Hinman v. Berkman

• Decision Date: 11 August 1949
• Docket Number: No. 715,716.,715
• Citation: 85 F. Supp. 2
• Parties: HINMAN v. BERKMAN et al. (two cases).
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

85 F. Supp. 2

HINMAN v. BERKMAN et al. (two cases).

Nos. 715, 716.

United States District Court W. D. Missouri, Southwestern Division.

August 11, 1949.

Truman B. Rucker, Tulsa, Okla., Sizer & Myres, Monett, Missouri, for plaintiffs.

Stone & Smith, Springfield, Mo., for defendants.

RIDGE, District Judge.

In the above actions plaintiffs seek recovery of actual and punitive damages of defendants for a tort arising out of an automobile collision occurring on a highway in the State of Missouri. Diversity of citizenship between the parties and requisite jurisdictional amount, give this court jurisdiction.

The defendant United Jewish Appeal is a non-profit, charitable corporation, organized under the Membership Corporation Law of the State of New York, McKinney's Consol.Laws, c. 35, § 10 et seq. N.Y.Laws of 1926, Chap. 772. Plaintiffs assert liability here exists against the individual defendant by reason of his own negligence and against the defendant United Jewish Appeal under the doctrine of respondeat superior in causing the collision in question. The corporate defendant has moved to dismiss these actions, as to it, on the ground that under Missouri Case Law a charitable corporation has immunity from tort liability, and the doctrine of respondeat superior cannot be invoked to impose liability on such an institution. Plaintiffs here concede that under the law as existing in the State of Missouri, charitable corporations are exempt from tort liability under certain circumstances, but, they contend that it has never been held in the State of Missouri that such exemption extends to actions as the one at bar. Thus, the proposition is presented as to whether immunity from tort liability afforded charitable corporations under the case law of Missouri extends to actions involving liability to strangers to such corporations, arising out of an automobile collision occurring in that State.

Jurisdiction here being premised on diversity of citizenship, we are, of course, in resolving the above proposition, bound by the law as declared by the highest courts of the State of Missouri. Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487. The question is distinctly local to Missouri, in origin and in content; therefore, the case law of said State, pronounced by way of definitive decision or considered dicta, is to be our guide. Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 8 Cir., 117 F.2d 488.

It is the law of Missouri that where the agent of a foreign corporation, while acting in the course of his employment, commits a tort, the law of the State where the act was done determines whether his corporation is liable for the tort and the extent to which it is liable therefor. Root v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., 195 Mo. 348, 92 S.W.2d 621, 6 L.R.A., N.S., 212; Fogarty v. St. Louis Transfer Co., 180 Mo. 490, 79 S.W. 664, 1 Ann.Cas. 136; Taylor v. Integrity Mut. Cas. Co., 216 Mo.App. 599, 265 S.W. 881; Boneau v. Swift & Co., Mo.App., 66 S.W.2d 172; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 166, Comment (b). Consequently, if the law of Missouri grants immunity to charitable corporations from liability for torts committed against strangers, to such corporations as here considered, the foreign corporate defendant herein may take advantage of the exemption so granted by the laws of that State, though its liability under similar circumstances may be otherwise by the laws of its domicile. Cf. Redfield v. New York Cent. R. Co., 8 Cir., 83 F.2d 62; Taylor v. Integrity Mut. Cas. Co., supra.

The definitive law of Missouri clearly resolves that a charitable corporation is not liable for negligent injury to a beneficiary of a charity. Nicholas v. Evangelical Deaconess Home & Hospital, 281 Mo. 182, 219 S.W. 643; Dille v. St. Luke's Hospital, 355 Mo. 436, 196 S.W.2d 615; Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S.W. 453; Roberts v. Kirksville College of Osteopathy & Surgery, Mo.App., 16 S.W.2d 625; Stedem v. Jewish Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, Mo.App., 187 S.W.2d 469; or for tort liability to injured employees. Eads v. Y. W. C. Ass'n, 325 Mo. 577, 29 S.W.2d 701; Whittaker v. St. Luke's Hospital, 137 Mo.App. 116, 117 S. W. 1189. Although the courts of Missouri have not specifically ruled immunity from liability of charitable institutions for torts, under a state of facts such as here considered, we are of the opinion that the law of that State, as laid down in the above decisions, must be held to intend to and include strangers (i. e. immunity from liability to a person injured who receives no benefit from such institution, or is not employed by it) injured by reason of a tort committed by an employee of that class of corporations, such as would arise in a highway collision.

In Roberts v. Kirksville College of Osteopathy & Surgery, supra, and Whittaker v. St. Luke's Hospital, supra, the...