Hinkle v. Warden

Decision Date13 May 2021
Docket NumberCAUSE NO. 3:19-CV-577-RLM-MGG
PartiesJAMES E. HINKLE, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
OPINION AND ORDER

James E. Hinkle, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed an amended habeas corpus petition to challenge his conviction for child molestation and sexual misconduct with a minor under Case No. 20D03-812-FB-61. Following a jury trial, on October 22, 2013, the Elkhart Superior Court sentenced him as a repeat sexual offender to forty-two years of incarceration.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In deciding this habeas petition, the court must presume the facts set forth by the state courts are correct unless they are rebutted with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The Court of Appeals of Indiana summarized the evidence presented at trial:

In the summer of 2004, S.B., who lived in Michigan with his mother, visited family in Elkhart County, Indiana. At the time, S.B. was thirteen years old. While S.B. was in Elkhart County for a few weeks, his mother returned to Michigan.
Hinkle is part of S.B.'s extended family in Elkhart County, and S.B. spent some of the nights he was in Elkhart County at Hinkle's residence. On at least one occasion while S.B. was with Hinkle at Hinkle's residence, Hinkle isolated S.B. and performed oral sex on S.B. Hinkle then had S.B. manually stimulate him.
In the summer of 2005, when S.B. was fourteen years old, he again spent some time over the summer at Hinkle's residence. On at least one occasion during that time, Hinkle again isolated S.B. and performed oral sex on him. And Hinkle again had S.B. manually stimulate him.
Over the next few years, S.B. began using illegal drugs. In the summer of 2008, when S.B. was seventeen years old, he used opiates and marijuana on a nearly daily basis. He was also experimenting with other drugs, and he had tried heroin a handful of times. His mother became concerned about changes in S.B.'s behavior, and when he again stayed with his family in Elkhart County that summer, his grandmother suspected drug use. S.B.'s family eventually discovered that S.B. had been using drugs and confronted him. During their discussion, S.B. admitted to his drug use and also revealed that Hinkle had been molesting him.
S.B.'s family reported Hinkle's molestations to local police. On August 13, 2008, S.B. participated in a video-recorded interview at the Child and Family Advocacy Center ("CFAC"). That interview was conducted by a CFAC employee and attended by Elkhart City Police Department Detective Carlton Conway as well as a representative of the Indiana Department of Child Services. A few days after that interview, Detective Conway conducted his own interview with S.B., and he separately interviewed P.B. and S.M., S.B.'s grandmother and uncle, respectively. Those interviews were also video-recorded. Susan Snyder, the deputy prosecuting attorney, conducted a third, unrecorded interview of S.B. in November.

* * *

The morning of trial, the State moved to amend the charging information such that the State charged Hinkle with child molesting, as a Class A felony; sexual misconduct with a minor, as a Class D felony; and for being a repeat sexual offender.

* * *

The jury found Hinkle guilty on the child molesting counts, and he then admitted to being a repeat sexual offender. The trial court entered its judgment of conviction and sentence accordingly

ECF 11-10 at 3-6; Hinkle v. State, 97 N.E.3d 654, 659 (Ind. App. 2018).

Mr. Hinkle contends that the trial court deprived him of the right to present a complete defense by excluding evidence about the victim's motive to fabricate the accusation against him. He also asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief based on claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel.

PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Every habeas corpus inquiry begins with whether the petitioner has exhausted all available remedies in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Lewis v. Sternes, 390 F.3d 1019, 1025 (7th Cir. 2004). To avoid procedural default, a habeas petitioner must fully and fairly present his federal claims to the state courts. Boyko v. Parke, 259 F.3d 781, 788 (7th Cir. 2001). Fair presentment "does not require a hypertechnical congruence between the claims made in the federal and state courts; it merely requires that the factual and legal substance remain the same." Anderson v. Brevik, 471 F.3d 811, 814-15 (7th Cir. 2006). It does, however, require "the petitioner to assert his federal claim through one complete round of state-court review, either on direct appeal of his conviction or in post-conviction proceedings." Lewis v. Sternes, 390 F.3d at 1025. "This means that the petitioner must raise the issue at each and every level in the state court system, including levels at which review is discretionary rather than mandatory." Id. "A habeas petitioner who has exhausted his state courtremedies without properly asserting his federal claim at each level of state court review has procedurally defaulted that claim." Id.

In his petition to transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court, Mr. Hinkle argued that, during post-conviction proceedings, the prosecution should have provided him with the information made available to trial counsel, but he didn't argue that the prosecution violated its obligation to disclose material, exculpatory evidence before his conviction as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). ECF 11-11. This distinction is meaningful because the Supreme Court of the United States has not held that "this disclosure obligation continued after the defendant was convicted and the case was closed." D.A.'s Off. for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68 (2009). Further, "states have no obligation to provide post-conviction relief, which is not part of the criminal proceeding itself and is considered to be civil in nature," Simmons v. Gramley, 915 F.2d 1128, 1137 (7th Cir. 1990), so a claim that he did not receive discovery during post-conviction proceedings is not a basis for habeas relief. Because Mr. Hinkle didn't present a cognizable claim of prosecutorial misconduct to the Indiana Supreme Court, he can't proceed on such a claim on federal habeas review.

Mr. Hinkle presented the claim about the right to present a complete defense to the Court of Appeals of Indiana and the Indiana Supreme Court, so the court will consider this claim. ECF 11-1; ECF 11-11. Before the Indiana Supreme Court, Mr. Hinkle presented only the ineffective assistance claims regarding the lack of objection to the amended charges; the lack of objection to the delayed trial under Ind. Crim R. 4(C); and the lack of a request for an instruction on unanimity. ECF 11-11. Therefore,the court will consider the merits of only these ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Warden argues that the court should review Mr. Hinkle's claim that the trial court violate his right to present a complete defense under the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) instead of conducting a de novo review. If a state court adjudicates a claim on the merits, federal courts may grant habeas relief on that claim only if the petitioner demonstrates that the "decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or a "decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). These standards are "intentionally difficult to meet." Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015). To demonstrate that a state court has unreasonably applied federal law, "a habeas petitioner is required to show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id.

"When no state court has squarely addressed the merits of a habeas claim, however, we review the claim under the pre-AEDPA standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2243, under which we dispose of the matter as law and justice require." Morales v. Johnson, 659 F.3d 588, 599 (7th Cir. 2011) "This is a more generous standard: we review thepetitioner's constitutional claim with deference to the state court, but ultimately de novo." Id. The Court of Appeals of Indiana addressed the exclusion of evidence on the victim's motive to fabricate evidence in the context whether the exclusion was proper under State evidentiary rules, but neither the Court of Appeals of Indiana nor the Indiana Supreme Court addressed Mr. Hinkle's claim in the context of whether it violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense. ECF 11-10; ECF 11-16. At first glance, it appears that the court should review the claim de novo.

Perhaps acknowledging these circumstances, the Warden argues the appellate court's quotation and in-depth discussion of another opinion, Hyser v. State, 996 N.E.2d 443 (Ind. App. 2013), demonstrates that the appellate court considered Mr. Hinkle's constitutional claim on the merits. The Warden notes that Hyser discussed and resolved the constitutional issue of whether the exclusion of evidence violated a criminal defendant's right to present a complete defense. Consequently, this court must determine whether the appellate decision, including the reliance on Hyser, is sufficient to demonstrate that the appellate court considered Mr. Hinkle's constitutional claim on the merits.

"[D]etermining whether a state court decision resulted from an unreasonable legal or factual conclusion does not require that there be an opinion from the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). "Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was...

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