Hinkley v. Baker

• Decision Date: 21 November 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-CV-286-B.,99-CV-286-B.
• Citation: 122 F.Supp.2d 48
• Parties: Angela HINKLEY, Plaintiff, v. Charles BAKER, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

122 F.Supp.2d 48

Angela HINKLEY, Plaintiff, v. Charles BAKER, Defendant.

No. 99-CV-286-B.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

November 21, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Sumner H. Lipman, Lipman & Katz, Augusta, ME, Tracie L. Adamson, Lipman & Katz P.A., Augusta, ME, for Angela Hinkley, plaintiff.

J. William Druary, Jr., Alton C. Stevens, Marden, Dubord, Bernier & Stevens, Waterville, ME, Robert E. Sandy, Sherman & Sandy, Waterville, ME, for Charles Baker, defendant.

ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

SINGAL, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (Docket # 8). Alleging that Defendant sexually molested her while she was a child, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as Maine state law claims for assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. In his Motion to Dismiss, Defendant specifically challenges Counts I, II and IV. For the reasons discussed herein, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED with regard to Count II, and DENIED for all other Counts.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Generally, a court may dismiss a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) only if it clearly appears that, on the facts alleged, the plaintiff cannot recover on any viable theory. See Gonzalez-Morales v. Hernandez-Arencibia, 221 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir.2000). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all of a plaintiff's well-pleaded factual averments and indulge every reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 52 (1st Cir. 1990). Pursuant to this standard, the Court lays out the facts of the case below.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Angela Hinkley, was born on December 27, 1975. In 1981, Hinkley began attending first grade at Shirley Elementary School. Now a resident of Greenville, Maine, she was about five or six years old at the time. Defendant, Charles Baker, was Hinkley's teacher. Baker taught kindergarten through third grade at Shirley Elementary, a two-room schoolhouse.

In her Complaint, Hinkley alleges that between approximately 1982 and 1985, Baker often touched her and other students in a sexually inappropriate manner. Specifically: (1) Baker would hug and squeeze Hinkley while kissing her face and nibbling her ears; (2) Baker would stand behind Hinkley, place his hand inside the front of her shirt, and feel her bare chest; (3) Baker would order Hinkley and other students to rub his back and comb his hair; (4) Baker would take Hinkley to sit on a small bed in the back of the classroom for sick students, and there he would hug her, kiss her ears, and blow in her ears and down her neck; and (5) while sitting on the sick bed, Baker would order Hinkley to stroke his neck and back. In addition, Baker occasionally would take Hinkley sledding. While sledding, Baker would make Hinkley sit between his legs, with her back and buttocks pressed against his groin. When the sled would stop, Baker would roll over on top of Hinkley, and remain laying on top of her for an extended period of time.

A decade and a half later, on December 13, 1999, Hinkley filed her Complaint against Baker, alleging violations of her Due Process rights, actionable under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act (Count I).¹ As well, Hinkley seeks damages through three common law claims: assault (Count II), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count III) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count IV). In addition, Hinkley claims that Baker should be ordered to pay punitive damages (Count V). Baker specifically argues that the Court should dismiss Counts I, II and IV.² The Court now considers those counts.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 (Count I)

Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 — 2000bb-3 creates a cause of action against persons acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage ..." who are responsible for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws ...". 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to state a claim under section 1983, "a plaintiff must allege (1) the violation of a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) that the perpetrator of the violation was acting under color of law." Cruz-Erazo v. Rivera-Montanez, 212 F.3d 617, 621 (1st Cir.2000).

Defendant does not contest the fact that as a schoolteacher, he acted under the color of law. See Doe v. Rains County Independent School Dist., 66 F.3d 1402, 1406-07 (5th Cir.1995) (noting that school-teacher who molested child while at school acted under color of law). Rather, Defendant argues that (1) the alleged conduct is not severe enough to amount to a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights and (2) Defendant should be protected from a section 1983 claim by qualified immunity.

