Hinkle v. Neal

• Docket Number: 21-2067
• Decision Date: 13 October 2022
• Citation: 51 F.4th 234
• Parties: James E. HINKLE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ron NEAL, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

51 F.4th 234

James E. HINKLE, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.Ron NEAL, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 21-2067

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued January 13, 2022

Decided October 13, 2022

Russell W. Brown, Jr., Attorney, Region Lawyers, Inc., Merrillville, IN, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Tyler Banks, Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before Hamilton, Brennan, and Jackson-Akiwumi, Circuit Judges.

Brennan, Circuit Judge.

James Hinkle is serving a 42-year prison sentence after an Indiana jury convicted him of sexually molesting his minor nephew, S.B., who testified at trial. On appeal from the denial of his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Hinkle argues his constitutional right to present a complete defense was violated when the state trial court excluded evidence of S.B.'s drug use. Because the Court of Appeals of Indiana did not unreasonably apply federal constitutional law in upholding the exclusion of that evidence, we affirm.

I

In 2004, S.B. was 13 years old and lived with his mother in Michigan. That summer, S.B. visited his extended family in Elkhart, Indiana. On at least one occasion during this trip, S.B.'s uncle, Hinkle, isolated and molested him. Hinkle molested S.B. again during another trip to Indiana the following summer.

As he grew older, S.B. began using illegal drugs. By the time he was 17, he used opiates and marijuana regularly and had experimented with heroin. In 2008, S.B.'s family learned of his drug use and confronted him. Hinkle was not present at this meeting. S.B. admitted he used narcotics and also revealed that Hinkle had molested him. S.B.'s family reported Hinkle to the police.

The State charged Hinkle with child molesting, sexual misconduct with a minor, and being a repeat sexual offender. At a pretrial conference, Hinkle's counsel opposed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of S.B.'s drug use, arguing the evidence was relevant to show S.B.'s motive to fabricate his allegations against Hinkle. The trial court ruled that it would not allow evidence of S.B.'s drug use unless offered to show that it interfered with his ability to recall relevant events, but it invited Hinkle's counsel to raise the issue again during trial.

At trial, S.B. testified that Hinkle had molested him more than once. On cross-examination, Hinkle's counsel raised the issue of S.B.'s drug use in an offer of proof outside the jury's presence. She argued that S.B. had falsely accused Hinkle to avoid facing consequences from his family when they confronted him for using narcotics.

During this offer of proof, S.B. testified that when his family confronted him in 2008, he did not consider it to be "quite an intervention." Instead, he characterized the meeting as "more [of] an open family discussion about [his] drug use. It was just an open discussion." During the meeting, S.B. was informed that a family member would be monitoring him more closely. When asked whether he was told he would be sent to a drug rehabilitation program, S.B. stated that "the option was being explored," but that "it wasn't like you're going, like you're going to rehab, bud." S.B. added that he did not know "[w]here" or "if [he] was going" to a drug rehabilitation program.

The trial court ultimately excluded S.B.'s drug use testimony. The court found "no connection between this family meeting and the establishment of a motive to falsely accuse [Hinkle] of molestation." After the court's ruling, the jury returned and heard impeachment evidence against S.B. This included that he "ha[d] a habit of playing family members against each other," and that he had been "manipulating" his mother and was "really good at lying" to her and his grandmother. S.B. also testified that he had convictions for credit card fraud, auto theft, and retail fraud.

In the State's rebuttal argument during closing, the prosecutor alluded to the challenge S.B. faced by testifying, rhetorically asking why he would put himself through that difficult process:

Do you think S.B. had fun here having every failing pointed out to him? For a man as weak as he's being portrayed, what would have been the easiest thing for him to do? To say it didn't happen .... But instead he's waited all the way up to 2013 to get on the stand and to answer the questions and be open to the humiliation and ridicule, not only of the fact of the felony conviction, but also the fact that he engaged in sex, not just with another man but with his uncle. Do you think that was fun for him? He easily could have avoided all that.

