 & nn. 6-7 (8th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1019, 102 S.Ct. 1716, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982); see also Silverberg v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 710 F.2d 678, 683 (11th Cir.1983); Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1, 15-17 (1st Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983, 100 S.Ct. 2964, 64 L.Ed.2d 839, 449 U.S. 890, 101 S.Ct. 248, 66 L.Ed.2d 116 (1980). The jury specifically found that Hinkle was dismissed for engaging in union activities, and thus if the verdict can be sustained on this ground we may affirm without considering the school district's allegations of error pertaining to the trial of Hinkle's procedural due process claims. See Silverberg, supra, 710 F.2d at 683; LeSuer Creamery, supra, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. W. Anda
...ground, a verdict should be sustained if the plaintiff is entitled to recover on the basis of one of the grounds. See Hinkle v. Christensen, 733 F.2d 74, 76 (8th Cir.1984). In essence, this means that if the plaintiff is entitled to recover on one ground, a court need not consider the other......
-
Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Services
...the jury. necessary element of proof was lacking in connection with one of six alleged misrepresentations); compare Hinkle v. Christensen, 733 F.2d 74, 76 (8th Cir.1984) (contrary rule where jury renders specific findings on submissible Eden's claim that Ryko fraudulently misrepresented its......
-
Martin v. White
...denied, 403 U.S. 931, 91 S.Ct. 2250, 29 L.Ed.2d 709 (1971) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). See, e.g., Hinkle v. Christensen, 733 F.2d 74, 76-77 (8th Cir.1984); Dace v. ACF Industries, Inc., 722 F.2d 374, 375 (1983), supplemented, 728 F.2d 976 (8th Cir.1984); Tribble v. Westingho......
-
Campbell v. Arkansas Dept. of Correction
...the evidence and the law as to his first amendment claim, it is not necessary to discuss his due process claim. 9 See Hinkle v. Christensen, 733 F.2d 74, 76 (8th Cir.1984). B. In support of their alternate request for a new trial appellants contend that the district court abused its discret......