Hiram Drown's Guardian v. George W. Chesley's Estate

• Decision Date: 02 October 1917
• Parties: HIRAM DROWN'S GUARDIAN v. GEORGE W. CHESLEY'S ESTATE
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

102 A. 102

92 Vt. 19

HIRAM DROWN'S GUARDIAN v. GEORGE W. CHESLEY'S ESTATE

Supreme Court of Vermont

October 2, 1917

May Term, 1917.

APPEAL from the disallowance of plaintiff's claim by commissioners upon the defendant estate. Answer, alleging an accord and satisfaction. Reply, a general denial. Trial by jury at the December Term, 1916, Caledonia County, Butler J., presiding. Verdict for plaintiff. Defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.

Judgment affirmed; to be certified to the probate court.

Simonds Searles & Graves for defendant.

James B. Campbell and David E. Porter for plaintiff.

Present WATSON, C. J., HASELTON, POWERS, TAYLOR, and MILES, JJ.

OPINION

TAYLOR

This is an appeal from the disallowance of commissioners on the estate of George W. Chesley, formerly of Sheffield, deceased. Plaintiff is the guardian of one Hiram Drown, who was placed under guardianship after the services involved in this action were rendered. The trial in the county court was by jury and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff. The only exception relied upon was taken by the defendant to the overruling of his motion for a directed verdict.

The principal issues raised by the motion (and the only grounds thereof that are briefed) were: (1) the effect of defendant's evidence introduced in support of his answer of accord and satisfaction, and (2) the sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence to support an implied promise to pay for the ward's services. Plaintiff's reply to defendant's answer of an accord and satisfaction was a general denial concluding to the country. As to the first ground of the motion defendant's claims are thus summarized in his brief: (1) Hiram Drown executed a written contract releasing his entire claim for wages. (2) This contract was never rescinded by the plaintiff, but was affirmed and ratified by him. (3) There was no evidence in the case tending to show any different understanding or agreement.

The evidence tended to show that when Drown was 16 years old he went to live with Mr. and Mrs. Chesley; that his father was dead and his mother poor; that he made his home with the Chesleys for about 18 years; that they furnished his board, clothing and spending money and in other respects treated him as a member of the family, but paid him no wages except as later appears; that while Drown was "mentally below par" he was physically strong and during all the time in question did the work of a hired man, filling a good man's place on a large farm.

Defendant's evidence of an accord and satisfaction tended to show that in April, 1915, some trouble arose between Drown and defendant's intestate; that the latter informed Drown that if he couldn't do "different" he wasn't going to keep him; that there was some talk about pay in which intestate told Drown that he would put $ 200 in the bank for him, if it would be satisfactory, to which Drown assented; that accordingly intestate went to Barton and deposited $ 200 in the bank there to Drown's credit; that at her husband's direction and while he was at Barton to make the deposit, Mrs. Chesley prepared and procured Drown's signature to the following writing, which was introduced in evidence: "April 5, 1915. Settled up to date with G. W. Chesley for all work and put it in Barton bank the sum of two hundred dollars. Hiram N. Drown;" that the writing was read to Drown, who said it was satisfactory, was then signed by him and left with Mrs. Chesley; that on intestate's return he handed Drown the bank deposit book. Defendant's evidence further tended to show that when intestate handed to Drown the bank book he told him he could stay if he would behave himself; that if he stayed he would give him $ 50 to put in the bank "when he went up in January"; that Drown stayed until January 1, 1916, and the $ 50 was deposited to his credit as agreed.

Against defendant's objection that he had shown an accord and satisfaction which could not be impeached under the pleadings and the further objection "to any evidence offered to vary the terms of that receipt," Drown was permitted to testify that Mrs. Chesley showed him the paper and told him that it was a receipt; that he didn't know what it was--couldn't read and write; that she read it to him and as she read it he was to receive $ 200 in Barton bank. In answer to the question, "Now, did she say anything to you about its being in settlement?" he replied, "I didn't understand it that way," and to the question, "Or read anything to you about its being a settlement?" his answer was, "No. " In cross-examination witness said he couldn't tell but that Mrs. Chesley read all there was on the paper; and in answer to the question, "She handed you this paper and you signed it readily and willingly?" he replied, "I went willingly. I thought I was going to get some more money."

