Hintz v. Roberts

• Citation: 121 A. 711
• Decision Date: 18 June 1923
• Docket Number: No. 62.,62.
• Parties: HINTZ v. ROBERTS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)

121 A. 711

HINTZ

v. ROBERTS.

No. 62.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

June 18, 1923.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Action by Theodor J. Hintz against Henry S. Roberts. From the judgment rendered, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

E. A. Merrill, of Newark, for appellant.

Frank G. Turner, of Jersey City, for respondent.

TRENCHARD, J. This is the appeal of the plaintiff below from a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury in his favor for $37.18 at the Union circuit. The case grew out of a collision of automobiles on the Hudson County boulevard, in Jersey City.

According to the plaintiff's case (the defendant offered no evidence) the salient facts are these: The plaintiff, in his automobile, was proceeding west on Bowers street at 10 o'clock at night, intending to turn south on the boulevard. At that point, in the center of the boulevard, and in line with the north line of Bowers street, there was a traffic booth and signal operated by a traffic officer. The plaintiff waited until he received the proper signal, and then came out into the boulevard and turned south. Immediately 'thereafter the defendant, proceeding south on the boulevard at about 20 miles an hour, ran past the traffic officer and the signal set against him, and collided with the rear of the plaintiff's car. In his complaint the plaintiff claimed as damages money paid out by reason of the injuries to his automobile, and also punitive damages, making no claims for personal injuries. The appellant's grounds of appeal, for the most part relate to the measure of damages.

In an action for injury to an automobile (or other personal property) the general rule is that the measure of damages, where no circumstances of aggravation are shown, is the amount which will compensate for all the detriment naturally and proximately caused. This detriment, in the absence of total destruction of the automobile, is the difference in value of the automobile immediately before and immediately after the injury. Hughes v. Wells, 81 N. J. Law 339, 79 Atl. 1035; Graves v. Baltimore, etc., Ry. Co., 76 N. J. Law 362, 69 Atl. 971; Smith v. Public Service Corp., 78 N. J. Law 478, 75 Atl. 937, 20 Ann. Cas. 151.

The first ground of appeal is because the trial judge overuled a question put to plaintiff's expert (a repair man) as follows: "What was your estimate?"

No doubt evidence of the amount paid for repairing the damaged automobile, as well as evidence of the reasonable value of such repairs made necessary by the injury, and required to restore the car substantially to its former condition, was competent as tending to show the difference in value immediately before and immediately after the injury. Hughes v. Wells, 81 N. J. Law 339, 79 Atl. 1035; Graves v. Baltimore, etc., Ry. Co., 76 N. J. Law 362, 69 Atl. 971. But, if the car was rendered, by reason of repairs, more valuable than it was before the injury, then, of course, the full expenditure for repairs should not be at the expense of the defendant. On the other hand, if, by reason of the injury, the automobile was rendered incapable of being made by repairs as valuable as it was immediately before the injury, the plaintiff should not be required to lose this deterioration. Now in the case at bar the amount actually paid for repairs was proved (or admitted by the defendant), at the trial, and the verdict was for that precise amount. And we think where, as here, the plaintiff's expert had testified merely that he had made an estimate of the cost of repairs, without stating upon what repairs he estimated, it was not error requiring reversal for the trial judge to overule the plaintiff's question, "What was your estimate?"

The next point argued is that the trial judge erroneously ruled that evidence respecting loss of use must be definite and legal. Manifestly this ruling was correct. No doubt where, through an injury to an automobile, the plaintiff is temporarily deprived of its use the measure of his damages is the amount of injury to the automobile, together with the value of its use during the time required, by the exercise of proper diligence, to procure its repair. Graves v. Baltimore, etc., Ry. Co., 76 N. J. Law 362, 69 Atl. 971. But where (as here) the plaintiff seeks to show the value of such use by the cost of hiring other cars, the proof of such cost must be definite, and not mere conjecture. So the trial judge rightly ruled.

The next ground of...