Hinshaw v. Moore
| Decision Date | 03 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:14CV00024 ACL |
| Parties | ALLEN HINSHAW, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF KEITH MOORE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Plaintiff Allen Hinshaw has filed this action against three law enforcement defendants alleging that they violated his constitutional rights when he was arrested without probable cause on his own real property and incarcerated. Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a state law claim. This case has been assigned to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the Civil Justice Reform Act and is being heard by consent of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Presently pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 18.)
In Count I of his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Sheriff Keith Moore, Deputy Sheriff Michael Borders, and Deputy Gerald Douglas entered into a conspiracy to arrest Plaintiff for the manner in which Plaintiff parked his tractor on his own real property without probable cause in violation of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. In Count II of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Borders violated Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable seizures by arresting Plaintiff without probable cause. In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Douglas conducted a strip search and body cavity search at the Mississippi County Jail in violation of Missouri law.
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because their actions did not violate clearly established constitutional law and they had probable cause to believe Plaintiff committed the offenses of false imprisonment and disturbing the peace. Defendants contend that the strip search of Plaintiff while he was being booked into the Mississippi County Jail did not violate federal or state law.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a district court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the court demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The burden is on the moving party. City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op. Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988). After the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must do more than show that there is some doubt as to the facts. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact is not the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties." State Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 358 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 2004). "Instead, the dispute must be outcome determinative under prevailing law." Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910-11 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). A fact is material when it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The nonmoving party bears the burden of setting forth specific facts showing that there is sufficient evidence in his favor to allow a jury to return a verdict for him. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. "If 'opposing parties tell two different stories,' the court mustreview the record, determine which facts are material and genuinely disputed, and then view those facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party - as long as those facts are not 'so blatantly contradicted by the record . . . that no reasonable jury could believe' them." Reed v. City of St. Charles, Mo, 561 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). Self-serving, conclusory statements without support are not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Armour and Co., Inc. v. Inver Grove Heights, 2 F.3d 276, 279 (8th Cir. 1993).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must review the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of any inferences that logically can be drawn from those facts. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005). The Court may not "weigh the evidence in the summary judgment record, decide credibility questions, or determine the truth of any factual issue." Kampouris v. St. Louis Symphony Soc., 210 F.3d 845, 847 (8th Cir. 2000). The court is required, however, to resolve all conflicts of evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chemical Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 210 (8th Cir. 1976).
The incident that is the subject of Plaintiff's claims stems from a property dispute. The following facts are undisputed:1
Plaintiff Allen Hinshaw owns real estate (hereinafter "the Property") in Mississippi County, Missouri, in Section 5 to the east of the Dorena Hunt Club. See Township Plat, Def'sEx. A. The Property, consisting of approximately 50 acres, was inherited in 1965 and is owned jointly with Hinshaw's brother. The northern edge of the Property is bounded by a levee and further north of the levee is Bryant Farms. The southern edge of the property is bounded by the Mississippi River at the southeast corner, and by property commonly known as the Riley Estate along the remainder of the southern side and much of the western and eastern sides of the property. Bryant Farms also borders the Property on the upper portion of the eastern and western boundaries. West of the Riley estate is the Tomera property, further West of the Tomera property is the Dorena Hunt Club.
There is a pathway from County Road 509 through Hinshaw's property to the Riley estate ("Pathway").2 The Pathway has been in existence since at least 1965. The Pathway was an old turn row, which would allow access to a field. The Pathway came off the old Dorena Ferry Road, which is east of the Riley property and runs north and south. The Pathway runs east and west across the lower part of Section 5 in Mississippi County. Sometime in the early-to-mid 1990s, E.J. Marks or Mike Bryant erected a locked gate where the old Dorena Ferry Road crosses the levee. Nevertheless, prior to October 2012, the Pathway was used by many people to go from the Dorena Ferry Road to the Riley property. For at least twenty years, various third parties used the Pathway to get to the Dorena Hunt Club. People who have farmed and frequented the Dorena Hunt Club had permission to use the Pathway to cross Hinshaw's property. Alvin Marcum and E.J. Marks, who farm the Tomera farm ground, had permission to use the turn row. There was no written agreement concerning the use of the Pathway by any of the relevant landowners.
During the first and second weeks of August 2012, Hinshaw put up a fence on the east part of the turn row to stop people from using it. The fences had been torn down. Hinshaw told Marcum to stop using the turn row and Marcum told Hinshaw that he did not see how Hinshaw could stop Marcum from crossing the property.
Roy Russell, a family friend of Marks and Marcum, had hunted on the Tomera property with the permission of Marcum off and on since the mid-1980s. Russell joined Marks and Marcum when they started the Dorena Hunt Club. The Dorena Hunt Club charges individuals $250 per year to hunt at the Tomera property. Sheriff Moore is allowed to hunt at no cost. Moore used the Pathway to access the hunting club continuously since the early 1990s. Russell had used the Pathway to access the Tomera property since 1965, when he worked for Bryant driving a tractor. Keith Arnold is the son-in-law of Roy Russell. He has hunted the Tomera property for sixteen years with the permission of Marcum, and has used the Pathway to access the property.
On October 20, 2012, Russell, Arnold, and Arnold's fifteen-year-old daughter Dakota went bow hunting on the Tomera property, and went out to hunt at approximately 5:30 a.m. When the group went across the Pathway, there was nothing blocking it. Russell and Arnold knew Hinshaw had revoked permission to use the Pathway at least two weeks prior, when they had an encounter with Hinshaw at a restaurant.
On October 20, 2012, Hinshaw and his employee, Steven Carter, went to Hinshaw's property to clean up limbs. Hinshaw saw tracks across his property and, as a result, he put up barbed wire and posts across the western Pathway along with his tractor across the Pathway with wire on it, and hooked the wire to a tree.
That same day, Russell and the Arnolds finished hunting and were returning at approximately 8:00-8:30 a.m. When they arrived at the Pathway on the Hinshaw property, Hinshaw had a tractor parked across the Pathway and barbed wire running over to a tree and from the front of the tractor to a post. Russell asked Hinshaw if Hinshaw was going to let them pass. Hinshaw responded that they would be trespassing, and told them to go around a tree to their right. Russell declined, stating that he would then be on Hinshaw's property and was not going to trespass. Arnold asked Hinshaw to move his tractor, and Hinshaw did not comply, responding that they would be trespassing. After Hinshaw refused to allow the group passage across the Pathway, Russell called Defendant Sheriff Moore and talked to him about the situation. Moore told Russell to tell Hinshaw to move the tractor or he would be arrested. In response, Hinshaw shrugged his shoulders and said "so."
Moore heard Hinshaw tell Russell he was not going to move the tractor. Moore then contacted Defendant Borders, a deputy sheriff with the Mississippi County Sheriff's Department for over fourteen years, and directed him to go down to the area and see if he could get Hinshaw to move his tractor. Borders contacted Darren Cann, the Prosecuting Attorney of Mississippi County, to...
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