Defendant says that the writing signed by Drown was a contract, amounting to a release of any claim for prior services; and that in the absence of fraud or mistake it could not be varied or contradicted by parol evidence. If this position is well taken, his claims to the motion must be sustained. If the writing should be construed as a contract it cannot be varied, controlled or contradicted by extrinsic evidence unless fraud or mistake in its procurement are both alleged and proved. McGregor v. Bugbee, 15 Vt. 734. Here there was no such allegation and plaintiff expressly disavowed any such claim both on the trial below and on the argument in this Court. Defendant relies, in support of the claim that the writing is a contract of settlement and as such is clear and specific, upon Sessions v. Gilbert, Brayt. 75, and Raymond v. Roberts, 2 Aik. 204, 16 Am. Dec. 698, neither of which is any longer authority on the question at bar. Neither case has been expressly overruled, but both have been disregarded and their holdings repudiated. The statement to which the latter case is cited was not necessary to the decision and Judge Prentiss, in a brief concurring opinion, expressed no doubt but that parol testimony may be given to contradict a receipt. In Burnap v. Partridge, 3 Vt. 144, where the rule is laid down that a receipt is only evidence of an acknowledgment and is liable to be contradicted or explained by other testimony, it is said, "This has been repeatedly decided, not only in the courts of this State but elsewhere." See, also, Murdock v. Matthews, Brayt. 100.

Receipts not under seal are held in this State to be always open to explanation, and even to contradiction, by parol evidence. They are not contracts so as to be the exclusive evidence of the intention of the parties. Hitt v. Slocum, 37 Vt. 524; Earle v. Wallingford, 44 Vt. 367; Bennett v. Flanagan, 54 Vt. 549. Nor does the fact that the receipt is written "in full" or "in full settlement" affect the rule. Such receipts are held to have the force of evidence of full payment and satisfaction sufficient to make a prima facie defence to the claim, but as not having the conclusive effect of a written contract. Page v. Perno, 10 Vt. 491; Stephens v. Thompson, 28 Vt. 77; Guyette v. Bolton, 46 Vt. 228; Ashley v. Hendee, 56 Vt. 209. See note to Dodge v. Billings, 2 D. Chip. 26 (Vt. Repts. Ann. Ed.).

A distinction is made in the cases between writings, however formal or informal, that are simply an acknowledgment of payment and receipts that embody an agreement between the parties. The former are regarded as prima facie admissions and not within the meaning of the parol evidence rule; while as to the latter, like other contractual writings, the rule of exclusion intervenes. See 5 Chamb. on Ev. § 3552; Randall v. Kelsey, 46 Vt. 158. The case last cited involved a receipt in full for services as administrator and cash paid out. It was held that the receipt did not preclude other evidence of the purpose for which it was given, as it did not constitute or import a contract as to anything thereafter to be done nor purport to cover any future transaction.

The true test is, does the writing which Drown signed embody a contract, or is it merely a receipt in full for his work? Clearly it falls in the latter class. As said in Randall v. Kelsey, it does not constitute or import a contract as to anything thereafter to be done. It mentions no future transaction. In short it is no more than the recital of a consummated transaction and wants the essentials of a contract. Defendant says that by it Drown impliedly agreed to release his claim for wages. But this no more so than in an ordinary case of a receipt in full settlement; besides it was held in Winn v Chamberlin, 32 Vt. 318, that the character of a receipt was not altered by an express agreement to release the settled claim. This case is full authority for the holding that this writing is a mere receipt and not a contract. See, also, Earle v. Wallingford, Bennett v. Flanagan, and Hitt...