Hinton v. DEPT. OF PROBATION, PAROLE
Decision Date | 12 January 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 3722.,3722. |
Citation | 592 S.E.2d 335,357 S.C. 327 |
Parties | Jack L. HINTON, Jr., Appellant, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION, PAROLE AND PARDON SERVICES, Respondent. |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
William M. Hagood, III, of Greenville, for Appellant.
Deputy Director for Legal Services Teresa A. Knox, Legal Counsel Tommy Evans and Legal Counsel J. Benjamin Aplin, all of Columbia, for Respondent.
Jack L. Hinton appeals from a declaratory judgment that his out-of-state conviction rendered him ineligible for parole by virtue of South Carolina's subsequent violent offender statute. We reverse.
Since June 17, 1992, Jack L. Hinton has been serving a thirty-year sentence pursuant to a South Carolina kidnapping conviction. Prior to the present conviction, Appellant completed a jail sentence in Ohio for a 1986 conviction for abduction.
Upon Appellant's incarceration, the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC") provided a projected parole eligibility date of February 19, 2000. Based on this projected date, the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services ("the Department") conducted a pre-parole investigation and presented Appellant's case to the Parole Board for a hearing on March 1, 2000. Appellant was denied parole shortly thereafter.
Before a second parole hearing scheduled for April 17, 2002, the Department notified Appellant that he was not eligible to be considered for parole pursuant to South Carolina's subsequent violent offender statute.
For purposes of applying the subsequent violent offender provision of section 24-21-640, should the exclusive list of "violent crimes" in section 16-1-60 be interpreted to implicitly include out-of-state convictions?
The Omnibus Crime Bill of June 3, 1986, enacted section 16-1-60 and amended section 24-21-640 of the South Carolina Code to prohibit the Parole Board from granting parole "to any prisoner serving a sentence for a second or subsequent conviction, following a separate sentencing for a prior conviction, for violent crimes as defined in § 16-1-60." S.C.Code Ann. § 24-21-640 (Supp.2001). Section 16-1-60 codifies which crimes are considered "violent crimes." S.C.Code Ann. § 16-1-60 (Supp.2001). Effective January 1, 1994, the General Assembly amended section 16-1-60 so that each offense's name was parenthetically followed by its South Carolina Code section. The statute was again amended on January 12, 1995, this time adding the statute's final sentence: "Only those offenses specifically enumerated in this section are considered violent offenses." S.C.Code Ann. § 16-1-60 (Supp.2001).
South Carolina has long recognized the principle that penal statutes are to be strictly construed. State v. Germany, 216 S.C. 182, 188, 57 S.E.2d 165, 168 (1949) (); State v. Lewis, 141 S.C. 207, 211, 139 S.E. 386, 389 (1927) (); State v. Dupree, 354 S.C. 676, 693, 583 S.E.2d 437, 446 (Ct.App.2003) (). At the same time, the cardinal rule of statutory construction requires that we endeavor to "ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature." Branch v. City of Myrtle Beach, 340 S.C. 405, 409, 532 S.E.2d 289, 292 (2000); State v. Baucom, 340 S.C. 339, 531 S.E.2d 922 (2000); State v. Morgan, 352 S.C. 359, 365, 574 S.E.2d 203, 206 (Ct.App.2002). A law must be interpreted reasonably and practically, consistent with the purpose and policy of the General Assembly. Abell v. Bell, 229 S.C. 1, 4, 91 S.E.2d 548, 550 (1956); see also Georgia-Carolina Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County of Aiken, 354 S.C. 18, 22, 579 S.E.2d 334, 336 (Ct.App.2003)
().
91 S.E.2d at 550 ().
The legislature's intent should be ascertained primarily from the plain language of the statute. Georgia-Carolina Bail Bonds, 354 S.C. at 23, 579 S.E.2d at 336. Words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction which limits or expands the statute's operation. Rowe v. Hyatt, 321 S.C. 366, 369, 468 S.E.2d 649, 650 (1996); City of Sumter Police Dep't v. One (1) 1992 Blue Mazda Truck, 330 S.C. 371, 375, 498 S.E.2d 894, 898 (Ct.App.1998). When faced with an undefined statutory term, the court must interpret the term in accord with its usual and customary meaning. Morgan, 352 S.C. at 366, 574 S.E.2d at 206; Hudson, 336 S.C. at 246, 519 S.E.2d at 581.
486 S.E.2d at 495. Any ambiguity in a statute should be resolved in favor of a just, equitable, and beneficial operation of the law. City of Sumter Police Dep't, 330 S.C. at 376, 498 S.E.2d at 896.
On two occasions, the question of the applicability of extrajurisdictional criminal convictions to South Carolina law has been reviewed, once by our supreme court and once by this court. The supreme court examined the issue in State v. Breech, 308 S.C. 356, 417 S.E.2d 873 (1992), which involved a defendant charged with unlawfully driving under the influence of alcohol. Specifically, the issue before the court was whether the defendant's prior out-of-state convictions were within the scope of section 56-5-2940, which enhanced the penalty for repeat offenders. The version of section 56-5-2940 in effect when the supreme court decided Breech expounded:
For the purposes of this chapter any conviction ... for the violation of any law or ordinance of this State or any municipality of this State that prohibits any person from operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, drugs, or narcotics shall constitute a prior offense for the purpose of any prosecution for any subsequent violation hereof.
S.C.Code Ann. § 56-5-2940 (1991).
Noting that the rules of statutory construction required that criminal statutes be construed strictly with ambiguities resolved in favor of the defendant, the supreme court determined that the statute did not cover out-of-state convictions because explicit language in the statute limited its coverage to "violation of any law or ordinance of this State or any municipality of this State." Breech, 308 S.C. at 358, 417 S.E.2d at 874 (quoting S.C.Code Ann. § 56-5-2940 (1991)). Effective June 30, 1992, the General Assembly subsequently amended section 56-5-2940 to provide for enhanced...
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