Hinton v. State

Decision Date28 April 2006
Docket NumberCR–04–0940.
Citation172 So.3d 249
PartiesAnthony Ray HINTON v. STATE of Alabama.
CourtAlabama Court of Criminal Appeals

J. Drew Colfax, Bryan A. Stevenson, Cathleen I. Price, Charlotte R. Morrison, and Aaryn M. Urell, Montgomery, for appellant.

Troy King, atty. gen., and Corey L. Maze, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

Opinion

BASCHAB, Judge.

On September 17, 1986, the appellant was convicted of two counts of capital murder for the killings of John Davidson and Thomas Wayne Vason. The murders were made capital because he committed them during the course of a robbery. See § 13A–5–40(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975. By a vote of 10–2, the jury recommended that he be sentenced to death. On December 15, 1986, the trial court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced him to death. We affirmed his convictions and sentences, see Hinton v. State, 548 So.2d 547 (Ala.Crim.App.1988) ; the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences, see Ex parte Hinton, 548 So.2d 562 (Ala.1989) ; and the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari review, see Hinton v. Alabama, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 419, 107 L.Ed.2d 383 (1989). This court issued a certificate of judgment on July 6, 1989.

On August 15, 1990, the appellant filed a Rule 32 petition, challenging his conviction and sentence, which he subsequently amended. After the State responded, the circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition. This appeal followed.

The appellant raises several arguments, including claims that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance during the proceedings. In reviewing the circuit court's rulings on the appellant's arguments, we apply the following principles:

[T]he plain error rule does not apply to Rule 32 proceedings, even if the case involves the death sentence.” Thompson v. State, 615 So.2d 129 (Ala.Cr.App.1992).’ Cade v. State, 629 So.2d 38, 41 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, , 114 S.Ct. 1579, 128 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994).
“In addition, [t]he procedural bars of Rule 32 apply with equal force to all cases, including those in which the death penalty has been imposed.’ State v. Tarver, 629 So.2d 14, 19 (Ala.Crim.App.1993).”

Brownlee v. State, 666 So.2d 91, 93 (Ala.Crim.App.1995).

“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show (1) that his counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that he was prejudiced as a result of the deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
‘The appellant must show that his counsel's performance was unreasonable, considering all of the attendant circumstances.... [A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066.’
Duren v. State, 590 So.2d 360, 362 (Ala.Cr.App.1990), aff'd, 590 So.2d 369 (Ala.1991), cert. denied, , 112 S.Ct. 1594, 118 L.Ed.2d 310 (1992).
“When this court is reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was appropriate and reasonable. Luke v. State, 484 So.2d 531, 534 (Ala.Cr.App.1985). The burden is on the appellant to show that his counsel's conduct was deficient. Luke.
‘Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action “might be considered sound trial strategy.” There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.’
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065–66. (Citations omitted.) Ex parte Lawley, 512 So.2d 1370, 1372 (Ala.1987).
“Initially we must determine whether counsel's performance was deficient. We must evaluate whether the action or inaction of counsel of which the petitioner complains was a strategic choice. ‘Strategic choices made after a thorough investigation of relevant law and facts are virtually unchallengeable....’ Lawley, 512 So.2d at 1372. This court must avoid using ‘hindsight’ to evaluate the performance of counsel. We must evaluate all the circumstances surrounding the case at the time of counsel's actions before determining whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Falkner v. State, 586 So.2d 39 (Ala.Cr.App.1991).”

Hallford v. State, 629 So.2d 6, 8–9 (Ala.Crim.App.1992).

“In determining whether a defendant has established his burden of showing that his counsel was ineffective, we are not required to address both considerations of the Strickland v. Washington test if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one of the prongs. Id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. In fact, the Court explained that [i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.’Id. We defer to this guidance and address the ‘prejudice’ prong, for [w]ith respect to the prejudice component, the lack of merit of [Thomas's] claim is even more stark.’ Id. at 699, 104 S.Ct. at 2070.”

Thomas v. State, 511 So.2d 248, 255 (Ala.Crim.App.1987) (footnote omitted).

“Furthermore, to render effective assistance, an attorney is not required to raise every conceivable constitutional claim available at trial and on appeal. Holladay v. State, 629 So.2d 673 (Ala.Cr.App.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1171, 114 S.Ct. 1208, 127 L.Ed.2d 555 (1994) ; McCoy v. Lynaugh, 874 F.2d 954, 965–66 (5th Cir.1989). Rather, counsel must be given some discretion in determining which claims possibly have merit, and thus a better chance of success, and which claims do not have merit, and thus have little chance of success. Heath v. State, 536 So.2d 142 (Ala.Cr.App.1988) ; Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986) ; Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982).”

Davis v. State, 720 So.2d 1006, 1014 (Ala.Crim.App.1998). Finally,

[t]he purpose of ineffectiveness review is not to grade counsel's performance. See Strickland [v. Washington], 104 S.Ct. [2052] at 2065 [ (1984) ]; see also White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1221 (11th Cir.1992) (We are not interested in grading lawyers' performances; we are interested in whether the adversarial process at trial, in fact, worked adequately.’). We recognize that [r]epresentation is an art, and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another.’ Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2067. Different lawyers have different gifts; this fact, as well as differing circumstances from case to case, means the range of what might be a reasonable approach at trial must be broad. To state the obvious: the trial lawyers, in every case, could have done something more or something different. So, omissions are inevitable. But, the issue is not what is possible or ‘what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.’ Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3126, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987).”

Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir.2000) (footnote omitted).

The following facts, as set forth in this court's opinion on direct appeal, are helpful to an understanding of this case:

“The two robbery-homicides which are the basis for the charges, which were brought under separate indictments, occurred on separate dates. The first robbery-homicide occurred on February 23, 1985, at Mrs. Winner's fried chicken restaurant, located at 737 29th Street, South, in Birmingham. This restaurant is approximately two and one-half blocks from the Red Mountain Expressway. Shortly after midnight on the morning of February 24, 1985, Thomas Elliott, an exterminator, arrived at Mrs. Winner's. Finding the door unlocked, Mr. Elliott entered the restaurant and called out. Mr. Elliott saw a light on in the back of the restaurant and headed toward it. Next to the cooler he found John Davidson, the restaurant's assistant manager, lying in a pool of blood. Mr. Davidson had been shot and was bleeding very badly. Mr. Davidson's false teeth were on the floor of the cooler. Blood was all over the door of the cooler. Mr. Elliott immediately called the 911 emergency number and summoned the Birmingham Police Department, as well as the rescue facilities of the Birmingham Fire Department, to the restaurant.
“After assistance had been summoned, Mr. Davidson got up and started walking around the restaurant, but was unresponsive to Mr. Elliott's presence. Because he was frightened, Mr. Elliott went outside the restaurant to await the arrival of the paramedics. Moments later, the police and paramedics arrived, almost simultaneously. The paramedics administered emergency treatment to Mr. Davidson, then transported him to Medical Center East Hospital.
“While the paramedics were attending Mr. Davidson, the police began their investigation of the incident. In the course of their investigation, the police determined that there was no sign of forced entry into the restaurant. However, the top of the safe was off and the safe was empty. A
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