Hintze v. Black

• Decision Date: 21 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. 20521,20521
• Citation: 125 Idaho 655,873 P.2d 909
• Parties: Marjorie HINTZE and Bonnie Colyer, Co-Personal Representatives, Appellants-Appellants on Appeal, v. John P. BLACK, Respondent-Respondent on Appeal.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 909

873 P.2d 909

125 Idaho 655

Marjorie HINTZE and Bonnie Colyer, Co-Personal Representatives, Appellants-Appellants on Appeal, v. John P. BLACK, Respondent-Respondent on Appeal.

No. 20521.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

April 21, 1994.

Park & Burkett, Boise, for appellants. W. Anthony Park, argued.

Hall & Friedly, Mountain Home, for respondent. Jay R. Friedly, argued.

LANSING, Judge.

By this appeal we are asked to determine the meaning of a clause in a will which makes a bequest to a legatee "provided he survive distribution thereof to him." Appellants Marjorie Hintze and Bonnie Colyer, personal representatives of the estate, ask this Court to hold that "distribution" means any transfer of estate assets to the legatee during the course of the administration of the estate. The respondent, John Black, asks us to hold that "distribution" requires an order of the court approving the transfer or a final settlement or closing of the estate. We conclude that the interpretation of the will advocated by Black, and adopted by the magistrate below, is correct.

I.

Amy Minsch died on February 2, 1991, in Mountain Home, Idaho. In 1963, while a resident of California, she executed a will prepared by an attorney in that state. ¹ Her will provided:

I give, devise and bequeath all of my estate ... to my husband John Carl Minsch, provided he survive distribution thereof to him, otherwise to my brother, namely, David F. Black, now residing at Santa Monica, California, provided he survive distribution thereof to him, but he failing to survive distribution, then the same shall go and be distributed to his wife, Elsie Black, provided she survive such distribution thereof to her, otherwise to my heirs at law living at the time of my death according to the laws of succession of the State of California then in force.

Of the three beneficiaries specifically named in the will, only Ms. Minsch's brother, David Black, was still living at the time of her death. Bonnie Colyer and Marjorie Hintze filed a petition for informal probate on March 4, 1991, and Letters Testamentary were issued on March 5, 1991, appointing Ms. Colyer and Ms. Hintze as co-personal representatives. ² By the end of April 1991, the personal representatives had transferred the bulk of the estate into David Black's name, ³ reserving a portion of the assets for the payment of estate taxes and administration.

On June 1, 1991, before expiration of the period for presentation of creditors' claims, I.C. § 15-3-803, and before entry of an order of settlement of the estate, David Black died. In September 1991, after paying all taxes and other claims against the estate, the personal representatives of the Minsch estate petitioned for the court's approval of a final settlement and distribution by which the entire Minsch estate would be distributed to the estate of David Black. John Black, a nephew of the testatrix, and an heir at law who would share in the estate if the bequest to David Black failed, filed an objection to the proposed distribution. John Black argued that David Black had failed to survive distribution of the Minsch estate to him, and therefore, in accordance with the terms of the will, the estate should pass to Amy Minsch's surviving heirs under the intestate laws of California.

The magistrate ruled in favor of John Black, reasoning that "distribution" as that term was used in the will, required a final, court-approved distribution or settlement of the estate. The personal representatives appealed to the district court, asserting that "distribution" required only an actual disbursement of the estate assets to the legatee. The district court rejected this argument and affirmed the magistrate's decision.

II.

When reviewing a decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity, we consider the record before the magistrate independently of the district court's determination, while giving due consideration to the district court's conclusions. Nicholls v. Blaser , 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981); Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 194, 765 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Ct.App.1988).