The jury found Hinkle guilty of child molesting and sexual misconduct with a minor. After being advised of his rights, Hinkle then admitted to being a repeat sexual offender. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 42 years.

Following his sentence, Hinkle stayed his direct appeal and pursued post-conviction proceedings in state court under Indiana's Davis-Hatton procedure.¹ His petition for post-conviction relief alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which the trial court denied.

Hinkle appealed the denial of post-conviction relief to the Court of Appeals of Indiana. He raised four issues; the only one before us is whether Hinkle was denied "the fundamental right to due process," and specifically the right to present a complete defense, when the state trial court excluded evidence of S.B.'s drug use. As the federal district court acknowledged, and as Hinkle's counsel stated to us during oral argument, Hinkle's claim was presented to the state appellate court as a violation of Hinkle's right to present a complete defense—not as a Confrontation Clause claim.² Hinkle argued that he was "denied an opportunity to challenge the credibility of S.B.," and that S.B.'s accusations against Hinkle "were made in order to deflect ... disciplinary action by the family; including, placing S.B. in an inpatient, out-of-state drug facility." In support of his argument, Hinkle relied heavily on Hyser v. State , an Indiana appellate decision addressing the constitutional right to present a complete defense. 996 N.E.2d 443 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

The Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed, holding that the state trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of S.B.'s drug use. Hinkle v. State , 97 N.E.3d 654, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). After a lengthy recitation of Hyser , the state appellate court ruled that Hinkle's case was distinguishable. "Hinkle did not present any basis, other than speculation, to support his assumption that S.B. had invented the allegations of molestation against Hinkle," the court reasoned. Id. at 664. Further, Hinkle's theory was "factually misplaced" because S.B. testified that he did not know his family "was considering consequences for his behavior, and, instead, he thought ‘[i]t was just an open ... discussion’ with his family about his use of drugs." Id. (alteration in original).

Hinkle petitioned for transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court. When that was unsuccessful, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. That court denied habeas relief, concluding that the state appellate court had reached the merits of Hinkle's federal constitutional challenge and had not unreasonably applied federal law.

On appeal, Hinkle now argues that the Court of Appeals of Indiana did not address his constitutional challenge, and that in any event, his federal right to present a complete defense was violated by the exclusion of evidence about S.B.'s drug use.

II

A

We begin with the standard of review. The district court's decision denying habeas relief is reviewed de novo. Carter v. Duncan , 819 F.3d 931, 940 (7th Cir. 2016). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), a habeas petition will be denied unless the state court's adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This deferential standard applies only when a state court adjudicates a claim "on the merits." Id.

While a state court must reach the merits of the issue for AEDPA deference to apply, " § 2254(d) does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been ‘adjudicated on the merits.’ " Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 100, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). Instead, "[w]hen a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits." Id. at 99, 131 S.Ct. 770 ; see Johnson v. Williams , 568 U.S. 289, 301, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 185 L.Ed.2d 105 (2013) ("[A] federal habeas court must presume that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits"). This presumption is "strong," but it "can in some limited circumstances be rebutted." Johnson , 568 U.S. at 301, 133 S.Ct. 1088. "When the evidence leads very clearly to the conclusion that a federal claim was inadvertently overlooked in state court, § 2254(d) entitles the prisoner to an unencumbered opportunity to make his case before a federal judge." Id. at 303, 133 S.Ct. 1088. We presume that a state court adjudicated a claim on the merits unless the evidence very clearly shows that "the state court relied wholly on state law grounds for its decision or expressly declined to consider the claim." Minnick v. Winkleski , 15 F.4th 460, 467 (7th Cir. 2021).

The parties agree that Hinkle raised the constitutional right to present a complete defense before the Court of Appeals of Indiana. But Hinkle contends the state appellate court did not decide his federal claim on the merits and advocates that we review the issue de novo. Hinkle does not suggest that the state appellate court expressly declined to consider his constitutional claim; nor could he, as that court took no such position. Instead, Hinkle argues that the state appellate...