Hinterberger v. City of Indianapolis
| Decision Date | 30 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:16-cv-01341-SEB-MJD,1:16-cv-01341-SEB-MJD |
| Parties | LEIF HINTERBERGER, 49-50 LLC, CARREAU DESIGN CORPORATION, 49TH STREET SHOPS LLC, UPTOWN RETAIL LLC, UPTOWN BUSINESS CENTER LLC, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OTHER PENDING MOTIONS (DKTS. 132, 137, 149, 157)
Plaintiffs sued various Defendants, among them the City of Indianapolis ("the City"), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law for alleged harms arising from Plaintiffs' failed real-estate development bid. Now before the Court is the City's motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 132, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, and collateral motions. Dkts. 137 (sanctions), 149 (motion in limine), 157 (same). For the reasons given below, the motion for summary judgment is granted. The motions in limine are denied as moot without further discussion. The City's motion for sanctions is denied without prejudice on the terms described under "Conclusion and Order" below.
Plaintiffs are Leif Hinterberger, an Indianapolis real estate developer, and his companies, whom we refer to collectively as "Hinterberger." (The Clerk has previously entered the default of Defendant Mansur Real Estate Services, and Defendant Charles Cagann ("Cagann") has been dismissed by stipulation.) Much of what follows is taken directly from the City's "Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute," for reasons explained below.
In spring 2005, Hinterberger had modest plans for a small retail development he called "The Uptown" to occupy five plots of land at the northwest corner of the intersection of 49th Street and College Avenue in Indianapolis. Hinterberger closed on the sale of the five plots in April of that year. As initially conceived, Hinterberger had no plans to pursue public financing, funding, or grant money for The Uptown.
At the time, Maury Plambeck ("Plambeck") was serving as the director of the City's Department of Metropolitan Development (DMD). Plambeck expressed excitement about Hinterberger's project and suggested that Hinterberger add apartments. Adding a housing component to the project required Hinterberger to acquire the remaining half of the block. Initially, Hinterberger did not want to add a housing component because in his opinion it did not make financial sense. Plambeck then suggested to Hinterberger that the City could put together a package of public funding taken from various sources to help finance the development.
Hinterberger had never sought public financing before 2005 but he was interested in seeking public financing for The Uptown. Between 2007 and 2011, the City presented public financing options to Hinterberger. The options came with different contingencies outlined in four commitment letters. The City made clear the options were subject to detailed terms and execution of a final definitive project agreement. Hinterberger neversatisfied the contingencies and conditions for receipt of public funds, and thus no final written agreement was ever executed.
Plambeck recommended that Hinterberger work with Cagann, a partner with Mansur Real Estate Services ("Mansur"), who was familiar with development projects that entailed a public financing component. In 2000, the City's Metropolitan Development Commission had contracted with Mansur to oversee another development project in Indianapolis, which was substantially completed by 2004. This was the only contract Mansur ever entered into with the City.
In late 2005, Hinterberger sought out Cagann to ask whether Mansur was interested in partnering with him on The Uptown. At Hinterberger's request, Cagann signed a nondisclosure agreement on behalf of Mansur ("the NDA"). The City was not a signatory to that agreement. The parties to the NDA were only Mansur and one of Hinterberger's companies.
At some point in 2005, Hinterberger began sharing economic modeling information with Cagann and Plambeck related to the 49th Street and College Avenue corridor. By 2007, he had completed his economic modeling, acquired the other half-block of real estate at 49th and College (four additional lots, now nine in total), and rezoned the land to build an expanded project. But by 2008, the real estate market was in serious decline and nearly every developer was feeling those negative effects.
By July 2010, Hinterberger was experiencing financial difficulty. He had defaulted on loans and lenders were looking to short-sell his properties. Hinterberger knew that if he lost control of the properties, there was a good chance the expanded project would notcome to fruition. By December 2010, Hinterberger had sold the four additional lots he had acquired in 2007.