We begin with the proposition that, when interpreting the terms of a will, the intent of the testatrix controls. I.C. § 15-2-603; Dolan v. Johnson, 95 Idaho 385, 388, 509 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1973); Matter of Estate of Berriochoa, 108 Idaho 474, 475, 700 P.2d 96, 97 (Ct.App.1985). If the language of the will is clear and unambiguous, this intent is derived from the will itself. However, if the meaning of a term is ambiguous, the court can look to extrinsic evidence to determine intent. Id. In the absence of extrinsic evidence of intent, the court may apply rules of construction to interpret the instrument. Id. One such rule is that where a term used in a will has a technical, legal meaning, it will be given that technical meaning unless it is inconsistent with the testator's intent as derived from the context of the will. In re Estate of Julian, 227 Ill.App.3d 369, 169 Ill.Dec. 552, 592 N.E.2d 39 (1991); Zauner v. Brewer, 220 Conn. 176, 596 A.2d 388 (1991). In other words, a testatrix is presumed to intend the legal effect of language used in a will, particularly if, as here, the will was drawn by a lawyer. 4 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 30.9 (rev. ed. 1961). Such rules of construction may only be used, however, when the intent of the testatrix is unclear. Allen v. Shea, 105 Idaho 31, 34, 665 P.2d 1041, 1044 (1983).

From the four corners of this will we are unable to discern the testatrix's intent, and no extrinsic evidence on this issue was presented to the magistrate. Therefore, to aid our determination of the testatrix's intent we will apply the rule of construction that a legal term in a will is to be given its technical legal meaning where no contrary intent appears.

The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted a similar clause on only one prior occasion. In Allen, supra, the Supreme Court held that a clause creating a gift over to a contingent beneficiary if the primary beneficiary "dies prior to distribution of my estate," required that the primary beneficiary survive administration and closing of the estate. In that case, the primary beneficiary, the decedent's wife, was also the personal representative of the estate. She had marshalled the estate's assets but had not made any distribution to herself as a beneficiary or filed a closing statement or petition for final settlement and distribution prior to her own death four years after that of the testator. The Supreme Court interpreted the will to make vesting of the wife's interest contingent upon her survival until settlement of the estate following payment of all estate liabilities. Id. at 33, 665 P.2d at 1043.

We find the Allen decision persuasive in deriving the intent of the testatrix in this case. The word "distribution," when used in relation to decedent's estate, is a legal term which refers to a disposition pursuant to a decree of distribution or, if court approval is not required under the laws of the jurisdiction, a final disposition to beneficiaries of the net assets of the estate after satisfaction of estate liabilities. Our Supreme Court clearly so understood the term in rendering its decision in Allen. See also Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Beebe, 67 F.2d 662, 664 (1st Cir.1933) ("to those familiar with probate proceedings 'distribution' has a distinct meaning ... it may be defined as the division by order of a court having authority among those entitled thereto."); State ex rel Dryden v. Thym, 282 S.W.2d 178, 184 (Mo.App.1955) ("the term 'distribution' when applied to the estate of a deceased person refers to the ultimate division of the estate ... among the beneficiaries under a will, after the estate is free from debt.").

We find it particularly significant that when this will was drafted by a California attorney in 1963, the law of that state ascribed this same technical meaning to the word "distribution." In a 1948 decision, In re Hampe's Estate, 85 Cal.App.2d 557, 193 P.2d 133, 135 (1948), the California court stated:

The phrase "die prior to distribution" as used in a will providing that a legacy shall lapse if the legatee "dies prior to distribution" means that if the legatee is not alive on the date of entry of the decree of distribution the legacy lapses.

Similarly, in a 1953 decision the court observed:

It is doubtful that there are in the law and practice of wills and probate administration terms that are more commonly used than 'distribution,' 'partial distribution' and 'distribution of the estate.' Anyone familiar with practices in probate would understand that 'distribution of my estate' means distribution in probate.... If it [the word "distribution"] have any legal technical meaning, it has such meaning with reference to decrees of distribution in probate courts.

In re Rankin's Estate, 118 Cal.App.2d 184, 257 P.2d 95, 97 (1953); See also Matter of Estate of Newman, 230 Cal.App.2d 158, 40 Cal.Rptr. 785, 790 (1964) ("[T]he word 'distribution' as used in the practice of wills, refers to distribution in probate and not to the actual physical distribution of the assets.").

In reviewing the will of Amy Minsch, we find no indication that she intended a meaning different from this legal definition when she used the term "distribution." Accordingly, we conclude that it was the testatrix's intent to create a gift contingent upon David Black's survival of a judicial order of distribution or, if the estate were to be closed informally without court order, a final disbursement by the personal representatives following payment of all estate taxes and liabilities.

In this case the transfers to David Black were made before the statutory period for the presentation of creditors' claims and before estate taxes had been paid. While these preliminary transfers to David Black were permissible, the assets were subject to recoupment by the personal representatives if...