Hinton ex rel. Hinton v. Monsanto Co.
Decision Date | 14 September 2001 |
Citation | 813 So.2d 827 |
Parties | Travis HINTON, By and Through his mother and next friend, Nona HINTON v. MONSANTO COMPANY. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
M. Shane Luckado, Birmingham; and David D. Shelby and Robert B. Roden of Shelby & Cartee, L.L.C., Birmingham, for plaintiff.
Warren B. Lightfoot, Jere F. White, Adam K. Peck, Harlan I. Prater IV, and William S. Cox III of Lightgfoot, Franklin & White, L.L.C., Birmingham, for defendant.
S. Allen Baker, Jr., and Eric B. Langley of Balch & Bingham, L.L.P., Birmingham, for amici curiae Business Council of Alabama, the Alabama Chemical Association, and the American Chemistry Council.
W. Stancil Starnes and A. Kelley McLeod of Starnes & Atchison, L.L.P., Birmingham, for amicus curiae Medical Association of the State of Alabama.
Forrest S. Latta and Gabrielle Reeves Pringle of Pierce, Ledyard, Latta, Wasden & Bowron, P.C., Mobile; and Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, and Rochelle M. Tedesco of Crowell & Moring, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.
Carol Ann Smith and Joel S. Isenberg of Smith & Ely, L.L.P., Birmingham, for Michael Ignatius Hanna, Jr., M.D., Vishala Chindolore, M.D., Vinton Crawford, M.D., and Jefferson Trupp, M.D., for amicus curiae Group of Anniston Physicians.
D. Frank Davis and Rebecca Williams Block of Burr & Forman, L.L.P., Birmingham, for amici curiae Community Against Pollution and Environmental Working Group.
Donald W. Stewart of Stewart & Smith, P.C., Anniston, for amici curiae 3500 Anniston residents.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Eastern Division, has certified the following question to this Court:
"Does a complaint which does not allege any past or present personal injury to the plaintiff state a cause of action for medical monitoring and study when the plaintiff alleges that he has been exposed to hazardous contamination and pollution by the conduct of the defendant?"
The question presents an issue of first impression in this State. We answer this question in the negative.
This Court has before it only a limited recitation of the facts. We therefore summarize the allegations from the plaintiff's complaint as necessary to address the question certified to us.
The plaintiff, Travis Hinton, by and through his mother and next friend, Nona Hinton, on behalf of himself and a putative class of persons similarly situated, filed an action in the federal district court, asserting that he and others similarly situated have been exposed to polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs"), a known hazardous substance, released into the environment in the Anniston area by the defendant Monsanto Company. Hinton does not allege that he has sustained a physical injury or an illness as a result of his exposure to PCBs; rather, he seeks to recover the costs of medical monitoring he alleges is necessitated by that exposure. He claims that this need for medical monitoring constitutes a harm sustained by him and that this harm is a result of Monsanto's tortious act of releasing PCBs into the environment.
Hinton argues that medical monitoring (or medical surveillance) of the members of the putative class is necessary in order to detect injuries or illnesses that may arise in the future as a result of the exposure of members of the class to PCBs. His complaint purports to state a cause of action under theories of negligence, wantonness, and strict products liability.
The most striking aspect of Hinton's claim is the lack of a present physical injury or illness among the putative class members. Because the class members do not purport to have a present injury or illness, we are asked to determine whether exposure to a hazardous substance, without a present injury attributable to that exposure, gives rise under Alabama law to a cognizable claim for medical monitoring of the class members. As the question is phrased by the United States District Court, we are asked to determine whether Alabama law recognizes a distinct cause of action for medical monitoring in the absence of a manifest physical injury or illness. We answer the question in the negative.
As Monsanto correctly notes, Alabama law has long required a manifest, present injury before a plaintiff may recover in tort. See DeArman v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 786 So.2d 1090 (Ala.2000) ( ); Stringfellow v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 743 So.2d 439 (Ala.1999) (same); Williamson v. Indianapolis Life Ins. Co., 741 So.2d 1057 (Ala. 1999) (same); Ford Motor Co. v. Rice, 726 So.2d 626 (Ala.1998) ( ); Pfizer, Inc. v. Farsian, 682 So.2d 405 (Ala.1996) ( ). We have previously refused to recognize as an "injury" or "damage" under Alabama law, a "concern" that a product "could later" cause a harm. See Farsian, 682 So.2d at 407; see also Rice, 726 So.2d at 629 ().
Noted commentators have agreed with this approach. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring: Should Tort Law Say Yes?, 34 Wake Forest L.Rev. 1057, 1059 (Winter 1999) ("For over two hundred years, one of the fundamental principles of tort law has been that a plaintiff cannot recover without proof of a physical injury.")(citing William L. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts § 54, at 330-33 (4th ed.1971)); W. Page Keeton et al., The Law of Torts § 30, at 165 (5th ed. 1984) () (footnote omitted).
Although we acknowledge that other jurisdictions have recognized medical monitoring as a distinct cause of action or as a remedy under other tort causes of action, even in the absence of a present physical injury, we do not and need not know how such jurisdictions coordinated that recognition with the traditional tort-law requirement of a present injury. Here, the plaintiff has not alleged a present injury. He seeks simply to recover the costs of monitoring his health to detect whether he develops an illness or an injury in the future as a result of his exposure to PCBs. He has not alleged a cause of action under our long-standing tort law, and we find insufficient justification to expand Alabama law in the direction urged by plaintiff.1
Hinton asserts that allowing recovery for the costs of medical monitoring in the absence of a physical manifestation of injury is consistent with Alabama law because, he argues, the costs of all reasonable medical expenses necessarily incurred as a result of a tort are recoverable under Alabama law. He argues that "[t]he fact that there may not be a physical manifestation of injury is of no consequence where there is competent expert testimony that the exposure has significantly increased the risks of contracting a latent disease and [that] more frequent monitoring is medically necessitated because of the exposure." (Hinton's brief to this Court, p. 6). However, our recognizing a cause of action based upon nothing more than an increased risk that an injury or an illness might one day occur would result in the courts of this State deciding cases based upon nothing more than speculation and conjecture.
Hinton's logic appears to be as follows: if enough people are brought into a medical-monitoring program, an illness will eventually be detected and perhaps some of the more serious effects of the illness can be avoided by early detection. This goal is indisputably laudable. The odds are that such a program would benefit some, although not most, of its participants. But what of the ill effects of such an endeavor? How would such a drastic departure from our traditional tort law requiring a manifest, present injury impact the laws of this State? What other areas of the law would also be affected by such a development? What would be the impact upon our statutes of limitation and the legal doctrines that have developed to guide the courts in the application of these statutes?
These are questions upon which we can only speculate at this juncture. To recognize medical monitoring as a distinct cause of action, under the confines presented by this certified question, would require this Court to completely rewrite Alabama's tort-law system, a task akin to traveling in uncharted waters, without the benefit of a seasoned guide. We are unprepared to embark upon such a voyage.
In addition to the flood of legal questions raised by this issue, a "cost-benefit" analysis counsels against recognizing a cause of action for medical monitoring. We recognize, as did the United States Supreme Court in Metro-North Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 117 S.Ct. 2113, 138 L.Ed.2d 560 (1997), that there are "important competing considerations— of a kind that may have led some courts to provide a form of liability" for medical monitoring even in the absence of a manifest injury. Id. at 443, 117 S.Ct. 2113.
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