Hinton v. Upton
| Decision Date | 28 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 5:22-CV-016 |
| Parties | TIMOTHY HINTON, Plaintiff, v. STEVE UPTON, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
This action is before the Court on Defendants Upton, Webb, Jones Williams, Clark, and Strickland's partial motion to dismiss, dkt. no. 13, and Defendant Grieco's motion to dismiss, dkt. no. 14. For the reasons given below, both motions are DENIED.
Plaintiff Timothy Hinton is an inmate at the Coffee Correctional Facility (“CCF”). Dkt. No. 1 at 1. CoreCivic, a private corporation, runs CCF pursuant to a contract with the State of Georgia or the Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDC”). Id. ¶¶ 80-82. CoreCivic employs Defendants Upton, Webb, Jones, Williams Clark, and Strickland (“CoreCivic Defendants”). Id. ¶ 79.
On or about March 24, 2020, another inmate who resided in Plaintiff's housing unit “made threats against Plaintiff's life.” Id. ¶ 14. That inmate was a member of the street gang “Gangster Disciples” and threatened Plaintiff because he allegedly owed a Gangster Disciple leader money. Id. According to the complaint, “[i]t is commonly known in Georgia prisons that a threat by a gang can be carried out by any gang member or even a non-gang member” such that “if a gang puts out word that an inmate is going to be attacked, it is a near-certainty that the inmate will be attacked.” Id. ¶ 46. Later that day, Plaintiff notified his housing unit manager about the threats and formally requested to be placed in protective custody. Id. ¶ 15.
CCF staff moved Plaintiff to protective custody while they investigated the threats. Id. ¶ 16. The CCF classification committee-which included Defendants Upton (CCF Warden) and Jones (CCF Chief of Security)-investigates requests for protective custody and decides whether to grant or deny the requests. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. On or about April 1, 2020, the classification committee verified the threats against Plaintiff, determined there was a substantial risk of serious harm against him, and granted his request for protective custody. Id. ¶¶ 17-18.
The controlling CCF policy (“single-cell policy”) at the time (1) prohibited double-bunking of inmates in protective custody except in emergency situations; (2) required notification of the double-bunking to the Warden or Superintendent during an emergency; (3) required the Warden or Superintendent ask the Regional Director for approval to double-bunk inmates; (4) prohibited any approval of emergency double-bunking from lasting more than 72 hours; and (5) required any double-bunking exceeding 72 hours to be approved in writing by the Director of Field Operations. Id. ¶ 24.
Plaintiff asked Defendant Strickland to place him in a single cell during his protective custody, citing the CCF single-cell policy. Id. ¶ 26. Defendant Strickland refused, referring to an “institutional policy” that CCF did not put protective-custody inmates in single cells. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. Instead, CCF staff placed Plaintiff in a protective-custody cell with inmate Mingo, who was serving a life sentence for murder. Id. ¶ 47.
On subsequent occasions, Plaintiff pleaded with Defendants Strickland, Clark, Jones, Webb, Williams, Upton, and Grieco to move him to a single cell, reminding them of CCF's single-cell policy. Id. ¶¶ 29-44. Defendants all denied Plaintiff's request, and several Defendants again told Plaintiff it was CCF's policy not to place protective-custody inmates in single cells. Id.
While Plaintiff was housed in protective custody, Defendant Grieco, the GDC commissioner's designee, regularly patrolled the area where Plaintiff was housed. Id. ¶ 39. Plaintiff saw Defendant Grieco multiple times and “begged” to be moved to a single cell. Id. ¶ 40. Defendant Grieco did not move Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 44.
On April 9, 2020, Plaintiff saw that Mingo received several “kites,” which are written messages the CCF staff permitted Mingo to receive in the cell he shared with Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 48. On April 10, 2020, Mingo attacked Plaintiff from behind while Plaintiff urinated. Id. ¶¶ 45, 49. CCF staff transported Plaintiff to the local hospital, where he was treated for lacerations to his face and a severe concussion. Id. ¶ 49. After the attack, Defendants Clark and Strickland again tried to force Plaintiff to house with Mingo. Id. ¶ 56. When Plaintiff objected, Defendant Clark responded, “This ain't Burger King; you can't have it your way.” Id. ¶ 56.
Plaintiff filed a pro se suit relating to the attack against Defendants Grieco, Upton, Webb, Jones, Williams, and Clark, among others, alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment rights under Section 1983. Dkt. No. 16 at 9; see also Hinton v. CoreCivic, Inc., et al., No. 5:20-cv-88 (S.D. Ga.). The Court conducted a frivolity review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and authorized an action against Defendants Upton and Grieco. Hinton, No. 5:20-cv-88, ECF 1. Id. After retaining counsel, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the suit, which the Court accepted. See Hinton, No. 5:20-cv-88-LGW-MWC, ECF 19. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this suit, “crafting the complaint anew.” Dkt. No. 16 at 9; see also Dkt. No. 1.
In this suit, Plaintiff alleges (1) a Section 1983 Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Grieco and CoreCivic Defendants for failure to protect, id. ¶¶ 59-78, and (2) a state-law negligence claim against CoreCivic Defendants, id. ¶¶ 79-98.
CoreCivic Defendants filed a motion to dismiss only Plaintiff's state-law negligence claim under Rule 12(a)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 13. Defendant Grieco filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim against him under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and qualified immunity. Dkt. No. 14. The motions are fully briefed, dkt. nos. 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, 22, and thus ripe for review.
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be asserted on facial or factual grounds. Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). Facial challenges are “based solely on the allegations in the complaint,” while factual challenges may refer to extrinsic evidence. Id. In a facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, “the plaintiff is left with safeguards similar to those retained when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is raised.” McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't of Augusta-Richmond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981)). Thus, “[a] ‘facial attack' on the complaint ‘requires the court merely to look and see if the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion.'” Id. (alterations accepted) (quoting Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)); see also Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1279.
To state a claim for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a plaintiff's complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility” when the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In deciding whether a complaint states a claim for relief, the Court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Ray v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 836 F.3d 1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2016). The Court should not accept allegations as true if they merely recite the elements of the claim and declare that they are met; legal conclusions are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
A complaint must “contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001)). Ultimately, if “the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (emphasis added)(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).
CoreCivic Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's state law negligence claim under Rule 12(a)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 13-1. Specifically, CoreCivic Defendants urge the Court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law negligence claim. Id.
In relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) states:
[e]xcept as provided in subsections (b) and (c) . . . the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) permits a district court to “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” in four circumstances, including if “the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,” id. § (c)(1), or if “in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction,” id. § (c)(4). “[W]hile supplemental jurisdiction must be exercised in the...
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