Hinson v. United States
| Decision Date | 09 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:11-cr-122-J-37JBT,Case No.: 3:16-cv-769-J-39JBT |
| Parties | TALF STUART HINSON, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This case is before the Court on Petitioner Talf Stuart Hinson's Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Civ. Doc. 1, § 2255 Motion) and Supporting Memorandum (Civ. Doc. 14, Memorandum).1 Hinson argues that the Court incorrectly sentenced him under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). The United States has responded (Civ. Doc. 21, Response), and Hinson has replied (Civ. Doc. 22, Reply). The parties have also filed supplemental briefs (Civ. Doc. 27, Government's Supplemental Response; Civ. Doc. 29, Hinson's Supplemental Response), which the Court has reviewed along with Hinson's supplemental authorities (Civ. Docs. 15, 25) and the government's notice of expanding the record (Civ. Doc. 28). Thus, the matter is ripe for review.
Proceedings2, the Court has determined that a hearing is not necessary to resolve the merits of this action. See Rosin v. United States, 786 F.3d 873, 877 (11th Cir. 2015) (). For the reasons set forth below, Hinson's § 2255 Motion is due to be denied.
On May 24, 2011, a grand jury indicted Hinson on three counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e). (Crim. Doc. 1, Indictment). Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Hinson pled guilty to the first count in exchange for the United States agreeing to dismiss the second and third counts. (Crim. Doc. 31, Plea Agreement). The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) recommended that Hinson be sentenced as an armed career criminal. PSR at ¶ 29. The PSR identified four prior convictions as ACCA predicates: (1) felonious restraint and breaking-and-entering in North Carolina; (2) assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury ("AWDWISI") in North Carolina3; (3) felonious child abuse and felonious restraint in North Carolina; and (4) aggravated battery with a deadly weapon in Florida. Id. Hinson did not object to the ACCA enhancement. (See Addendum to PSR); (Crim. Doc. 33, Hinson's Sentencing Memorandum); (Civ. Doc. 28-9, Sentencing Transcript at 5-10). The Courtadopted the PSR's sentencing guidelines calculation and sentenced Hinson to the mandatory minimum term of 180 months in prison. Sentencing Transcript at 10, 18.
The Court entered an Amended Judgment on February 8, 2012. (Crim. Doc. 49, Amended Judgment). Hinson did not appeal his conviction or sentence. A little over four years later, Hinson filed the instant § 2255 Motion.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added). Subsection (i) is referred to as the "elements clause," the first nine words of subsection (ii) are referred to as the "enumerated offense" clause, and the rest of subsection (ii), which is emphasized above, is referred to as the "residual clause." Mays v. United States, 817 F.3d 728, 731 (11th Cir. 2016).
In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. 135 S. Ct. at 2557-58, 2563. However, the Supreme Court made clear that the elements clause and the enumerated offense clause remain unaffected. Id.at 2563. Later, in Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016), the Supreme Court held that Johnson applies retroactively on collateral review.
For a prisoner to successfully challenge his ACCA sentence based on Johnson, he must prove "more likely than not" that reliance on the residual clause led the sentencing court to impose the ACCA enhancement. Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1220-22 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, — S. Ct. —, 2019 WL 659904 (Feb. 19, 2019).
Only if the movant would not have been sentenced as an armed career criminal absent the existence of the residual clause is there a Johnson violation. That will be the case only (1) if the sentencing court relied solely on the residual clause, as opposed to also or solely relying on either the enumerated offenses clause or elements clause (neither of which were called into question by Johnson) to qualify a prior conviction as a violent felony, and (2) if there were not at least three other prior convictions that could have qualified under either of those two clauses as a violent felony, or as a serious drug offense.
Id. at 1221. "If it is just as likely that the sentencing court relied on the elements or enumerated offenses clause, solely or as an alternative basis for the enhancement, then the movant has failed to show that his enhancement was due to use of the residual clause." Id. at 1222.
Whether the sentencing court relied on the residual clause is a "historical fact," which is determined by reference to the state of affairs that existed at the time of sentencing. See id. at 1224 n.5. Thus, court decisions rendered afterward holding that an offense does not qualify under the elements clause or the enumerated offense clause "cast[ ] very little light, if any, on th[is] key question of historical fact." Id. A prisoner can prove that the sentencing court relied on the residual clause by pointing to "direct evidence: comments or findings by the sentencing judge indicating that the residual clause was relied on and was essential to application of the ACCA in that case." Id. at 1224 n.4. Alternatively,absent direct evidence, there will "sometimes be sufficient circumstantial evidence to show the specific basis of the enhancement," such as statements in the presentence investigation report (PSR) or concessions by the prosecutor that the elements clause and enumerated offense clause were inapplicable. Id. A prisoner may also circumstantially prove that the ACCA sentence depended on the residual clause "if the law was clear at the time of sentencing that only the residual clause would authorize a finding that the prior conviction was a violent felony." Id. at 1224 n.5 (emphasis added). However, if "'the evidence does not clearly explain what happened ... the party with the burden loses.'" Id. at 1225 (quoting Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Before discussing the merits, the Court addresses the United States' argument that Hinson's § 2255 Motion is untimely. Response at 3. The United States asserts that Hinson's § 2255 Motion is untimely because "Johnson does not affect his sentence or excuse the late filing of his motion." Id. at 4.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), there is a one-year statute of limitations for a federal prisoner to file a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The limitations period runs from the latest of four possible triggering dates. Id. Hinson contends that the motion is timely under § 2255(f)(3). § 2255 Motion at 7. Under § 2255(f)(3), a prisoner may file a motion to vacate within one year of "the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). Hinson contends that the motion is timely because he filed it within one year of the Supreme Court's decision inJohnson, which the Supreme Court held in Welch to be retroactively applicable on collateral review. § 2255 Motion at 7.
The Eleventh Circuit's discussion in Beeman, 871 F.3d at 1219-21, about how to apply the statute of limitations is instructive. In Beeman, the prisoner filed a § 2255 motion raising three arguments:
First, he contended that the Johnson decision invalidated his ACCA sentences because when he was sentenced in 2009 his Georgia conviction for aggravated assault would have qualified as a violent felony under the residual clause of the ACCA. Second, he pointed out that his aggravated assault conviction was not a violent felony under the enumerated offenses clause because assault is not included in that list of crimes. And third, he argued that a conviction under the Georgia aggravated assault statute does not now qualify as a violent felony under the elements clause. In making that argument about the elements clause he relied heavily on the Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013), which is one in a line of Supreme Court decisions describing how federal courts should determine whether an offense qualifies as a predicate offense under the ACCA's enumerated offenses and elements clauses. SeeMathis v. United States, 579 U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016); Descamps, 133 S. Ct. 2276; Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct....
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