1. Severity of the Conduct

Federal courts have recognized that "the right to be free from sexual abuse at the hands of a public school teacher is clearly protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 506 (6th Cir.1996) (citing Abeyta v. Chama Valley Independent School Dist., 77 F.3d 1253, 1255 (10th Cir.1996); Doe v. Taylor Independent School Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451-52 (5th Cir.1994); Stoneking v. Bradford Area School Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 722 (3rd Cir.1989)). This principle stems from Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.1980), in which the Fourth Circuit held that a teacher corporally punishing a student could amount to a section 1983 claim. See id. at 613. The Hall court based its holding on "the right to be free of state intrusions into realms of personal privacy and bodily security through means so brutal, demeaning, and harmful as literally to shock the conscience of a court." Id.

Relying on Hall, Defendant contends that his behavior was not so brutal, demeaning or harmful as to shock the conscience. After all, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant had sexual intercourse with her, although many section 1983 cases involve teachers having intercourse with their students. See Claiborne, 103 F.3d at 501 (teacher having sexual intercourse with student); Rains, 66 F.3d at 1406-07 (same); Taylor, 15 F.3d at 451-52 (same); Doe v. Manson, No. 99-262-P, 2000 WL 893396 at *1 (D.Me. June 22, 2000) (same). As well, Defendant asserts that because Plaintiff was only a young child at the time of the alleged molestation, her breasts had not yet developed, so touching her chest did not violate her bodily integrity. Finally Defendant makes the argument that all of the alleged conduct could have innocent explanations.

The Court disagrees with Defendant's arguments, even though precedent may not be clear as to what types of sexual misconduct are sufficient to state a claim under section 1983. Although many of the opinions explicitly describe the behavior, many of the opinions use only vague language to characterize the events that occurred. See Stoneking v. Bradford Area School Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 722 (3rd Cir. 1989) (teacher and high school student engaged in "various sexual acts"); Doe v. School Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F.Supp.2d 57, 60-61 (D.Me.1999) (teacher committed "sexual misconduct" and had "sexual relations" with high school students); Wilson v. Webb, 869 F.Supp. 496, 496 (W.D.Ky. 1994) (teacher "sexually harassed and molested" two high school students); Sowers v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 694 F.Supp. 125, 127-28 (W.D.Pa.1988) (teacher "sexually molested," committed "sexual abuse" and did "sexually molest and/or harass" high school students), vacated, Smith v. Sowers, 490 U.S. 1002, 109 S.Ct. 1634, 104 L.Ed.2d 150 (1989). From such opinions, it is impossible to discern exactly what happened that shocked the conscience, because the gravity of the conduct was not in dispute in these cases.

Only a few cases have examined whether the defendant's alleged conduct was sufficient to shock the conscience. In Abeyta, the Tenth Circuit held that it did not amount to sexual abuse actionable under section 1983 when a teacher repeatedly called a twelve-year old girl a "prostitute" in front of the class for a period of several weeks. See id. at 1255-56. In arriving at this conclusion, the court found it significant that there had been no allegations of "sexual assault, molestation, or touching of any sort." Id. at 1255. In Boldthen v. Indep. School Dist. No. 2397, 865 F.Supp. 1330 (D.Minn.1994), the court held that a twelve-year old plaintiff had no section 1983 claim against a school principal for patting her on the back or on the hand, even though the principal knew that the student feared her. See id. at 1334, 1337. Although the plaintiff in that case cited several cases of sexual abuse supporting her section 1983 claim, the plaintiff did not allege that this patting was at all sexual in nature. See id. at 1337.

On the other hand, in Doe v. Beaumont I.S.D., 8 F.Supp.2d 596 (E.D.Tex.1998), the court found that a teacher's alleged touching of the plaintiffs' breasts could constitute sexual abuse that shocked the conscience. See id. at 606-07. In Beaumont, two eleven year-old fourth grade girls complained that one of the schoolteachers would drape his arm over their shoulders, with his hand touching their chest areas. See id. at 602-03. The defendant argued that this type of touching did not rise to the level of sexual abuse that shocked the conscience. See id. at 605. After analyzing the relevant case law, the court stated that it felt uncomfortable "gauging social norms" of whether touching a girl's breasts was shocking. See id. at 607. Denying summary judgment, the court held that it would hear all of the evidence before deciding whether the alleged conduct could or could not rise to a level that shocks the conscience. See id.

The within Plaintiff argues that Defendant's conduct resembles...