By late 2011 or early 2012, Hinterberger was bankrupt. He lost the original five lots at 49th Street and College Avenue at a sheriff's sale in August 2012. By October 2012, Hinterberger's bankruptcy attorney was threatening the City with litigation. This lawsuit was filed on three-and-a-half years later on May 31, 2016. Dkt. 1.
The complaint charges the following causes of action: Count I, a Section 1983 "Monell claim"; Count II, state-law promissory estoppel; Count III, state-law equitable estoppel ; Count IV, a Section 1983 Equal Protection Clause claim; Count V, a Section 1983 substantive due process claim; Count VI, a Section 1983 procedural due process claim; Count VII, state-law breach of contract; Count VIII, state-law misappropriation of trade secrets; and Count IX, state-law unjust enrichment. These claims are the subjects of the pending summary judgment motion filed by the City.
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine disputes of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A party that does not bear the burden of persuasion may move for summary judgment 'by showing—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.'" Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1167 (7th Cir. 2013) () (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 137, 325 (1986)). If "'the non-movant does not come forward with evidence that wouldreasonably permit the finder of fact to find in h[is] favor on a material question, then the court must enter summary judgment against h[im].'" Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994)).
Under our local rules, a movant's brief "must include a section labeled 'Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute' containing the facts[] that are potentially determinative of the motion[,] and as to which the movant contends there is no genuine issue." S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(a) (internal subdivisions omitted). The nonmovant's brief similarly "must include a section labeled 'Statement of Material Facts in Dispute' that identifies the potentially determinative facts and factual disputes that the party contends demonstrate a dispute of fact precluding summary judgment." S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b). Such statements should contain only material facts, "not . . . mere background facts," and must "state facts, not the party's argument . . . ." S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(a) cmt.; S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b) cmt. "[E]ach fact" asserted in a brief must be supported by a "specif[ic]" citation to the record. S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(e). The court "has no duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically cited" in this manner. Id. The movant's facts "are admitted without controversy" unless the nonmovant "specifically controverts" them in his fact statement; shows them to be unsupported by admissible evidence; or shows that reasonable inferences in his favor can be drawn from them sufficient to preclude summary judgment. S.D. Ind. L.R. 56(f)(1)(A)-(C).
In outline form, this procedure has been well settled for more than thirty years. And for more than thirty years, nonmovants have frequently "'misconceive[d] what is required of them.'" Modrowski, 712 F.3d at 1167 (quoting Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 921).Against even this backdrop, though, Hinterberger's opposition brief stands out as remarkable. It has all the appearance of diligence and competence without a crumb of their substance. It is difficult to overstate how frustrating this is to the Court; how breezily, almost cheerfully deficient; how negligent of the applicable law, not to mention the truth; how unrelentingly at war it is with a "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of this action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. A few observations and examples may help to illustrate the severity of the problem we have faced in our struggle to correctly and justly resolve the issues before us; an exhaustive account is simply beyond us.
The summary judgment record spans nearly 2,000 pages; 1,935, to be precise. There are, thus, a great many "facts." The City's disciplined "Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute" is six pages in length, divided into thirty numbered paragraphs. Out of a forty-four-page brief, Hinterberger's "Material Facts Precluding Summary Judgment" is twenty-one pages long, none of which is responsive to, or shows more than a dim awareness of, the City's fact statement. "There is no attempt to controvert the factual averments set forth in [the City's] own statement[.]" Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 922. It is simply a narrative, one that is exceptionally difficult to follow and woven principally from strands of insinuation and innuendo. This "defeats the whole point" of the fact statement required by Local Rule 56-1(b)—"to identify just what facts are actually in dispute." Bordelon v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2000) (former N.D. Ill. L.R. 12(N)).
Hinterberger's fact statement is divided into nine sections. The sections bear headings such as: "There are disputed issues of fact created by the uncontested facts ofHinterberger's...
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