Hinton v. Uvalde Paving Co.
| Decision Date | 26 May 1938 |
| Docket Number | No. 2032.,2032. |
| Citation | 118 S.W.2d 317 |
| Parties | HINTON v. UVALDE PAVING CO. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Kaufman County; Claude M. McCallum, Judge.
Suit for debt and to foreclose a paving lien by the Uvalde Paving Company against Mrs. Eva Hinton, administratrix of the estate of D. H. Mitchell, deceased, wherein a judgment in favor of the plaintiff was certified to the probate court by which the claim was approved as a secured claim on the realty by an order which was subsequently set aside. From an order of the probate court denying it the right to sell the property in satisfaction of its claim, the plaintiff appealed to the district court, and, from a judgment of the district court reversing an order of the probate court and ordering the property sold in satisfaction of the claim, the defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Charles Ashworth, of Kaufman, for appellant.
Bartlett & Bartlett and O. D. Montgomery, all of Dallas, for appellee.
The district court, on an appeal from the probate court, entered an order directing Mrs. Hinton, as administratrix of the estate of her former husband, D. H. Mitchell, deceased, to sell certain real property in the city of Terrell in satisfaction of a paving lien held by the Uvalde Paving Company. Said judgment was ordered certified to the probate court for observance. Said administratrix appealed.
The record discloses that the Uvalde Paving Company sued Mrs. Hinton, as administratrix of said estate, in the district court for debt and to foreclose the paving lien in question. The administratrix attempted to defeat the lien on the ground that the property was exempt as a homestead at the time the lien was attempted to be created. On November 29, 1932, judgment was entered in said suit in favor of the plaintiff therein for its debt with foreclosure of said lien and said judgment was ordered certified to the probate court for observance. This judgment was later affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals at Dallas. See Hinton v. Uvalde Paving Co., 77 S.W.2d 733. On May 27, 1935, after said judgment had been certified to the probate court, the county judge of said court approved the claim as a secured claim on the real estate in question. Thereafter, on June 24, 1935, said probate court set aside its order of date May 27, 1935, found that the property in question was exempt as a homestead and not subject to the lien in question, classified the paving company's claim as a fourth class claim and refused to order the property sold in satisfaction of such claim. Shortly thereafter, on an original application to the Court of Civil Appeals, that court issued a writ of mandamus requiring the probate court to set aside its order of date June 24, 1935, and to reinstate its order of date May 27, 1935. See Uvalde Paving Co. v. Brooks, Tex.Civ.App., 86 S. W.2d 49. Apparently, the probate court did not obey the writ of mandamus. At any rate, the paving company appealed to the district court from the order of the probate court of date June 24, 1935, denying it the right to sell the property in satisfaction of its claim. In the district court the order of the probate court was reversed and the property ordered sold in satisfaction of the lien. It is from this last judgment that the administratrix has appealed.
We think the original judgment in the district court of date November 29, 1932, settled the homestead question and finally determined the paving company's right to subject...
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Highland Park Independent School Dist. v. Thomas
... ... v. Williams, 130 Tex. 572, 112 S.W.2d 709; Britton v. Wilson, Tex.Civ.App., 101 S.W.2d 889; Hinton v. Uvalde Paving Co., Tex.Civ.App., 118 S. W.2d 317, writ refused; Lovejoy v. Cockrell, ... ...
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Mosley v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. of California
...by the court of a previously non-existing lien. It is clear from the court's statements and holding in Heinton v. Uvalde Paving Co., 118 S.W.2d 317 (Tex.Civ.App.--Waco 1938, writ ref'd), that res judicata and collateral estoppel do apply to judgments which adjudicate homestead rights and th......
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Chisholm v. Bewley Mills
...is made that anyone has been prejudiced or inconvenienced by the delay in filing the judgment. Respondent cites Hinton v. Uvalde Paving Co., Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 317 (writ ref.), which is similar in many respects to the present case. The administrator there argued that the claim was bar......
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Chisholm v. Mills, 3290
...counsel to be in constant attendance upon the sessions of the Supreme Court, and is obviously unreasonable. See Hinton v. Uvalde Paving Co., Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 317, writ In the case at bar the certified copy of plaintiff's judgment establishing the claim was filed within 30 days after......